Flagler v. State
| Decision Date | 01 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 35805,35805 |
| Citation | 198 So.2d 313 |
| Parties | Lewis Andrew FLAGLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jack P. LaMarr, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Fred T. Gallagher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
The petitioner was convicted of robbery and appealed to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 189 So.2d 212, where the judgment was affirmed.
The matter was then brought to this court on a petition for certiorari based on an apparent conflict between the decision rendered by the District Court and one by the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Thomas v. State, 183 So.2d 297, with reference to the element of fear in the commission of robbery and because of an apparent conflict with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Allison v. State, 162 So.2d 922, dealing with the subject of lesser included offenses.
This introduces the two questions we now decide, id est, first the denial of the motion of the petitioner for a directed verdict of not guilty based on the failure of the State to prove that the victim of the alleged robbery was put in fear prior to the asportation of her property, and second the failure of the court to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of larceny.
In effect, it is the theory of the petitioner that since the victim of the theft was not put in fear before her pocketbook was taken, larceny at the most could be charged to him and as larceny is a lesser included offense in a charge of robbery, it was reversible error not to charge the jury on that crime. The argument is plausible but, we think, hardly convincing.
Before proceeding, it seems appropriate to give the bare facts which brought about the prosecution. An automobile driven by a housewife who was accompanied by her four-year-old son stopped in obeyance to a stop sign at the point where the street she was travelling entered an arterial boulevard, whereupon a man, who was a complete stranger, stealthily opened the door and took a seat by the woman and her child. After a short period of silence, the intruder grabbed the woman's pocketbook containing $400 and other valuables and departed, slamming the car door. Both mother and child then screamed. The man attempted to re-enter the car but failed. The woman drove away to seek help.
The facts in this case vary widely from those related in the Thomas opinion as is evident from even a cursory examination. There the occupants of the house, entered by a masked person, said they were not frightened but 'had the situation well under control.' Here a stranger furtively got into a car with a mother and her child and reached for the pocketbook at her side. Evidently she was first aware of his presence when, as she attempted to change gears, she saw his hand reaching for the pocketbook and explained that she did not scream until he was outside the car as she feared for the safety of the child.
We think that in this setting the mother would have been less than human if she had not been frightened out of her wits and that the fear was generated when she saw a strange hand reaching for her purse at about the time she became conscious of petitioner's presence. She testified at the trial that she was frightened although she did not make an outcry and it is easy to understand why she did not, for an outcry in her situation might well have endangered her little boy. The conclusion that she was indeed actually in fear when he seized the pocketbook from the very side of herself and her little boy is not to us strained. And, strangely enough, the fact that she did not at the time give expression to her fear was in itself evidence of fear.
So we pass to the failure to charge the jury on larceny. We think no...
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People v. Sailor
...force as required under New York's third degree robbery statute (see, Penal Law §§ 160.00, 160.05). Defendant's reliance on Flagler v. State, 198 So.2d 313 (Fla.) for this interpretation is unfounded because in that case the Supreme Court of Florida held no more than that outward manifestat......
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United States v. Lee
...Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth District's ruling, focusing only on the reasonableness of the victim's fear. See Flagler v. State , 198 So.2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1967) ("The conclusion that [the mother] was indeed actually in fear when [the defendant] seized the pocketbook ... is not to us str......
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State v. Moore, 79,807.
...Cf. United States v. Robinson, 527 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1975); State v. Stephens, 66 Ariz. 219, 186 P.2d 346 (1947); and Flagler v. State, 198 So.2d 313 (1967).' .... "As pointed out in United States v. Alsop, 479 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1973), if the focus were on the victim's reaction and no......
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Adams v. State, 56134
...to raising an alleged error on appeal. Alford v. State, 280 So.2d 479 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 284 So.2d 218 (1973); Flagler v. State, 198 So.2d 313 (Fla.1967). Defendant says that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting into evidence, over defendant's objection, two pho......