Fisk v. Town of Redding
Decision Date | 19 April 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 37537.,37537. |
Citation | 138 A.3d 410,164 Conn.App. 647 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Gregg FISK v. TOWN OF REDDING, et al. |
A. Reynolds Gordon, with whom was Frank A. DeNicola, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jared Cohane, with whom was Luke R. Conrad, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant BL Companies, Inc.).
ALVORD, KELLER, and SCHALLER, Js.
SCHALLER
, J.
The plaintiff, Gregg Fisk,1 appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant BL Companies, Inc.,2 in his absolute public nuisance action. The plaintiff alleged that he was injured when he fell off a retaining wall that was constructed as part of a municipal construction project for which the defendant was the design contractor. The court rendered summary judgment on the ground that the defendant, as a design contractor, was not a user of the wall and, therefore, as a matter of law could not be liable in public nuisance. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. By substitute complaint, filed on October 7, 2014, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured when he fell off a retaining wall that was constructed with no protective fencing by M. Rondano, Inc. (Rondano), as contractor for the town of Redding (town). The defendant had been hired by the town to design, engineer, inspect and supervise the “Streetscape Project” (project) of which the wall was a part. The complaint alleged in separate counts against the town, Rondano, and the defendant that the wall was constructed on public land and constituted a public nuisance. In its answer, the defendant denied, inter alia, that it was required to supervise the project, that it was responsible for site safety, and that it had control over the retaining wall.
On September 17, 2014, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that it could not, as a matter of law, be deemed to have been in control of the project and therefore could not be liable under a nuisance theory. In support of the motion, the defendant filed a memorandum of law outlining its legal claims, and attached an affidavit of Derek A. Kohl, a principal of the defendant; portions of an agreement between the defendant and the town;3 a construction report; specifications for roads, bridges and incidental construction by the Department of Transportation (department) dated January, 2010; a letter dated July 5, 2011, from the defendant on behalf of the town to the department; a document entitled scope of services; and several Superior Court cases. Kohl's affidavit averred that the defendant was the architect for the project and was primarily responsible for architectural and engineering services and did not install, perform or put into motion any physical act upon the wall. He further averred that the defendant did not have the ability to control the contractor or the construction site, or to advise as to site safety; those responsibilities were allocated to the contractor during the construction until the responsibilities reverted to the town.4 The agreement specifies that the contractor will maintain the construction area throughout the duration of the project.
The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on September 26, 2014. He argued in the alternative that each defendant had control of the project, that design engineers can be liable in public nuisance for defective or dangerous construction that they create by their design, that the defendant had control over the project until it was completed in 2012, and that the project was not even substantially completed until October, 2011, after the plaintiff's fall. In support of these contentions, the plaintiff filed a certificate of compliance from the department dated October 25, 2011; a certificate of acceptance of work dated January 18, 2012; sections of the department's bridge design manual; the defendant's meeting minutes from June 16, 2011; further portions of the agreement between the town and the defendant; a department consultant administration and project development manual; an April 6, 2010 letter from the defendant regarding the status of the project; an excerpt from the deposition of Natalie Ketcham;5 a department project manual for the project with the defendant's copyright notification; a department construction manual; the defendant's meeting minutes dated October 4, 2011; the affidavit of Brandon Smith; the affidavit of Skylar Smith with attached photographs of the wall; and a document entitled “Fielding deposition.”
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a memorandum of decision on December 5, 2014.6 Citing State v. Tippetts–Abbett–McCarthy–Stratton, 204 Conn. 177, 527 A.2d 688 (1987)
( Tippetts ), it concluded that the plaintiff could not establish that the defendant was a user of the property in question when the plaintiff sustained injury. It noted that the plaintiff had failed to assert claims of professional negligence against the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue on December 23, 2014, which the court denied on January 5, 2015.7 The plaintiff argued that the court was incorrect in concluding that the defendant did not design the wall. The plaintiff subsequently appealed to this court.
We apply a well settled standard of review to the plaintiff's claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chirieleison v. Lucas, 144 Conn.App. 430, 437–38, 72 A.3d 1218 (2013)
.
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded the defendant did not design the wall, had no control over the wall, and no longer controlled the wall when the fall occurred. The defendant responds that neither the issue of whether the defendant actually designed the wall nor whether the defendant's role in the design of the wall had ceased is material to the question of whether the defendant had control of the wall for purposes of nuisance liability. It asserts that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant controlled the wall, and, therefore, the court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. We agree with the defendant.
(Citation omitted.) Quinnett v. Newman, 213 Conn. 343, 348, 568 A.2d 786 (1990)
, overruled on other grounds by Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 329, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). Our Supreme Court set out the standard for public nuisance liability in Connecticut in Tippetts, supra, 204 Conn. at 183, 527 A.2d 688 : (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) “If the creator of the condition intends the act that brings about the condition found to be a nuisance, the nuisance thereby created is said to be absolute and its creator is strictly liable.” Quinnett v. Newman, supra, at 348, 568 A.2d 786.
In Tippetts, our Supreme Court applied the requirement implicit in the phrase “the use of the land” in the third factor that the defendant be a user of the property. See Tippetts, supra, 204 Conn. at 183–84, 527 A.2d 688
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