Fitzwilliam v. Wesley United Methodist Church, WD

• Decision Date: 30 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 882 S.W.2d 343
• Parties: R.A. FITZWILLIAM, et al., Appellant, v. WESLEY UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Respondent. 48511.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 343

882 S.W.2d 343

R.A. FITZWILLIAM, et al., Appellant, v. WESLEY UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Respondent.

No. WD 48511.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Aug. 30, 1994.

James Buckley, Sedalia, for appellant.

Stanley Brian Cox, Sedalia, for respondent.

Before ULRICH, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and HANNA, JJ.

HANNA, Presiding Judge.

The plaintiffs are residents of Bloess & Routszong's First Subdivision to Stewart and Thompson's Second Addition to the City of Sedalia, Missouri. On October 22, 1991, the defendant, Wesley United Methodist Church (Church), acquired Lots Eight and Nine of Block Two of that subdivision, "subject to easements apparent or of record and restrictions, if any." The Church intends to remove the existing home from the lots and construct a surface parking facility, providing approximately fourteen to eighteen parking spaces for congregation members. The plaintiffs filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Church's proposed use of the residential real estate as a parking lot violates both a restrictive covenant and zoning ordinances of the city. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction preventing the Church from constructing the lot.

The church building and a previously established parking area are located immediately to the south of the subdivision, and were in existence on October 26, 1955, when the restrictive covenants were recorded. The church building itself is located immediately to the south of Lots Eight and Nine, separated by an alley twenty feet in width, which is owned and maintained by the city of Sedalia. A surface water drainage ditch, approximately eight feet deep, is located on the western half of the alley making the alley impassable to vehicular traffic.

The trial court found that the use of Lots Eight and Nine as a church parking lot did not violate the restrictive covenant or the city zoning ordinance. The court also found that, because of certain structures located on other lots in the subdivision, the plaintiffs were estopped from enforcing the covenant, and that the primary purpose of the covenant was to preserve the residential character of the neighborhood and to prevent commercial use of the real estate. Balancing the equities, the court found that the Church's proposed use of the real estate would cause little, if any, harm to the plaintiffs, and that the Church would suffer great hardship if not allowed to use the lots for parking. Therefore, the court allowed the Church to construct a parking lot on Lots Eight and Nine, but ordered the Church to close the way of access that exits the lot directly onto Maple Lane in order to minimize harm to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs appeal the court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in determining that the proposed parking lot did not violate the restrictive covenant or the municipal zoning ordinance. Also, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs were estopped from enforcing the restrictive covenant because of multiple violations of the covenant existing throughout the neighborhood. However, our holding on the first two points render this issue moot.

In their first point, the plaintiffs argue that the Church's use of Lots Eight and Nine as a parking lot is not residential in character and, therefore, violates the restrictive covenant. The covenant states in relevant part:

2. No lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No building shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed two and one-half stories in height and a private garage for not more than two cars.

Restrictive covenants are not favorites of the law, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the free use of land. Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n For Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Mo. banc 1986). In interpreting the meaning of a restrictive covenant, the court must look at the plain and obvious purposes of the restriction and give all terms their ordinary and usual meaning in the connection in which they are used. Fox v. Smidt, 869 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Mo.App.1994). The primary purpose is to ascertain the intention of the parties as to the purpose which they sought to accomplish by the covenants, taking into account the circumstances existing at the time the covenants were drafted. Blackburn v. Richardson, 849 S.W.2d 281, 286-87 (Mo.App.1993).

The Missouri Supreme Court has held that a structure which is used for residential purposes is "one in...