Fisher v. Payne
Decision Date | 23 May 1927 |
Citation | 113 So. 378,93 Fla. 1085 |
Parties | FISHER et al. v. PAYNE et al. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 16, 1927.
Error to Court of Record, Escambia County; C. Moreno Jones, Judge.
Action by Robbie Lee Fisher and husband against W. C. Payne and another for damages. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Actions for libel, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution may have as primary basis written statement, either under oath or otherwise. There are three causes of action which may have as a primary basis for their existence a written statement either under oath or otherwise. They are the action for libel, the action for false imprisonment, and the action for malicious prosecution.
Defamatory words published by parties, counsel, or witnesses in judicial proceeding must be connected with, or relevant or material to, cause or subject of inquiry, to be absolutely privileged no action lies for defamatory words by parties, counsel, or witnesses in due course of judicial proceeding, relevant or pertinent to subject of inquiry, regardless of falsity or malice. In order that defamatory words, published by parties counsel, or witnesses in the due course of a judicial procedure may be absolutely privileged, they must be connected with or relevant or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry. If they be so published and are so relevant or pertinent to the subject of inquiry, no action will lie therefor, however false or malicious they in fact be.
Declaration alleging 'lawful imprisonment' does not state cause of action for false imprisonment. A cause of action for false imprisonment is not alleged where the declaration alleges a lawful imprisonment; that is, an imprisonment authorized by a commitment from a court of competent jurisdiction, regular on its face, and valid as such order.
Declaration for malicious institution of lunacy inquisition held insufficient; victim of malicious institution of lunacy inquisition may sue for malicious prosecution, although result was commitment (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2308). The allegations of the declaration were not sufficient to set forth a cause of action for malicious prosecution. It is generally held that the essential elements of malicious prosecution are, first, that the prosecution complained of has terminated in favor of the plaintiff; second, that it was instituted maliciously; third, that it was brought without probable cause; and, fourth, that it caused him damage. It appears, however, that this rule applies strictly to cases which has as their basis a prior criminal prosecution or a civil action. There is another class of cases in which action will lie for the malicious institution of unfounded proceedings not criminal in their nature nor constituting a civil suit, and this is where proceedings are taken to have a person declared insane and to have such person restrained of his liberty as an insane person. In such cases it appears that the person who is the victim of such proceedings may maintain his action for malicious prosecution, although the result of the inquisition was the commitment of such person to the care and custody of an institution provided for that purpose.
Person maliciously instituting lunacy inquisition is liable in action for malicious prosecution for damages in excess of taxable costs of proceedings (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2308). One who maliciously, and without probable cause, institutes or procures to be instituted against another an inquisition of lunacy is liable to the latter on his discharge, in an action for malicious prosecution, for all damages suffered by him in excess of the taxable costs of such proceeding. It is not alleged in the declaration in the instant case that the defendants, or either of them, instituted the proceedings, or that the proceedings were unfounded and without probable cause.
Commissioners committeemen, and like functionaries, legally required by courts of competent jurisdiction to make examinations and report findings, are privileged as to defamatory words relevant to subject of inquiry. The rule as stated by this court with reference to defamatory words published by parties, counsel, or witnesses in due course of judicial proceedings, we think, must be held to apply to commissioners, committeemen, and other like functionaries who are lawfully required by the courts of competent jurisdiction to examine persons or things and report their findings to such court.
John S. Beard, of Pensacola, for plaintiffs in error.
Watson & Pasco & Brown, of Pensacola, for defendants in error.
The plaintiffs in error filed an amended declaration, which was as follows:
'Wherefore she brings this suit and claims $25,000 damages.
'Second Count.
'For a second count, the plaintiff E. C. Fisher, husband of said Mrs. Robbie Lee Fisher, avers each and every allegation of and in the first count, and further alleges that by reason of said adjudication of insanity of his wife, Mrs. Robbie Lee Fisher, based upon said false, wanton, and malicious report of said committee, and upon which his said wife, Mrs. Robbie Lee Fisher, was adjudged insane, imprisoned, and restrained of her liberty, he was deprived of her assistance, companionship, aid, and comfort, and was put to great trouble, expense, and humiliation.
'Wherefore the plaintiff claims $25,000 damages.'
A demurrer was filed containing six counts. The demurrer was overruled. It may be assumed that the court below construed the declaration to state a cause of action for libel. After the demurrer was overruled, pleas were filed as follows:
'(1) That it is not true that the report of the said committee was false, wanton, and malicious, as alleged.
'(2) For a further plea, the defendants say that the said report of March 12, 1925, in the declaration mentioned, was made jointly by the defendants and C. H. Gonzalez, as members of a committee duly appointed under the laws of Florida by the county judge of Escambia county, Fla., the said committee being required by the order of their appointment to secure the presence...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Andrews v. Florida Parole Com'n
...15. A private person may be required to answer in damages for the common-law tort of false imprisonment, see Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 1093, 113 So. 378, 380 (1927), which is closely related to the tort of false arrest. See Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 171, 19 So.2d 699, 700 (1944)......
-
Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Associates Engineers, Inc.
...295 Ala. 197, 326 So.2d 113 (1976) (negligence); Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 152 Me. 270, 128 A.2d 218 (1956) (negligence); Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) (malicious prosecution); Hurley v. Towne, 155 Me. 433, 156 A.2d 377 (1959) (false imprisonment); Dabkowski v. Davis, 364 Mich......
-
Dirienzo v. US
...person carries no tort liability where the arrest and imprisonment was otherwise privileged or justified by law. Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378, 380 (1927); Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So.2d 699, 799 (1944); see, e.g., Restatement (2d) Torts, § 122-124 (1965); accord Bro......
-
Rushing v. Bosse
...restraining the person's liberty and committing the person to the care and custody of an institution. See Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (Fla.1927); Perez v. Rodriguez, 155 Fla. 501, 20 So.2d 654 (Fla.1945). The person who is the victim of such a proceeding may maintain an actio......
-
Physical torts
...Co. v. Powell , 180 So. 757, 762 (Fla. 1938). 4. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer , 171 So. 214, 218 (Fla. 1936). 5. Fisher v. Payne , 113 So. 378, 380 (Fla. 1927). PHYSICAL TORTS §12:30 Florida Causes of Action 12-10 §12:30.1.1 Elements of Cause of Action — 1st DCA The tort of false imp......