Fisher v. Jordan
| Docket Number | 23-1246 |
| Decision Date | 18 January 2024 |
| Parties | Leslie Fisher, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randall Jordan, Matthew Trafelet, Michigan State Police, Rice, and John Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City. No. 1:17-cv-12504-Thomas L Ludington, District Judge.
ON BRIEF:
James G. Gross, JAMES G. GROSS PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
John Fedynsky, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing Michigan, for Appellees.
Before: MOORE, READLER, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Leslie and Steven Fisher were arrested after officers executed a search warrant and discovered marijuana growing in the Fishers' garage. A state court eventually dismissed all charges against Leslie. She then sued the arresting officers in federal court, claiming that their decision to arrest her violated the federal constitution as well as state law. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers. Because defendants had probable cause to arrest Leslie, we affirm.
Steven and Leslie Fisher, husband and wife, resided in a single-family home they co-owned in Shepherd, Michigan. The property included a detached garage located just a few steps from the house. The Fishers also owned a workshop located down the street from their home.
Michigan state officers suspected that the Fishers' property was being used to grow and possibly sell marijuana. A tipster told Officer Randall Jordan that Steven was growing marijuana at the Fishers' residence and processing the marijuana into THC wax at the Fishers' workshop. The tipster claimed to have seen THC wax inside the shop, providing Jordan with what the officer believed to be an "extremely accurate" description of the wax. Over the ensuing three weeks, officers discovered marijuana stems, wax paper, and what they suspected to be THC wax in trash from the Fishers' residence.
Suspecting illegal drug activity, Jordan obtained a warrant to search the Fishers' house, detached garage, and workshop. Under Officer John Trafelet's command, a team of officers knocked on the Fishers' door and announced their presence. When no one answered, Trafelet ordered forced entry, and the officers began their search. They discovered 29.9 grams of marijuana in Leslie's bedroom, stored in a nightstand and a minifridge. Elsewhere in the residence, officers found marijuana seeds, six firearms (two handguns and four long guns), body armor, jewelry, and nearly $4,000 in cash. In the garage, officers found a trove of items signifying drug production: over 25 pounds of marijuana, 67 marijuana plants, 5 drying racks, 12 growing lights, 10 growing "amps," a digital scale, and other paraphernalia used to grow and process marijuana. And in the workshop down the street, officers discovered an additional six pounds of marijuana and THC wax and equipment used to cultivate the drug and convert it into wax.
As the search was underway, Jordan along with Officer Matthew Rice questioned the Fishers. During those interviews, the couple presented the officers their Michigan Medical Marijuana Cards, meaning the Fishers, collectively, were authorized to possess 24 plants and five ounces (approximately 142 grams) of marijuana. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.26424(a) (2016). Steven admitted that he began the grow operation two years earlier and that his efforts yielded several pounds of marijuana annually, which he stored in the garage. According to the officers, Steven explained that he had tried to sell his marijuana overages but could not find a buyer, a statement Steven later denied.
As for Leslie, she admitted to smoking marijuana grown by Steven. She also admitted that she knew Steven was growing marijuana in their garage. But she denied ever entering the garage during the two-year growing operation. She likewise claimed not to know how much marijuana Steven was growing, nor what he did "at his shop."
The officers had reason to doubt Leslie's story. The Fishers used electronic keypad locks to secure both the house and the garage. And, as explained by Steven, the code to enter the house was the same as the one used for entering the garage. As a result, at the time of the search, the officers believed that Leslie could access the garage. (Six years later, in her deposition testimony, Leslie denied ever knowing that the electronic key codes to the garage and the house were the same.)
The officers eventually decided to arrest Leslie and Steven. The next day, a state prosecutor charged Leslie with four crimes, including possession of processed marijuana with intent to deliver. Jordan signed the criminal complaint as the witness supporting the charges. The Isabella County District Court found probable cause and bound over Leslie to the county Circuit Court. The Circuit Court, however, eventually dismissed the charges, a decision the government did not appeal.
Leslie then filed this federal lawsuit against Jordan, Rice, and Trafelet alleging that her arrest violated federal and state law. Invoking qualified immunity in response to the federal claims-arrest and prosecution without probable cause, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-and governmental immunity as to the state claims-false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution-the officers moved for summary judgment. Concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Leslie, the district court awarded them summary judgment on all claims. Leslie timely appealed.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Jordan v. Howard, 987 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate if there "is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). If the nonmoving party cannot point to evidence demonstrating a material dispute of fact, summary judgment for the moving party is appropriate if the record and law could only support judgment in the moving party's favor. Lemon v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 958 F.3d 417, 418-20 (6th Cir. 2020).
A. Begin with the question of whether qualified immunity shields the officers from Leslie's federal constitutional claims. Overcoming an assertion of qualified immunity requires Leslie to make a two-part showing. One, that defendants violated a federal constitutional right she enjoyed. Two, that the unlawfulness of defendants' conduct was clearly established when the violation occurred. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018). As Leslie's arrest did not violate the Constitution, we can resolve today's case by focusing on the first inquiry alone. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Federal law governing arrests has deep roots, tracing back, in earnest, to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment familiarly protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. An arrest has long been considered a "seizure." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-25 (1991). Taking the constitutional text at its word, then, if Leslie's arrest was "unreasonable," it ran afoul of the Amendment's command. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 56.
How do we go about determining if a warrantless arrest was reasonable? Precedent here is longstanding as well. In a sense, the court's job is straightforward: we evaluate whether there was probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime or was in the process of committing a crime. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). But that task is not always an easy one. For unlike more bright-line legal principles, probable cause is a "fluid concept," one that is "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). At bottom, assessing probable cause depends on an evaluation of the events leading up to the arrest. From that pre-arrest backdrop, we ask whether an objectively reasonable officer would conclude that there is a "probability or substantial chance of criminal activity," thereby justifying an arrest. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57 (citation omitted).
In making that assessment, we operate with the understanding that "[p]robable cause is not a high bar." Id. (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). It requires more than a reasonable suspicion but less than a preponderance of the evidence-and far less than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. McCallister, 39 F.4th 368, 374 (6th Cir. 2022). A "reasonable ground for belief of guilt" is sufficient. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citation omitted). For example, an officer is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect's story or forgo arrest pending further investigation if the initially discovered facts support probable cause. Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988). Nor do officers need proof conclusively showing that the suspect committed the crime. Id. at 262. Likewise, a valid arrest "is not vitiated if the suspect is later found innocent." Id.; see also Manley v. Paramount's Kings Island, 299 Fed.Appx. 524, 530-531 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) ().
Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Leslie is a question of federal law. But because the officers arrested her on suspicion of a state crime, we also consider Michigan law to understand the elements of that offense. See Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2007). All parties...
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