Fisher v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n of Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 17 October 1898
• Docket Number: 479
• Citation: 41 A. 467,188 Pa. 1
• Parties: Elhanan W. Fisher v. The Fidelity Mutual Life Association of Philadelphia, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

41 A. 467

188 Pa. 1

Elhanan W. Fisher v. The Fidelity Mutual Life Association of Philadelphia, Appellant

No. 479

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 17, 1898

Argued April 4, 1898

Appeal, No. 479, Jan. T., 1897, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 3, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1896, No. 1311, on verdict for plaintiff. Affirmed.

Assumpsit on a policy of life insurance. Before McMICHAEL, J.

At the trial plaintiff offered in evidence the portion of the policy attached to his statement.

The offers, objections and rulings of the court were as follows:

Mr Hancock, of counsel for plaintiff: I am offering the policy and it is contained on the front page of this sheet alone.

Objected to on the ground that the statement of claim is entirely different from the policy.

By the Court: I refuse to allow you to prove the face of the policy alone. The whole contract must go in. Exception for plaintiff.

Mr Hancock: I offer in evidence the whole paper, and ask the court to exclude the part marked "Application," and the part marked "Privileges and conditions referred to in this policy," from the consideration of the jury, because they refer to the by-laws of the company, which are not printed in full on the back of this policy, nor are they printed in the application. In connection with that I offer in evidence by-laws of the company, containing some eighteen pages, to show that while they are referred to in the privileges and conditions they are not printed in full.

By the Court: I understand you offer that paper in evidence, and request me to direct the jury not to consider a portion of it. I decline that.

Counsel for plaintiff offers in evidence the by-laws of the company. Objected to. Objection sustained. Exception for plaintiff. [1]

Mr. Hancock calls for the original report of the medical examiner attached to this policy.

By the Court: As to the application, I must assume that it is a correct one until proof is shown that it is not.

Mr. Hancock: I offer in evidence supplementary application, statements made to the medical examiner as supplementary to and part of the application, which contains this clause: "I hereby further declare that I am the identical person described above; that I have read and understood all the above questions put to me by the medical examiner and the answers thereto, and I hereby warrant said answers to be true; and in consideration of the policy applied for by me being in the case of my death made incontestable three years after date of issue, I agree that if, during my lifetime, any statements or answers in this or my original application are alleged to be untrue, and I fail, when called upon, to furnish to said association satisfactory evidence of their truth, the policy of insurance issued upon the faith of such statements or answers shall be ipso facto void, and I agree to surrender said policy upon tender or payment to me of the aggregate premiums paid."

I also offer confidential report of the medical examiner to the association.

I also offer to show, by comparing the application on the back of this policy, that neither the so-called supplementary application nor the medical examiner's report, on the strength of which this policy was issued, is attached to this policy.

Also the by-laws referred to in the policy, and the policy itself; to show by a comparison between the original by-laws of the company and the provisions and conditions contained on the back of the policy that it is not a full copy of the by-laws, and that it is not a correct copy.

Mr. McCullen, of defendant's I object to any offer on the part of the plaintiff until he offers the whole policy in evidence.

By the Court: I will permit you to show that the copy of the application is not a correct one. You have already offered the by-laws, and I understand that you offer the paper which is annexed to it and the application to show that it is not a correct copy. The act of assembly is mandatory upon the insurance company to furnish a correct copy of the application with the policy. I have to decide how much of this paper is evidence. If the copy of the application is a correct copy, the whole of it is evidence. If it is not correct, that portion is not evidence.

Mr. McCullen, for defendant, objects to the offer or admission of any testimony of any character whatever until the counsel for the plaintiff first proves some contract of some character obligating the defendant to pay some amount of money to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff under this offer called Levi G. Faust, president of defendant company, and proved that the by-laws of the association referred to in the condition on the back of the policy are not printed with the conditions.

Plaintiff offered in evidence the whole policy with the indorsement thereon.

Defendant objected because it differed from the instrument declared on.

The offer was admitted. Exception for defendant. [1]

The court charged in part as follows:

As a trial judge, I am of opinion that on proper cause being shown, it would have been the court's duty to compel the plaintiff to produce a full copy of the policy, but that part of the proceedings having passed, and the case having come for trial, [I think the statement is sufficient to go to trial on, and that the plaintiff has a right to come before the court and jury and ask that his case may be proceeded with. Therefore, the case is before you upon it. I am bound to say, in justice to the defendant -- and he may review my decision if I am in error -- that an inspection of the policy shows that all the conditions which are a part of the policy were not set forth in the copy in the statement, as should have been done, but in our advanced stage of legal proceeding, when we look at the substance of things rather than the form -- for, although we have not abandoned those ancient time-honored forms of pleading under which causes under our jury system have been tried for hundreds of years, yet we rather look at substance than form, and whatever may be the views of counsel and however bitterly and zealously they press those views on us, yet we must look, in the administration of justice, at the cause of the parties and not at the methods that counsel employ in bringing suits before us. Therefore, looking at the rights of the parties here, I have reached the conclusion, which I do not mean to say is free from error, that the plaintiff's case is sufficiently set forth to bring it before you for trial.]

The contract on which the plaintiff sues is a policy of insurance, and that paper is before you, and is to be considered by you and by me, for written documents are to be construed by the court as made; that is, where parties of full age make contracts, they make them with the understanding that courts will enforce them as they are made, and if those contracts are made subject to certain conditions, those conditions will be enforced, if they are not opposed to public policy or to good morals. There is no higher policy in the law that I know of, and nothing more in accordance with the proper administration of justice, than that the courts should enforce contracts as they are made by individuals. The rule seems to be common sense as well as law, and one that has been enunciated by one of the greatest masters of jurisprudence that ever sat in any court. I refer to the master of the rolls, Baron JESSEL, of England. Therefore, this case comes before you on the whole policy, and that policy of insurance, among other things, says: "It is understood that if the member, within three years from the date hereof, dies by his own act, whether sane or insane, . . . this policy shall be absolutely void, except as to the moneys paid hereon, which moneys in every such event shall constitute the sum insured in this association under this policy." So that the question of fact in this case for your consideration is, did the decedent, the man on whose life this policy was taken out, Edgar L. Fisher, die by his own hand? It matters not whether he was sane or insane, for when he made the contract in the policy of insurance he provided that if he should die by his own hand only a certain amount should be due. Therefore, the question of fact which you are to determine is, did he die by his own hand, whether he was sane or insane.

To come down to the facts of this case, it is only necessary to refer to that which is in evidence, for you are sworn to decide it on the evidence, and I am sworn to interpret the law as I understand it. What is in evidence in this case is, first of all, the policy itself -- the contract between the parties. Secondly, it is in evidence that Edgar L. Fisher is dead, and that proofs were furnished to the company. Whether satisfactory or unsatisfactory, they were sent to the company. [I may say that when the plaintiff closed his case, he had made out a case against the company, because he showed that the company had agreed to pay a certain amount of money under the contract of insurance on the death of Edgar L. Fisher, and that the premiums were paid, and that Edgar L. Fisher was dead. That made a case against the company, or what we call a prima facie case.]

[Then the duty or burden rested upon the defendant to show that the deceased man, Edgar L. Fisher, died by his own hand, sane or insane. Gentlemen of the jury, the only testimony we have in regard to that burden assumed by them -- I think I may say the only testimony -- is the admission made by the plaintiff Elhanan W. Fisher, when he forwarded the proofs of death. The proofs of death are before you. I cannot instruct you, as a matter of law, that that admission is of itself conclusive evidence that Edgar L. Fisher died by his own hand. The proofs of loss were properly admissible in evidence...