Fitzgerald v. Hickman Cnty. Gov't
| Decision Date | 04 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. M2017-00565-COA-R3-CV,M2017-00565-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | DAVID R. FITZGERALD v. HICKMAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hickman County
Former county employee appeals the dismissal of his claims against the county and the county mayor related to the termination of his employment. In his complaint, the employee raised claims of violations of due process, indemnification, restitution, negligence, invasion of privacy, workplace harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and misrepresentation. After the county and county mayor filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that it would decide the motion without the benefit of a hearing. The trial court eventually dismissed all the claims; some claims, however, were dismissed on the basis of summary judgment after the trial court considered a county personnel manual. We conclude that the trial court was entitled to consider the personnel manual as part of the pleadings for purposes of the motion to dismiss under Rule 10.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of all claims raised by the employee under the motion to dismiss standard, with the exception of the employee's claim against the county mayor for false light invasion of privacy. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; and Remanded
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.
Robin C. Moore, Carthage, Tennessee, for the appellant, David R. Fitzgerald.
Michael T. Schmitt, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Hickman County, Tennessee, and Mayor of Hickman County, Shaun Lawson.
Background
Appellant David R. Fitzgerald ("Appellant") filed a complaint in 2016 against Appellees Hickman County Government ("Hickman County") and the Hickman County Mayor, Shaun Lawson ("Mayor Lawson," and together with Hickman County, "Appellees"). The complaint alleged violations of due process, claims for indemnification and restitution, negligence, invasion of privacy, workplace harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional and negligent misrepresentation. The complaint was later amended to clarify the parties and to omit a prior claim under the Open Meetings Act.1 We summarize the facts from Appellant's complaint, which will be more fully discussed infra.
According to the amended complaint, Appellant had been employed by Hickman County since 1999. In 2015, he served as Emergency Management Director, as he had been hired under Hickman County's previous mayor. Sometime following the election of Mayor Lawson, however, Appellant alleged that Appellees, chiefly through the actions of Mayor Lawson, subjected Appellant to a continuing course of unlawful, malicious, and retaliatory conduct that destroyed his reputation and forced a "constructive discharge" from his employment. As early as December 2, 2014, Appellant states that rumors began to surface that Mayor Lawson intended to terminate Appellant's employment. Although Appellant contends that Mayor Lawson assured him that the rumors regarding termination were untrue, on January 6, 2015, Mayor Lawson removed Appellant from his position, citing what Appellant describes as "bogus complaints" by disgruntled employees.2
After Appellant was provided notice of his termination, but while he was still employed with Hickman County,3 Appellant attempted to participate in the Hickman County Grievance Procedure ("Grievance Procedure") as outlined by the Hickman County Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual ("Personnel Manual"). Eventually on January 26, 2015, Mayor Lawson sent Appellant a letter stating that after "careful thought and review," Appellant's grievance claim had been denied. Appellant alleged, however, that the proper procedure was not followed and he was deprived of a hearing before the Grievance Committee. In support of this assertion, Appellant cited portions of the Personnel Manual; the entirety of the handbook, however, was not appended toAppellant's complaint. Following the termination of Appellant's employment as Emergency Management Director, Appellant asserted that Hickman County hired a new director who was not qualified for the position pursuant to legal requirements.
Appellant further alleged that at the time of the termination of his employment Mayor Lawson promised him that Hickman County would create a new job for him, albeit at a substantially lower salary; the job was never created after the Hickman County Commission ("County Commission") determined that it could not afford to fund the new position. Appellant thereafter took a job with the Hickman County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department").4 Later, after certain public statements were made by Mayor Lawson and the County Attorney regarding an alleged extramarital affair by Appellant and allegations that Appellant had improperly received certain compensation in his final payment as Emergency Management Director, Appellant alleged that he was forced to resign "from his full-time position with the Sheriff's Department."5
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting governmental immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In support of their motion, Appellees attached the entirety of the Personnel Manual. On July 1, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a reply brief and ruled that it would decide the motion "on the papers."
On or about August 26, 2016, the trial court issued its ruling dismissing all of the claims against Appellees. First, the trial court ruled that Hickman County was immune from suit with regard to the claims of violations of due process (Count 1), invasion of privacy (Counts 4 & 5), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 6), workplace harassment (Count 7), and intentional and negligent misrepresentation (Counts 8 & 9). As such, the trial court dismissed these Counts under Rule 12.02(6). With regard to the violations of due process allegations against Mayor Lawson, the trial court ruled that Appellant's allegation that he was deprived of a property interest in his employment was incorrect because the Personnel Manual stated that he was an "at-will" employee; as such, the trial court granted summary judgment on this claim.
With regard to Appellant's indemnification and restitution claims (Count 2), the trial court ruled that Appellant had no contractual right to use Hickman County's grievance procedure after his employment was terminated, due to his at-will employment status; thus, summary judgment was granted as to this Count. The trial court also found that Appellant failed to establish a contract for future employment, as the trial court found no facts alleged showing mutual assent to the terms of the contract or acceptance of the contract; thus, this dismissal was also based upon Rule 12.02(6).
With regard to Appellant's negligence claim (Count 3), in which Appellant alleged that Appellees were negligent in hiring his successor, the trial court ruled that Appellant's complaint failed to contain any specific averments that Appellant was harmed by the alleged negligence or that Appellees owed a duty specifically to Appellant in this regard and that Appellant lacked standing to bring such a claim. Finally, the trial court ruled that Mayor Lawson could only be liable for the allegations against him if his actions were malicious, criminal, or performed for personal gain. The trial court considered each remaining count and concluded that Appellant's complaint failed to contain specific allegations to support all of the elements of each claim or that the facts alleged did not amount to willful or malicious conduct so as to allow liability. The trial court later partially granted a motion to alter or amend to include additional factual averments and then entered another order awarding attorney's fees. From these orders, Appellant appeals.6
Issues Presented
Appellant raises two issues, which are taken from his brief:
Discussion
As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to whether the trial court correctly converted certain matters to issues of summary judgment by relying on the Personnel Manual. Specifically, Appellees assert that the trial court was not required to convert the motion to one for summary judgment by relying on the Personnel Manual because this document was required to be appended to Appellant's complaint pursuant to Rule 10.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant asserts, however, that summary judgment was the correct standard but that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment prior to allowing full discovery.
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