Fitzgerald v. Martin-Marietta

• Decision Date: 24 December 1998
• Docket Number: MARTIN-MARIETT,R
• Citation: 681 N.Y.S.2d 895,256 A.D.2d 959
• Parties: 14 IER Cases 1279, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,407 Robert FITZGERALD, Appellant, v.espondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 895

681 N.Y.S.2d 895

14 IER Cases 1279, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,407

Robert FITZGERALD, Appellant, v. MARTIN-MARIETTA, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Dec. 24, 1998.

Cutler & Cutler (Daryl S. Cutler of counsel), Ballston Spa, for appellant.

Bond, Schoeneck & King (Nicholas J. D'Ambrosia Jr. of counsel), Albany, for respondent.

Before CARDONA, P.J., MERCURE, WHITE, SPAIN and CARPINELLO, JJ.

MERCURE, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Williams, J.), entered December 30, 1997 in Saratoga County, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In 1977, plaintiff was employed as an hourly utility worker at Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, a research facility in the Town of Milton, Saratoga County, which was at that time operated by General Electric Company pursuant to a contract with the Federal government. In 1986, plaintiff was offered a nonunion salaried position at Knolls as a maintenance specialist. Although plaintiff was initially reluctant to accept the new position due to his fear of losing the security afforded by the collective bargaining agreement covering his existing position, he was assured by his superiors that he would be treated fairly, in accordance with the policies set forth in General Electric's Employee Relations Management Practices manual (hereinafter the manual). Relying on those verbal assurances and the contents of the manual, plaintiff ultimately accepted the new position. In 1993, plaintiff was terminated from his employment by defendant, General Electric's successor in interest. He then commenced this action alleging that his termination constituted a breach of an employment contract based on the terms of the manual and the verbal assurances of his superiors. Following joinder of issue, defendant moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals.

We affirm. It is well settled that "absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party" (Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919). Although the presumption can be rebutted by evidence that plaintiff was made aware of a written policy expressly limiting defendant's right of termination and that plaintiff detrimentally relied on that policy in accepting the employment (see, Matter of De Petris v. Union Settlement Assn., 86 N.Y.2d 406, 410, 633 N.Y.S.2d 274, 657 N.E.2d 269; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465-466, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441; Novinger v. Eden Park Health Servs., 167 A.D.2d 590, 591, 563 N.Y.S.2d 219, lv. denied 77 N.Y.2d 810, 571 N.Y.S.2d 913, 575 N.E.2d 399), the present record supports no such exception. First, the manual does not in any way expressly limit defendant's absolute right to terminate plaintiff's at-will employment (see, Novinger v. Eden Park Health Servs., supra, at 591, 563 N.Y.S.2d 219; see also, Weintraub v. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim, & Ballon, 172 A.D.2d 254, 568 N.Y.S.2d 84). Notably, " 'there is no express assurance in the manual that termination will be for cause only' " (Fieldhouse v. Stamford Hosp. Socy., 233 A.D.2d 540, 541, 649 N.Y.S.2d 527, quoting Novinger v. Eden Park Health Servs., supra, at 591, 563 N.Y.S.2d 219; see, Pearce v. Clinton Community Coll., 246 A.D.2d 775, 667 N.Y.S.2d 781; Manning v. Norton Co., 189 A.D.2d 971, 971-972, 592 N.Y.S.2d 154); rather, it promises nothing more than fair, equal and consistent disciplinary action. Although commendable, such generalized language will not give rise to an implied employment contract (see, Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86). Further, the oral assurances alleged by plaintiff cannot of themselves give rise to a triable question of fact (see, Fieldhouse v. Stamford Hosp. Socy., supra, at 542, 649 N.Y.S.2d 527; Skelly v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Capital Region, 210 A.D.2d 683, 684, 619 N.Y.S.2d 879; Diskin v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 135...