Fitzpatrick v. Dooley

• Decision Date: 04 April 1905
• Citation: 112 Mo. App. 165,86 S.W. 719
• Parties: FITZPATRICK v. DOOLEY.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

86 S.W. 719

112 Mo. A. 165

FITZPATRICK v. DOOLEY.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

April 4, 1905.

MASTER AND SERVANT—IMPLIED CONTRACT—SERVICES RENDERED BY MEMBER OF FAMILY—PRESUMPTION—BURDEN OF PROOF.

1. In an action for services rendered in defendant's household, if it appears that a family or parental relationship existed between the parties the burden is on the claimant to show an agreement for compensation.

2. Plaintiff, having been placed in defendant's household by her mother when plaintiff was about 15 years of age, rendered domestic services there, and continued to do so for a couple of years after her majority, and she then sued to recover reasonable compensation for the services rendered after majority. Held that, if plaintiff had been a member of defendant's family before her majority, she could not recover, but, if her status had been that of a servant, she could.

3. If her status was that of a servant, clothing furnished her by defendant after her majority should be deducted in assessing her damages.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Monroe County; David H. Eby, Judge.

Action by Lizzie Fitzpatrick against Henry Dooley. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Jas. P. Boyd, for appellant. J. H. Whitecotton, for respondent.

Opinion.

GOODE, J.

This is an action to recover compensation for services rendered by the respondent as a servant in the family of the appellant. The services consisted of washing, ironing, cooking, house cleaning, milking, churning, and such other duties as are incident to domestic work around the home of a farmer. The respondent went to dwell in the appellant's family in June, 1885, when she was 15 years old. She remained there until March 20, 1890, a period of about five years, and extending two years beyond her majority. The petition contains two paragraphs. The first declared on an implied promise to pay the respondent the reasonable value of her services, stating their value at $825, and allowing three small credits, amounting to $8.35, for pasturing a mare, leaving the balance due $816.65. The second paragraph counts on an express contract by which, as alleged, appellant agreed to pay respondent $500 for her services. The same credits are allowed in this paragraph as in the first one, and the balance stated is $491.65.

The defense pleaded to the first count of the petition is that at the request of respondent's mother appellant took respondent, when 15 years old, into his home to live as a member of his family, and she remained there pursuant to that arrangement until 1890, receiving board, clothing, and education, and treatment as a member of the family. The defense to the second paragraph was a general denial. In addition to those defenses, the statute of limitations was pleaded against both causes of action.

The testimony for the respondent conduces to show that when 15 years old she entered appellant's household, and from that time, through five years or more, did domestic work of the character mentioned. She received her board and clothing from the appellant, but positively denied that, to her knowledge, her mother placed her in his home to be raised and get only board and clothing for the work she would do. Her testimony was that prior to 1887—the year when she asserts an express contract was made about her compensation—no certain amount of wages for her labor had been agreed on, but that she never understood she was staying with the family as one of it, and for no wages. She swore she spoke to the appellant in 1887 on the subject, telling him she could no longer continue under the existing arrangement, whereupon he agreed to give her $500 when she married. This sum she said she demanded of him several times after her marriage, but he refused payment, asserting he owed her nothing. The testimony for the appellant supports the statement of the answer that respondent's mother made an arrangement with the appellant to give respondent a home, furnish her board and clothing, and treat her as a member of the family; that this arrangement was carried out, and determined the status of respondent in the household until she left in 1890, subsequent to her marriage. Appellant denied the alleged agreement to pay respondent $500 when she married, and swore the only agreement ever made was the one with her mother. The court gave an instruction to the jury regarding the cause of action contained in the second paragraph of the petition, and based on an alleged express promise to pay respondent $500 at her marriage. It is unnecessary to notice that instruction. The jury found the issues for the appellant on the cause of action to which it referred, and therefore he had no cause to complain of the charge, and has not complained. The following instruction was given in reference to the case stated in the first paragraph of the petition, which counted on the reasonable value of the appellant's services: "The court instructs the jury that if they find from the greater weight of the evidence in the cause that at the time plaintiff became of age she was then and thereafter continued for any length of time in the employ of defendant as his housekeeper, or house servant, and discharged her duties in that behalf to the satisfaction of defendant, and if the jury do not find that there was an express contract, understanding, or agreement between plaintiff and defendant, after she became of age, as to what wages, compensation, or remuneration should be paid or given plaintiff for such services, if any, after she became of age, then your verdict under the first count should be for the plaintiff, and in such sum as the jury may find from the evidence her said work and services, if any, after she became of age, were reasonably worth; provided the jury further find from the evidence in the case that the credits given by plaintiff on her account were given with the knowledge and consent of defendant at the time they were severally given, as referred to in plaintiff's instruction No. 1."

The jury returned a verdict for the respondent in the sum of $150.65 on the first paragraph of the petition. The instruction authorized no judgment quantum meruit for the respondent's services while she was a minor, but made her right to recover for those services depend on satisfying the jury that the appellant expressly agreed to pay her a certain sum when she married. Probably the reason for this ruling was that, in the opinion of the court, respondent's mother was entitled to her earnings while a minor, unless there was a positive arrangement by which respondent herself should be paid. In truth the evidence permits only two conclusions regarding respondent's compensation for work done while a minor. One is that she was to get nothing except a home and maintenance, and the other that by virtue of the alleged promise she was to get $500. The jury, having found there was no such promise, could not return a verdict in respondent's favor for services rendered while under age. The jury awarded compensation for the reasonable value of her services during the two years after she was of full age, and the question for decision on this appeal is concerning the soundness of the instruction of the court under which the award was made. The court instructed that if the jury found respondent remained in the appellant's employ as housekeeper and servant and discharged her duties to his satisfaction after she was of full age, and there was no express contract, understanding, or agreement between them, after she became of age, regarding remuneration for services rendered after that time, the verdict should be in her favor for such sum as those services were reasonably worth. Appellant's counsel say the jury should have been instructed that if they found the respondent had been residing and working in the family from the time she was 15 years old, and continued to reside and work therein after she became of age, the law presumed she did so on the same terms as before, and it devolved on her to overcome the presumption and show there was an express or implied contract for compensation. The instruction the court gave contained no allusion to the possibility of respondent's having been a member of appellant's family, and, like other members, having performed the tasks incident to her situation in consideration of support only, and without expecting wages. We find evidence in the record to prove those were the facts; and in truth there was no evidence to the contrary except respondent's own testimony that from the first she expected remuneration besides her support, and was promised it later. We suppose the trial court conceived that, if the original arrangement was of the nature appellant contended, having been made with respondent's mother instead of her, it expired when she reached her majority; and as the appellant continued to accept her work, the law implied a promise to pay for it. As has been said in numberless cases, such a promise is presumed from the acceptance of beneficial labor, unless the relationship of the parties concerned forbids the presumption. If there is no exceptional relationship in the way, the promise is raised, because natural equity calls for compensation for beneficial services, and experience proves...