Fisher v. Mayfield

• Citation: 49 Ohio St.3d 275,551 N.E.2d 1271
• Decision Date: 14 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-1764,88-1764
• Parties: , 59 Ed. Law Rep. 496 FISHER, Appellant, v. MAYFIELD et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 275

49 Ohio St.3d 275

551 N.E.2d 1271, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 496

FISHER, Appellant, v. MAYFIELD et al., Appellees.

No. 88-1764.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Nov. 15, 1989.

Decided March 14, 1990.

Appellant, Susan M. Fisher, began working for the Champion Local Board of Education as a learning disability teacher in September 1976. Appellant teaches at Central Elementary School. During November 1985, appellant was asked to coordinate the "flower fund" by a school building representative. The flower fund had been in existence for more than nine years and was being handled by Mrs. Buzzanco, another teacher employed by the Champion School Board. At the time in question, Mrs. Buzzanco's father had died and because appellant had previously handled the fund, appellant was asked to take care of the collections for Mrs. Buzzanco's father. The purpose of this fund was to provide flowers or other expressions of sympathy for the death of a co-worker's close family member, or congratulations upon an employee's marriage or the birth of a child. Contributions to the fund were made by various employees of the Champion School District, including principals, teachers, nurses, librarians and secretaries. The collection procedure was informal, with contributions being on a voluntary and personal basis. The flower fund was not addressed in the master contract between the school board and the Champion Education Association. Lastly, no notices were posted informing employees of collection dates; however, thank you notes and other acknowledgments were posted in the office at Central Elementary.

On November 14, 1985, appellant left her home early to stop at Kaiser Elementary School so that she could collect money towards the contributions for Mrs. Buzzanco's father, and to have co-workers sign the sympathy card. Appellant arrived at Kaiser Elementary at approximately 8:15 a.m. Appellant usually arrives at Central Elementary between 8:40 and 8:50 a.m. Kaiser Elementary School is on the way to Central Elementary from appellant's home. The parties stipulated that the two schools are approximately "one to one-half miles" apart. Appellant was not instructed by anyone from the school board to go to Kaiser, and appellant went there of her own volition. As appellant was leaving the building, she missed a step and fell. The parties agree that appellant's injuries were the result of the fall.

Appellant's claim for workers' compensation benefits was disallowed by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The board of review affirmed that order. The appellee Industrial Commission denied review of appellant's claim. Appellant filed an action in the common pleas court contesting the denial of her appeal by the Industrial Commission. Based upon stipulated facts, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, and denied appellant's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding that appellant was outside the scope and zone of her employment when the injury occurred.

This cause is before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Elliott, Heller & Maas, Richard L. Magill, Steven D. Maas, Youngstown, Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Stewart R. Jaffy, Columbus, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Michael L. Squillace, Columbus, Mark E. Mastrangelo, Willoughby, and Timothy J. Krantz, for appellees James L. Mayfield, Adm'r, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, and Industrial Com'n.

Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Frederick G. Cloppert, Jr., Frederic A. Portman and Charles J. Smith, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae United Auto Workers.

Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A., Dennis Haines, Barry Laine and Ronald E. Slipski, Canton, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Educ. Ass'n.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

The sole issue before this court is whether appellant's injury arose "out of an in the course of her employment," thus bringing the injury within the parameters of R.C. 4123.01(C).

R.C. 4123.01(C) provides in pertinent part: " 'Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. * * * " Ohio's workers' compensation statute, as do those of the vast majority of states, contains the basic coverage formula: "in the course of, and arising out of" employment. A leading scholar in this area of the law, Professor Larson, has noted that "[t]he heart of every compensation act, and the source of most litigation in the compensation field, is the coverage formula. * * * Few groups of statutory words in the history of law have had to bear the weight of such a mountain of interpretation as has been heaped upon this slender foundation. * * * " 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation (1984) 3-1 to 3-3, Section 6.10.

In Bralley v. Daugherty (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 302, 15 O.O.3d 359, 401 N.E.2d 448, this court set forth the general rules applicable to the issue of coverage under the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act, as follows:

"An injury sustained by an employee is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if it was 'received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment.' R.C. 4123.01(C); R.C. 4123.54; Fassig v. State, ex rel. Turner (1917), 95 Ohio St. 232 .

"The test of the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund is not whether there was any fault or neglect on the part of the employer or his employees, but whether a 'causal connection' existed between an employee's injury and his employment either through the activities, the conditions or the environment of the employment. Indus. Comm. v. Weigandt (1921), 102 Ohio St. 1 ; Indus. Comm. v. Gintert (1934), 128 Ohio St. 129 ; Fox v. Schiele (1955), 162 Ohio St. 569 ." Id. 61 Ohio St.2d at 303, 15 O.O.3d at 360, 401 N.E.2d at 449-450.

One year after Bralley, supra, we refined the "arising out of" element by considering the "totality of the circumstances" test for determining whether a causal connection existed between an employee's injury and his employment. In Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 441, 20 O.O.3d 376, 423 N.E.2d 96, we held at the syllabus:

"Whether there is a sufficient 'causal connection' between an employee's injury and his employment to justify the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, including: (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee's presence at the scene of the accident."

We now expressly recognize the conjunctive nature of the coverage formula of "in the course of and arising out of" the employment. Therefore, all elements of the formula must be met before compensation will be allowed.

Traditionally, other jurisdictions have bifurcated the basic coverage formula but have required that both prongs exist. The "in the course of" prong is construed to relate to the time, place and circumstances of the injury, while the "arising out of" prong is interpreted as referring to a causal connection between the employment and the injury. Larson, supra, at 3-3, Section 6.10. See, also, State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1982), 133 Cal.App.3d 643, 652, 184 Cal.Rptr. 111, 116.

Likewise, other jurisdictions have adhered to the principle that each prong of the formula must therefore be satisfied before compensability will be allowed. Maher v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983), 33 Cal.3d 729, 190 Cal.Rptr. 904, 661 P.2d 1058; Malacarne v. Yonkers Parking Auth. (1976), 41 N.Y.2d 189, 391 N.Y.S.2d 402, 359 N.E.2d 992; Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria (Fla.1980), 383 So.2d 623. "This two-pronged requirement is the cornerstone of the workers' compensation system." Maher, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 732-733, 190 Cal.Rptr. at 905-906, 661 P.2d at 1056-1060. In Strother, the Supreme Court of Florida embarked on a well-reasoned analysis as to whether that court had developed inconsistent constructions of the basic coverage formula, stating as follows:

"Although in several decisions, we have referred to the distinct and separate nature of the two elements of 'arising out of' and 'in the course of,' we have also, in other decisions, tended to merge these factors together into a test of work connectedness." Id. at 624-625. The court went on to hold that "to be compensable, an injury must arise out of employment in the sense of causation and be in the course of employment in the sense of continuity of time, space, and circumstances." Id. at 628.

Consistent with our decision and case law from other jurisdictions, we continue to interpret "in the course" to associate with the time, place and circumstances of the injury. The "arising out of" element, as noted earlier, contemplates a causal connection between the injury and the employment. In Lord, supra, we announced three distinct factors to aid in determining whether a sufficient causal relationship existed, based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances.

In Ohio, as well as in other jurisdictions, it is well-established that workers' compensation statutes must be liberally construed in favor of the employee. R.C. 4123.95. Thus, it is axiomatic that the phrase "in the course of, and arising out of" must be accorded a liberal construction. "In applying it [the coverage formula], this court must be guided by the * * * fundamental principle that the requirement is to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits." (Emphasis sic.) Maher, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 733, 190 Cal.Rptr. at 906, 661 P.2d at 1060.

We will now apply the appropriate analysis to the facts of the present case. Appellant was...