Fisher v. Paup
Decision Date | 16 December 1920 |
Docket Number | No. 33605.,33605. |
Citation | 180 N.W. 167,191 Iowa 296 |
Parties | FISHER v. PAUP ET AL. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Shelby County; J. B. Rockafellow, Judge.
Action for damages consequent on alleged breach of covenant of deed resulted in the dismissal of the petition. The plaintiff appeals. Reversed.Edward S. White, of Harlan, for appellant.
Cullison & Cullison, of Harlan, for appellees.
The defendant Frank Paup, his wife joining, executed a warranty deed purporting to convey block 6 in West Park addition to Grand Island, Neb. The consideration recited therein was $500, the date June 16, 1915, and the space for name of grantee was left blank. This conveyance, with $1,600, was the consideration for the transfer to Paup of a house in Harlan belonging to Asa White. J. G. Lewis conducted the negotiations for White, and finally bought the house for $1,600 and had it conveyed to Paup for like consideration and the deed of the blank. Nothing was said concerning the name to be inserted, though it was agreed the place for grantee's name should be left blank. Later Lewis exchanged the block in Nebraska for the share of the plaintiff Sanford J. Fisher in his father's estate, the former paying a difference of $1,100 and delivering the blank deed to Fisher. This was in May, 1916. In the course of two or three weeks Fisher went to examine the land described in the deed and found T. J. Dennon in possession claiming ownership. On June 24, 1918, Fisher by letter authorized his attorney to insert the former's name in the deed as grantee, which was done, and thereafter this action brought. The petition alleged breach of the covenants in the deed for that Paup did not hold the premises by good and perfect title, nor any title whatever, was without lawful authority to sell and convey the same, and that the property described in the deed was that owned by and in possession of another, and it was also asserted that defendants were estopped from questioning the validity of the deed. The answer was a general denial.
[1] Authority to insert the name of grantee in the deed was clearly to be implied according to numerous decisions of this court, as well as of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, and when this was done the conveyance, including covenants, related back to the date of its execution by the grantor. Halvorson v. Mullin, 179 Iowa, 293, 156 N. W. 289, 161 N. W. 309.
[2] The only remaining question is whether Dennon had acquired title by adverse possession. If he had so done at the time of the conveyance, the covenants therein were breached upon delivery. In such a case it is not necessary to allege an ouster of eviction; it is sufficient to negative the words of the covenant and to allege that the grantor had no seizin or title to the land. Brandt v. Foster, 5 Iowa, 287, 294;Mitchell v. Kepler, 75 Iowa, 207, 39 N. W. 241;Foshay v. Shafer, 116 Iowa, 302, 89 N. W. 1106. If, then, Dennon had acquired title to the land by adverse possession, there was a breach of warranty eo instante upon the execution of the deed. The evidence disclosed that Dennon had been in possession and enjoying the use of the block of land described continuously for eighteen years. During that time it has been inclosed by fences separately or with other land of Dennon. He began occupancy by picketing his cows on the block and then caused the rubbish, such as brick, iron, and the like, to be removed and the land broken. He testified:
It appears that there is a highway along the west side of West Park addition, containing this block, that Dennon had title by deed to 94 of the lots in the addition, leased 38 lots of one Welpton, and, in his language:
Other evidence tended to corroborate the above and to prove the market value of the land in controversy. Also section 7564 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska (1913) was introduced in evidence, by which--
“An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”
Numerous decisions of the court of last resort of that state also were introduced, from which it appears that the doctrine of Grube v. Wells, 34 Iowa, 148, does not obtain there, but that a naked claim of...
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