Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 03-1431.

• Decision Date: 15 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-1431.,03-1431.
• Citation: 695 N.W.2d 31
• Parties: Dennis FISCHER, Julie Fischer, James Horn, Judy Horn, Todd Niggeling, Liz Niggeling, Kraig Sankey, Christine Sankey, Shaun Smith, Kari Smith, Mark Stevenson, Lorin Walker and Linda Walker, Appellants, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

695 N.W.2d 31

Dennis FISCHER, Julie Fischer, James Horn, Judy Horn, Todd Niggeling, Liz Niggeling, Kraig Sankey, Christine Sankey, Shaun Smith, Kari Smith, Mark Stevenson, Lorin Walker and Linda Walker, Appellants, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Appellee.

No. 03-1431.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 15, 2005.

Michael P. Schmiedt and Marci L. Iseminger of Crary, Huff, Inkster, Sheehan, Ringgenberg, Hartnett & Storm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellants.

James L. Abshier, City Attorney, Sioux City, for appellee.

WIGGINS, Justice.

The plaintiffs are seven families who reside in the area around the intersection of Sergeant Road and Waldon Avenue in Sioux City, Iowa. On July 2, 1999, an unusually heavy rainstorm resulted in excess surface water running into the intersection. The rainwater from the storm backed up into the families' basements causing damage to their property. The families sued Sioux City alleging the city was negligent in connection with its storm-drainage system. The district court ruled the city was immune from liability under Iowa Code section 670.4(8) (2001). Because we agree with the city that substantial evidence supports the district court's conclusion that the city was immune from liability under section 670.4(8), we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1973, the city constructed the storm-drainage system when much of the drainage basin was undeveloped. As designed, the system utilized a sixty-inch pipe and allowed excess water to run off the intersection on an overland flow route. The families allege subsequent to the installation of the system the city allowed two events to take place contributing to the flooding in 1999.

The first event occurred in 1978 when the city council approved the construction of Southern Hills Mall, located five blocks from the intersection. The families claim the mall and other commercial development spawned by the mall significantly increased the amount of runoff into the drainage area because the city allowed the storm-drainage system in and around the mall area to connect to the 1973 storm-drainage system. The second event occurred when the residential development around the intersection blocked the overland flow route and created a low point in the intersection where water gathered and created a pool of water during a storm event, known as a sag condition. The families claim the city should have precluded the use of certain lots for development so excess water would continue to run off the intersection on the overland flow route. They also claim the city should not have allowed the residential development in the area because the development created the sag condition.

On August 11, 1999, each family filed separate petitions seeking compensation from the city for damages to their personal and real property. The petitions alleged ordinary and gross negligence against the city for its failure to properly design, construct, inspect, and maintain the storm-drainage system serving the drainage area where the families' properties were located; its failure to rebuild or replace the storm-sewer line prior to July 2, 1999; and its failure to require the drainage area in question to be properly graded and swaled so the surface water would run off without causing damage to the families' properties.

The district court consolidated the cases. The cases proceeded to trial in 2001. The district court entered judgment in favor of the families. The city appealed. On appeal, we reversed the district court decision and remanded the case for further proceedings holding the district court abused its discretion by granting the families' motion for partial summary judgment based on issue preclusion.¹ Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Iowa 2002).

Relevant to this appeal, on retrial the district court determined the storm-drainage system as constructed was in accordance with a generally recognized engineering standard in existence in 1973 when the city constructed the system. The district court also determined even after the commercial development, which took place in the 1970s, the city's use of detention ponds to neutralize the effects of the added runoff created by the commercial properties was adequate to handle the additional runoff.² Based on these findings, the district court concluded the city was immune from liability under Iowa Code section 670.4(8), which grants immunity to a city if the city constructed or reconstructed a public improvement or other public facility in accordance with a generally recognized engineering standard, criteria, or design theory in existence at the time of the construction or reconstruction. The families appeal.

II. Issue.

The court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the district court's findings that the city was immune from liability for the families' claims under Iowa Code section 670.4(8).

III. Scope of Review.

Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. The district court's findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App. P. 6.14(6)(a); Molo Oil Co. v. City of Dubuque, 692 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Iowa 2005). When a party argues the district court's ruling is not supported by substantial evidence,

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. When a reasonable mind would accept the evidence as adequate to reach a conclusion, the evidence is substantial. Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding. However, neither the district court's conclusions of law nor its application of its legal conclusions is binding on appeal.

Raper v. State, 688 N.W.2d 29, 36 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted).

IV. Analysis.

The Iowa Code provides a municipality shall be immune from liability for

[a]ny claim based upon or arising out of a claim of negligent design or specification, negligent adoption of design or specification, or negligent construction or reconstruction of a public improvement as defined in section 384.37, subsection 19, or other public facility that was constructed or reconstructed in accordance with a generally recognized engineering or safety standard, criteria, or design theory in existence at the time of the construction or reconstruction. A claim under this chapter shall not be allowed for failure to upgrade, improve, or alter any aspect of an existing public improvement or other public facility to new, changed, or altered design standards. This subsection shall not apply to claims based upon gross negligence.

Iowa Code § 670.4(8). Section 670.4(8) not only provides the city with a state-of-the-art defense with respect to the design and construction of public improvements but also states the finder of fact measures the extent of the city's duty for nonconstitutional torts by the "generally recognized engineering or safety standard, criteria, or design theory" in existence at the time of the construction or reconstruction. Connolly v. Dallas County, 465 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Iowa 1991). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish the city did not construct or reconstruct the improvement "in accordance with a generally recognized engineering or safety standard, criteria, or design theory in existence at the time of the construction or reconstruction." Id. at n. 3.

The families contend substantial evidence does not support the district court's findings that the city constructed the storm-drainage system in accordance with a generally recognized engineering standard in existence at the time the city constructed the system. The families argue that in order for the storm-drainage system to comply with the standards in existence in 1973, the city should have used a sixty-six-inch pipe instead of a sixty-inch pipe in the construction of the system. The families also argue the 1973 standards required an overland flow route protected by a permanent easement, which not only would protect the overland flow route, but also would have prevented a sag condition from developing. The families' expert...