Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Expressway Auth.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1D19-3625,1D19-3625
• Citation: 298 So.3d 1261
• Parties: FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and The Florida House of Representatives, Petitioners, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

298 So.3d 1261

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and The Florida House of Representatives, Petitioners,

v.MIAMI-DADE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, Respondent.

No. 1D19-3625

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 25, 2020

Daniel E. Nordby and Jason Gonzalez of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Tallahassee, for Petitioners.

Glenn Burhans, Jr. of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Tallahassee, and Eugene E. Stearns of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami, for Respondent.

Bilbrey, J.

The Petitioners seek a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from proceeding further in a case instigated by the Respondent which seeks a declaratory judgment as to the constitutonality of several legislative enactments. Because we do not possess jurisdiction to issue such writ given the existence of an adequate remedy at law, the petition is denied.

In 2019, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 2019-169, Laws of Florida, which among other things amended Chapter 348, Florida Statutes, to dissolve the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority (MDX) and to transfer its assets and authority to the Greater Miami Expressway Agency (GDX), an agency newly created by the chapter. See §§ 348.0301 – 348.0318, Fla. Stat. (2019) (Greater Miami Expressway Agency Act). MDX was created in 1994 by the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners by Ordinance Article XVIII, Section 2-128. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 2019-169, MDX controlled several expressways (toll roads) in Miami-Dade County. Such control was established by an agreement with the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) in 1996. After the Greater Miami Expressway Agency Act was enacted but before signed by the Governor, MDX filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Act as well as several existing related statutes violate the home rule authority of Miami-Dade County and unconstitutionally impair MDX's contracts. See Art. VIII, § 6(e), Fla. Const.

Petitioners sought summary judgment below on the ground that MDX lacked standing to bring the particular causes of action stated in its complaint and that it lacked standing to sue. Further, Petitioners argued that FDOT was improperly named as a defendant and that a proper party, GDX, was not named. The trial court denied summary judgment as to each of these grounds and granted partial summary judgment in favor of MDX as to count 1 of its complaint. By that count, MDX sought a declaration that the Greater Miami Expressway Agency Act is an unconstitutional local law which violates Miami-Dade County's home rule authority. In holding the Greater Miami Expressway Agency Act was unconstitutional, the trial court specifically found that "MDX has standing; MDX has capacity to bring [the] suit; FDOT is a proper party; and GMX, while it may be a proper party, is not an indispensable party." Petitioner FDOT appealed that partial summary judgment to this court.^* That appeal has been stayed pending a decision in this original proceeding.

In Roberts v. Brown , 43 So. 3d 673, 677–78 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court explained:

Prohibition may only be granted when it is shown that a lower court is without jurisdiction or attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction. It is preventive and not corrective in that it commands the one to whom it is directed not to do the thing which the supervisory court is informed the lower tribunal is about to do. Its purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to compel the undoing of something already done.

(Citing English v. McCrary , 348 So. 2d 293, 296–97 (Fla. 1977) ).

As the Florida Supreme Court also explained, the "writ is very narrow in scope and operation and must be employed with caution and utilized only in emergency cases to prevent an impending injury where there is no other appropriate and adequate legal remedy ." Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc ., 605 So. 2d 850, 854 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis added). Thus, "the writ has very limited application." Scott v. Francati, 214 So. 3d 742, 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ; see also Florida Dep't of Health v. Tropiflora, LLC , 265 So. 3d 673, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

Petitioners argue a writ of prohibition is warranted because MDX lacks standing to bring the declaratory judgment and because FDOT is not a proper party to the declaratory action. As noted, a writ of prohibition is not warranted where there is an adequate remedy at law. It is to be used only in an emergency, Tropiflora , and should not be used in place of an appeal, Pullins v. Candelaria , 291 So. 3d 168 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

Petitioners have not demonstrated that their pending appeal is not an appropriate remedy to address the denial of their defenses that MDX lacks standing to bring the causes of action filed below and that FDOT is not a proper party to the declaratory action. Of course, only a party which has standing to bring a particular declaratory judgment action is entitled to the grant of declaratory relief. "The test of the sufficiency of a complaint in a declaratory judgment proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff will succeed in getting a declaration of rights in accordance with his theory and contention, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all." Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury , 56 So. 2d 445, 448 (Fla. 1952) (quoting White v. Manassa , 252 Ala. 396, 41 So.2d 395, 397 (1949) ). see also Rhea v. District Bd. of Trustees of Santa Fe College, 109 So. 3d 851, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). And of course, a declaratory judgment action must name a proper party as defendant. See Marcus v. State Senate for the State of Fla. , 115 So. 3d 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Petitioners, therefore, may raise these cognizable issues in the pending appeal of the partial summary judgment, although we do not now pass on the validity of any argument Petitioners may raise in that appeal.

Because it has not been demonstrated that Petitioners do not have an adequate remedy at law and that an "emergency" is presented, Mandico , 605 So. 2d at 854, and because the "writ of prohibition is never allowed to usurp the functions of an appeal," State, ex rel. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Trammell , 140 Fla. 500, 192 So. 175, 176 (1939), we must deny the petition.

Accordingly, the petition is DENIED .

Wolf, J., concurs with an opinion joined by Bilbrey, J.; M.K. Thomas, J., concurs with an opinion.

Wolf, J., concurring.

I concur in the well-written opinion of Judge Bilbrey. I write only to explain the distinctions between this case and the case of Scott v. Francati , 214 So. 3d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), a case which based on initial reading would seem to support issuance of the writ of prohibition. In Scott , this court granted a writ of prohibition because there was a lack of justiciable controversy and because Governor Scott was not a proper defendant. Id. at 749-50.

The Scott court, however, recognized the limited scope of a writ of prohibition and the unique facts involved in that case which supported issuance of the writ.

Scott is distinguishable from this case in a number of important respects:

1. In Scott , the lack of the proper defendant was coupled with the jurisdictional defect of failing to allege a justiciable controversy. Thus, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In this case a justiciable controversy is sufficiently alleged.

2. The defendant in Scott was the head of a branch of government, the executive. The public interest in not involving the head of the executive branch in unwarranted litigation solely as a result of holding that position involves irreparable injury. This case does not involve the same public interest, and therefore does not share the same irreparable injury which existed in Scott . Therefore, in this case, there is an adequate remedy which would preclude issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3. In Scott , the court stated there were no factual allegations that could be made in good faith which would have envisioned Scott as a proper defendant. Scott at 750,. In this case, the Department of Transportation's jurisdiction over state roads in Dade County may implicate the specific responsibilities of the Department over who is responsible for maintaining and overseeing those roads, an issue which is presented in this case.

4. In Scott , the requested writ of prohibition sought only to preclude further action by the circuit court. In this case, the relief sought in part is to overturn the trial court's grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of respondent. A writ of prohibition is not the proper vehicle for overturning prior actions of the circuit court. DexterTowing v. Mobley , 590 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The proper remedy is an appeal to this court.

I, therefore, concur.

M.K. Thomas, J., concurring with opinion.

I agree with my esteemed colleagues that denial of the writ of prohibition is appropriate. However, I write to highlight the unique procedural backdrop which compels this result. On July 15, 2019, FDOT filed a motion to dismiss the complaint asserting MDX lacked standing and legal capacity, FDOT was not a proper party, and GMX was an indispensable party defendant. Four days later, MDX filed a motion for partial summary judgment. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was conducted on July 25, 2019. The following day, the trial court issued an order denying the motion. On August 9, 2019, two weeks later, the parties argued the merits of MDX's motion for partial summary judgment. On August 29, 2019, the trial court issued an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of MDX on count 1 of the complaint, finding the Amendment unconstitutional and declaring it void ab initio. The order again denied the affirmative defenses raised by FDOT in its motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for rehearing was denied by order dated September 30, 2019. On October 7, 2019, FDOT filed this petition for writ of prohibition seeking dismissal of the action for lack of...