Flaiz v. Moore

• Decision Date: 11 July 1962
• Docket Number: No. A-8901,A-8901
• Citation: 359 S.W.2d 872
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: Theodore R. FLAIZ et al., Petitioners, v. Jack Bernard MOORE, Sr., et al., Respondents.

Page 872

359 S.W.2d 872

Theodore R. FLAIZ et al., Petitioners, v. Jack Bernard MOORE, Sr., et al., Respondents.

No. A-8901.

Supreme Court of Texas.

July 11, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 3, 1962.

Jacob G. Hornberger, Laredo, for petitioners.

R. J. Goodman, Elmore H. Borchers, Laredo, for respondents.

WALKER, Justice.

On the basis of its conclusion that the contacts between the parties and the forum are insufficient to require that the courts of Texas retain and exercise jurisdiction over this suit, the Court of Civil Appeals has held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cause. 353 S.W.2d 74. It is our opinion that on the present record the order of dismissal cannot be upheld on that or any other ground.

Theodore R. Flaiz et al., petitioners, who are residents of the State of Maryland, instituted suit in the 49th District Court of Webb County against Jack Bernard Moore, Sr., respondent, and Jack Bernard Moore, Jr., neither of whom is a resident of Texas, to recover for personal injuries and property damage alleged to have been sustained in an automobile accident which occurred in South Dakota. Service of citation was never had on Jack Bernard Moore, Jr., but respondent was served while temporarily in Webb County. Respondent promptly filed a verified plea alleging that the accident occurred in South Dakota, that petitioners are residents of Maryland, that he and Jack Bernard Moore, Jr., were not residents of Texas when the suit was instituted or at any time since, and that in these circumstances the court had no jurisdiction of the action. He prayed that the suit be abated. This plea was overruled by the trial court on April 3, 1958.

About two years later respondent filed a second plea to the jurisdiction. After stating the residences of the parties and the place where the accident occurred, he alleged that South Dakota has adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence by statute, and that the laws of that state are so dissimilar to our laws that the courts of Texas cannot and should not undertake to administer and enforce the same. He prayed that the cause be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent then filed a motion under the provisions of Rule 184a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting the court to take judicial notice of the South Dakota comparative negligence statute and the decisions construing the same. He and petitioners also entered into a stipulation '(i)n connection with Defendant's motion to the jurisdiction based on the dissimilarity of the laws of South Dakota and of the State of Texas.'

On January 19, 1961, the trial court entered an order dismissing the cause. This order recites that the court was acting on 'the Plea to the Jurisdiction of this Court filed herein by Defendant, Jack Bernard Moore, Sr., such plea being based principally upon the dissimilarity of the law of South Dakota with the law of Texas,' and was of the opinion that such plea should be sustained. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, urging by a single point of error that the comparative negligence law of South Dakota does not create such a dissimilarity in the laws of the two states that the courts of Texas should refuse to administer and enforce the same. By his counterpoints in the Court of Civil Appeals, respondent asserted: (1) that the doctrine of comparative negligence goes to the very existence of a right of action and is so dissimilar to our law that the courts of Texas should not and cannot undertake to enforce and administer the same; and (2) that to allow petitioners to recover in spite of their contributory negligence is contrary to the public policy of Texas.

The statement of the factors to be considered in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens made by Mr. Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055, has been referred to or quoted in many cases. After observing that the principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute, he said:

'Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses.

'If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.

'Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.'

Where the forum non conveniens doctrine is given its broadest application, the reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction may relate to the parties, the subject matter, or both. One writer has said that the cases in which the courts declined jurisdiction...