Fitzgiven v. Dorey
| Decision Date | 26 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. CV–13–176.,CV–13–176. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
| Parties | Pamela FITZGIVEN; Loveida Ingram; and Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers, Appellants v. Robin DOREY; Callie Matthews; Kristina Laughy; Diane Wagner; Ella Sergeant; Nick Witherspoon; Paul Brewer; Veronica Perkins; Jackie Smith; the Pulaski County Special School District; the Arkansas Department of Education; and Tom W. Kimbrell, Commissioner of the Department of Education, Appellees. Lonnie Coney; Belinda Pearl; and Pulaski Association of Support Staff, Appellants v. Keith Cooper; Cheryl Howey; Regena English; Becky Del Rio; James Watson; John Sparks; Charles Blake; Derrick Brown; Bill Goff; the Pulaski County Special School District; the Arkansas Department of Education; And Tom W. Kimbrell, Commissioner of the Department of Education, Appellees. Erika Evans; Brenda Robinson; and Cheryl Carpenter, as Individuals and Class Representatives, Appellants v. Pulaski County Special School District; the Arkansas Department of Education; And Tom W. Kimbrell, in his Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Arkansas Department of Education, Appellees. Don Clevenger and Carlton Wyley, as Individuals and as Class Representatives, Appellants v. Pulaski County Special School District; the Arkansas Department of Education; and Tom W. Kimbrell, in his Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Arkansas Department of Education, Appellees. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mitchell, Blackstock, Ivers & Sneddon, PLLC, Little Rock, by: Mark Burnette and Clayton Blackstock, for appellants.
Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Scott P. Richardson, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellants Pamela Fitzgiven, Loveida Ingram, and the Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers (collectively, “PACT”); Lonnie Coney, Belinda Pearl, and the Pulaski Association of Support Staff (collectively, “PASS”); Erika Evans, Brenda Robinson, and Cheryl Carpenter, as Individuals and Class Representatives (collectively, “the Evans class”); and Don Clevenger and Carlton Wyley, as Individuals and Class Representatives (collectively, “the Clevenger class”), appeal from the circuit court's order that granted a motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity by appellees the Arkansas Department of Education and Tom W. Kimbrell, Commissioner of the Arkansas Department of Education (collectively, “ADE”).1 They assert that the circuit court erred in dismissing ADE from their respective actions because their complaints alleged recognized exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and because they alleged claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). We affirm the circuit court's order.
The circuit court's order granted ADE's motion to dismiss in the Appellants' four separate cases, all of which stemmed from ADE's administrative supervision of the Pulaski County Special School District (“PCSSD”), after the district was found to be in fiscal distress by the State Board of Education in accordance with the provisions of the Arkansas Fiscal Assessment and Accountability Program (“AFAAP”), codified at Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 6–20–1901 to –1911 (Repl. 2007 & Supp.2011). The first case, docketed as 60CV–12–1090, was filed by PACT and asserted that the plaintiffs included certified teachers employed by the PCSSD “by written contracts which incorporate a set of personnel policies, referred to as the Professional Negotiations Agreement (“PNA”).” 2 PACT stated that it was bringing the action against ADE in part under the APA and in part seeking a declaration of the parties' rights under Arkansas law.
PACT alleged that following the State Board's determination that the PCSSD was in fiscal distress, ADE dissolved the PCSSD's board of education, removed its superintendent, and placed ADE's Commissioner, Dr. Kimbrell, in the position of the district's school board, where he then appointed a temporary superintendent answering to him. It maintained that after the district's fiscal-distress determination, PCSSD and PACT entered into negotiations relating to the PNA; however, those negotiations eventually came to a standstill, at which time the PCSSD, according to the complaint, notified PACT that its recognition of PACT was withdrawn and that the terms of the PNA would cease on June 30, 2012, with new personnel polices becoming effective on July 1 of that year.
PACT alleged that ADE's application of its rules, as authorized by Ark.Code Ann. § 6–20–1908(f) (Repl.2007) allowing ADE to make binding recommendations to a district's superintendent regarding staffing and fiscal practices, threatened to injure the plaintiffs. It further alleged that by ordering the PCSSD superintendent to withdraw its recognition of PACT, terminate the PNA, and implement personnel policies, ADE exceeded the scope of its statutory authority, acted ultra vires, and acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith, as ADE's actions involved nonfiscal matters. In addition, PACT alleged that PCSSD breached the PNA by withdrawing recognition and terminating the PNA, breached the PNA by failing to complete the negotiation process before modifying the PNA provisions that were subject to modification through the negotiation procedure, and violated state law by recognizing a personnel-policy committee and withdrawing recognition; that the personnel-policy committee was illegal and had no power or authority, or alternatively, was illegally formed and had no power or authority; and that PCSSD was estopped from claiming that the personnel-policy committee was formed in compliance with the law.
Similarly, in case 60CV–12–1091, PASS asserted that the plaintiffs included nonmanagement, classified employees of PCSSD, “employed by written contracts which incorporate a set of personnel policies, referred to as the Professional Negotiations Agreement (“PNA”).” 3 PASS stated that it was bringing its action in part under the APA and in part seeking a declaration of the parties' rights under Arkansas law. After setting forth virtually the same sequence of events as PACT did, but relative to PASS, PASS asserted that ADE's application of its rules, as authorized by section 6–20–1908(f), threatened to injure the plaintiffs. It further asserted that ADE's actions exceeded the scope of its statutory authority, were ultra vires, and were arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith, when ADE ordered the PCSSD superintendent to withdraw its recognition of PASS, terminate the PNA, and implement personnel policies, as ADE's actions involved nonfiscal matters. PASS further alleged, like PACT, that PCSSD breached the PNA by withdrawing recognition and terminating the PNA; breached the PNA by failing to complete the negotiation process before modifying the PNA provisions that were subject to modification through the negotiation procedure and violated state law by recognizing a personnel-policy committee and withdrawing recognition; that the personnel-policy committee was illegal and had no power or authority or, alternatively, was illegally formed and had no power or authority; and that PCSSD was estopped from claiming that the personnel-policy committee was formed in compliance with the law.
In the third matter, Erika Evans, Brenda Robinson, and Cheryl Carpenter, as individuals and as class representatives, filed a class-action complaint against PCSSD and ADE; the case was docketed as number 60CV–12–3201. The Evans class consisted of “all certified teachers employed by the District during the 2011–2012 school year pursuant to individual written contracts” that incorporated the PNA, who received a letter notice from the PCSSD's acting superintendent that he was recommending nonrenewal of their teaching contracts for the 2012–2013 school year and who had requested a hearing within thirty days of receiving the notice of nonrenewal. The Evans class asserted that the case was brought as a breach-of-contract claim and under the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (“ATFDA”), the Arkansas Declaratory Judgment Act, the APA, and Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Like PACT and PASS in the previous two cases, the Evans class asserted that ADE's application of its rules threatened to injure the plaintiffs, whereby ADE ordered the PCSSD superintendent to withdraw recognition of PACT and PASS as the collective bargaining units for the district's licensed and classified staff, to terminate the PNAs, and to implement personnel policies for certified personnel and support staff. In doing so, they claimed, ADE's actions exceeded the scope of its statutory authority, were ultra vires, and were arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith, as ADE's actions involved nonfiscal matters. The Evans class further sought a declaration of the ATFDA's inapplicability to personnel-policy changes; that PCSSD's decision to nonrenew the plaintiffs' contracts was void under the ATFDA because the district failed to substantially comply with its personnel policies; and that the district's decision to nonrenew the contracts was not just or reasonable.
The final matter, docketed as 60CV–12–5075, was a class-action complaint by Don Clevenger and Carlton Wyley, as individuals and class representatives, against PCSSD and ADE. In it, they asserted that they represented the majority of classified PCSSD employees who were in “bargaining unit eligible positions” during the 2011–2012 school year pursuant to individual written contracts incorporating the PNA, who received a letter notice of nonrenewal for the 2012–2013 school year from the PCSSD acting superintendent, and who requested a hearing within twenty-five days of receiving the notice. The complaint stated that the matter was brought as a breach-of-contract claim, and under the Arkansas Declaratory Judgment Act, the APA, and Ark. R. Civ. P. 58. As in the other cases, the Clevenger class alleged that ADE's application of its rules threatened to injure the plaintiffs when ADE ordered the PCSSD superintendent to withdraw...
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