Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc.

• Citation: 464 F. Supp. 263
• Decision Date: 22 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-930 H.,78-930 H.
• Parties: William FITZGERALD, Plaintiff v. MOUNTAIN LAUREL RACING, INC., Kenneth Marshall, and John Knight, Presiding Judge, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

464 F. Supp. 263

William FITZGERALD, Plaintiff v. MOUNTAIN LAUREL RACING, INC., Kenneth Marshall, and John Knight, Presiding Judge, Defendants.

No. 78-930 H.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

January 22, 1979.

Sanford S. Finder, Washington, Pa., for plaintiff.

Dale Hershey, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION

DIAMOND, District Judge.

I

Plaintiff, a harness horse driver and trainer, brought this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, for injunctive relief on the grounds that the defendants violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution when they suspended him from driving and training horses at the Meadows Racetrack in Washington County, Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff's petition for a temporary restraining order was refused and a hearing was held, after which a preliminary injunction was issued by an order which provided in part as follows:

"The court finds that the prerequisites to the issuance of an injunction . . . have been met in this case, to-wit that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted; that said harm outweighs any injury that may visit the defendants or the public generally; and that plaintiff has shown a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claim.

". . .

"An opinion with underlying findings of fact and conclusions of law will follow."

The bases for the court's conclusion that the prerequisites to the issuance of the preliminary injunction were met are set forth below.

II

1. Prior to August 19, 1978, the plaintiff was duly licensed by the Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission (Commission) as a trainer of harness racing horses in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

2. At all times pertinent, the defendant Mountain Laurel Racing Inc. (Mountain Laurel) was a racing association incorporated in and under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the purpose of conducting racing meets at the Meadows Racetrack (Meadows) in Meadowlands, Washington County, Pennsylvania.

3. Defendant Kenneth Marshall was an employee of Mountain Laurel and worked at the Meadows as Racing Secretary at all times pertinent.

4. Defendant John Knight was an employee of Mountain Laurel and worked at the Meadows as Presiding Judge at all times pertinent.

5. On Saturday, August 19, 1978, the plaintiff was informed by defendant Marshall that based on discussions with the track judges Mountain Laurel had decided to suspend plaintiff from training and driving horses at the Meadows and to expel him from the track because of "inconsistent driving."

6. "Inconsistent driving" is a violation of Rule 18, § 5(c)(2) of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

7. Plaintiff received no prior notice of the suspension and was not afforded any hearing.

8. Prior to his suspension plaintiff had eleven horses stabled at the Meadows, which he trained and raced there.

9. Plaintiff was paid by the owners of these horses to stable, board, train, and race them, and both the amount of his compensation as well as his ability to obtain horses for the aforesaid purposes was based, inter alia, on the performance at races at the track of the horses handled by the plaintiff.

10. Plaintiff was unable to transport the aforesaid horses to another track and thereby continue pursuit of his occupation at the time of his suspension because (1) other reasonably accessible tracks had finished their meets, or, (2) plaintiff's horses could not qualify to race in those meets which were still in progress.

III

In Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917 (3rd Cir., 1974), the court held that the factors which control the issuance of an injunction and which the court must consider and balance are whether:

(1) Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted.

(2) The defendant will be harmed if relief is granted.

(3) The public generally will be harmed if relief is granted.

(4) Plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of his claim.

We conclude that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted because the nature of his business is such that no adequate remedy exists at law to compensate him for the loss he will sustain if he is unlawfully suspended from driving at the Meadows. Plaintiff's income as a trainer-driver of harness racing horses is derived from three different sources: (1) a percentage of the purses earned by horses he drives (2) a percentage of the purses earned by horses he trains and (3) a flat fee for the horses he trains. Clearly, the first two sources of income are directly related to the outcome of races in which plaintiff is involved as a driver or trainer. And, to some extent at least, an owner's decision to entrust his horses to plaintiff for training and driving is based upon plaintiff's past success as a trainer, and driver, so that the third source is also somewhat dependent upon plaintiff's success at the finish line. It appears, therefore, that a court or jury in attempting to calculate damages at law for the plaintiff would have to determine how often plaintiff's horses would have been victorious or, at least "finished in the money." Needless to say, this would be a highly speculative endeavor at best, and, at worst, practically an impossible one. Barchi v. Sarafan, 436 F.Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Further, it would be virtually impossible to calculate the ultimate loss to plaintiff's business and reputation from the fact alone that he was suspended from driving at a licensed racetrack for violation of a Commission rule which implies dishonest racing, as we find "inconsistent driving" does.

The second and third factors may be considered together in this case. While the defendants maintain that both their interest and that of the public will be adversely affected if relief is granted because this will cause their patrons' faith in the integrity of harness racing at the Meadows to be eroded, no proof was offered in support of this allegation. Therefore, we cannot find that it exists at all and obviously cannot conclude that it is sufficient to outweigh the substantial harm which plaintiff has shown he will probably suffer.

The final factor, namely, the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, poses more difficult questions. Plaintiff claims that his expulsion and suspension constitute a deprivation of his liberty or property rights without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. In order to prevail on the merits, plaintiff will have to establish: (1) that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) that the deprivation was without due process, and (3) that the deprivation was done by the state or under color of state law; i. e., that there was "state action."

We first consider whether there was a deprivation of a liberty or property interest within the meaning of those terms in Fourteenth Amendment context. Plaintiff asserts that his right to race and train horses at the Meadows constitutes both a liberty and property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants contend that it is neither.

To determine whether or not the right to race and train horses is "property" under the due process clause, this court, following the Supreme Court's direction in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976), would have to construe the nature of the right conferred on harness track licensees by the applicable Pennsylvania law, Section 9 of the act of December 22, 1959, P.L. 1978 as amended 1968, July 31, P.L. 857, No. 254, § 1, 15 P.S. § 2609(a). However, it is unnecessary to determine the "property" interest question, since, in our view the injury to plaintiff's reputation resulting from defendants' conduct constitutes the deprivation of a liberty interest.

It has long been recognized that the right to one's good reputation may come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rulings of the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); and Bishop v. Wood, supra, have made it clear that the right to one's good reputation alone is not sufficient to raise a due-process protection. Rather, there must be a showing of "reputation— plus;" i. e. that the stigma suffered will, with some degree of probability, lead to the loss of another tangible interest such as employment.

The petitioners in Roth and Paul were denied relief because they failed to allege and prove that their future employment prospects would be injured. And in Bishop, where a police officer was dismissed by a city manager for unsatisfactory performance and an allegation of future injury was made, the Court denied relief because it appeared that the probability of the additional injury materializing was slight in view of the fact that the city manager communicated the reasons for the dismissal to the officer privately and did not publicize them further.

In the instant case, however, the impairment of future business opportunities to the plaintiff as a result of the defendants' acts has been alleged, and, we conclude the likelihood thereof sufficiently proved, because under Rule 23 § 8 of the Commission Rules and Regulations, the fact of plaintiff's expulsion must be communicated to the Commission, which in turn must communicate it to every racing association in the state of Pennsylvania, which virtually assures that all of plaintiff's potential clients will be aware of it.

We next consider the question of due process. Both the plaintiff and defendant Marshall testified that plaintiff's expulsion and suspension on the evening of August 19, 1978, were preceded by neither a hearing nor any notice of...