Fitchette v. Sumter Hardwood Co
Decision Date | 12 April 1928 |
Docket Number | (No. 12427.) |
Citation | 142 S.E. 828 |
Parties | FITCHETTE et al. v. SUMTER HARDWOOD CO. et al. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Sumter County; John S. Wilson, Judge.
Action by George P. Fitchette and another. Individually and as George P. Fitchette & Son, against the Sumter Hardwood Company and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Lee & Moise, of Sumter, for appellants.
Epps & Levy and Harby, Nash & Hodges, all of Sumter, for respondents.
This is an action for damages on account of an alleged libelous letter written by C. F. Korn, president of Sumter Hardwood Company, to J. C. Bruton, of Columbia, S. C, under date of February 23, 1924; a copy of the letter being sent to W. A. Clark, of Columbia, S. C.
The plaintiffs are partners engaged in the logging business. In 1921 they entered into a contract with Sumter Hardwood Company, for the logging of certain timber, which contract continued in effect, with minor changes, until December, 1923. At the time of its expiration the Fitchettes were indebted to the company, and the company agreed to take over in the settlement certain equipment and supplies belonging to them, but a disagreement arose between the parties as to the value to be placed upon these articles and as to certain items of charge and credit. This controversy resulted in a lawsuit, instituted by the company, wherein the Fitchettes set up certain counterclaims, and which was still pending at the time of the trial of the present suit.
Early in the year 1924 the Fitchettes entered into negotiations looking to the purchase and logging of certain timber in Richland county, known as the Segars timber, which was under contract of sale to J. C. Bruton of Columbia, S. C., subject to certain incumbrances. Bruton had previously made a contract with Sumter Hardwood Company to sell it certain of the output of logs from the Segars timber at the price of $14 per thousand feet. Bruton was indebted to the Carolina National Bank, which held a mortgage of the timber, and also to W. A. Clark, then chairman of the board of directors, and formerly president, of the bank. For financial reasons Bruton was unable to perform his Segars contract, and his negotiations with the Fitchettes followed. In order that the proposed sale to the Fitchettes might be consummated, satisfactory arrangements with the parties having an interest in the Segars timber were sought to be made, and on February 4, 1924, Clark wrote to the Hardwood Company, advising that in his opinion Bruton was utterly unable to execute the Segars contract, but that Bruton thought he could Interest another party in the purchase of the timber included in the company's contract, and so render the standing timber on the Segars tract available, and inquiring whether the company would be willing to cancel its contract with Bruton, so as to allow him to contract with the other party. About ten letters on the sub-ject were exchanged between the company and Clark.
On February 12, the company, through Korn, its president, wrote Clark as follows:
"If we can enter into some arrangement whereby we can be sure of obtaining a million feet or more of this class of raw material for our Sumter mill, we believe we would be willing to give our consent to letting other parties operate this timber."
On February 13, Clark wrote Korn, advising that he had prepared a form of contract to be executed by Bruton and the parties with whom he wished to contract for the sale of the timber, and inclosed a copy of a section of the contract providing that the "party of the second part" should sell and deliver to Bruton, or such other person as he might name, 1, 000, 000 feet of logs at the current price, etc.
In a letter dated February 16, the company, through Korn, wrote Clark as follows:
By a contract dated February 14, Bruton attempted to sell the Segars timber to the Fitchettes, the contract containing the provision that the Fitchettes should sell and deliver to Bruton, or such other person as he might name, 1, 000, 000 feet of the logs at the current price at the date of sale and shipment. On February 19, Clark wrote a letter to the company, detailing the circumstances relied upon as showing Bruton's inability to deliver Segars timber to the company in accordance with his contract, and advising, at least by inference, that Bruton had made a contract of sale of the timber, adding:
"Under all the circumstances, I believe that your interest has been conserved and protected, and I trust that it will meet with your approval."
On February 20, the company, through Korn, wrote Clark as follows:
On the same day, the company, through Korn, wrote to Bruton as follows:
In a letter dated February 21, Bruton wrote the company as follows:
On February 23, the company, through Korn, wrote to Bruton the alleged libelous letter, sending a copy thereof to Clark. This letter is as follows:
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that this letter was written in malice, and that it— "imputed to the plaintiffs generally, and in their particular business, dishonest and fraudulent practice, motive, and intention, and a want of integrity; sought to bring them, and the manner in which they conducted their business, into disrepute; sought to destroy their reputation for integrity and fair dealing; sought to impair confidence in their character and ability in the conduct of their particular business; and all of which was calculated and intended to injure the credit of the plaintiffs, and was particularly injurious and hurtful to the reputation, character, and standing of plaintiffs as loggers, purchasers, and handlers of timber; and sought to injure the plaintiffs and defeat them in their purchase of said timber."
The defendants by their answer set up several defenses, which are thus summarized by their counsel:
"(1) A general denial; (2) that the statements in the letter were 'not libelous, but were made in absolute good faith and without malice, ' that said statements 'correctly and frankly expressed the experience and opinion which defendants had sustained and formed, ' and were true, and that said letter was written 'bona fide in the discharge of a legal or moral duty rendered necessary by the exigencies and circumstances of the...
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