Flam v. Lee

• Citation: 90 N.W. 70,116 Iowa 289
• Parties: FLAM v. LEE.
• Decision Date: 11 April 1902
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

116 Iowa 289

90 N.W. 70

FLAM

v.LEE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 11, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Henry county; W. S. Withrow, Judge.

Action for damages for malicious prosecution. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Blake & Blake and Palmer & Kopp, for appellant.

McCoid & Finley, for appellee.

WEAVER, J.

The plaintiff alleges that on October 9, 1899, the defendant made complaint to the sheriff of Henry county charging plaintiff with the crime of assault with intent to commit murder; that, acting upon such charge, the sheriff, without writ, arrested plaintiff at his home at a late hour of night, and took him before a magistrate, where the defendant also appeared, and swore out and filed an information formally charging plaintiff with said alleged crime; that upon such charge, being unable to give bail, plaintiff was cast into jail until the following day, when he was released upon bond; that, against plaintiff's objections, said cause was continued from time to time until October 23, 1899, when it was called for hearing, and the defendant not appearing to prosecute said charge, and there being no evidence against him, he was discharged, and the prosecution dismissed. He further says that the accusation made by the defendant was false, malicious, and without probable cause; that in defending against the same he was put to much expense and loss of time, and was made to suffer much pain in body and mind, and was injured in reputation and social standing, for all which he asks damages. The defendant answers in denial.

The evidence shows, without material contradiction, the charge of crime, the arrest, the incarceration in jail, the adjournment of the hearing, the defendant's failure to appear as a witness, and the final discharge of the plaintiff by the magistrate, substantially as alleged in the petition. The evidence in the record has no tendency to show plaintiff guilty of the crime charged against him, but defendant insists that in instituting the prosecution he acted without malice and with probable cause. These being matters for the consideration of the jury, the verdict is conclusive, unless we find substantial error in some of the rulings made or proceedings had in the trial court. We therefore proceed to a consideration of the errors assigned and argued by counsel.

1. The plaintiff was permitted to show that at the time of the arrest he was living at home with his parents; that his mother was in poor health; and that upon the sheriff making known his purpose to arrest her son she fainted or was prostrated by the shock, and that plaintiff was thereby caused to suffer great distress of mind. It is urged that this ruling, in effect, permits the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries sustained by his mother. We do not so view it. Plaintiff's recovery must be restricted, of course, to the injuries suffered by himself. But the principal basis of recovery in most actions of this kind is mental suffering and anguish arising from the wrongful charge and arrest, and, if the arrest be made in the presence of one's family or friends bringing him into shame and humiliation before them, it is a proper matter to be considered as bearing upon the pain inflicted upon him. If, then, in addition to the indignity of his arrest, he sees, as the effect of each act, his wife or mother fall in a faint, and he is forced to leave her in such prostrate and suffering condition, we see no reason why this increased pain, which naturally follows such a situation, shall not be an element in assessing his damages, if he is found entitled to recover at all. It is not a recovery of damages sustained by the mother that is asked or allowed, but the condition and sickness of the mother, from whom plaintiff was forcibly removed, are among the facts and circumstances immediately surrounding the arrest, and were properly shown, as bearing upon the suffering which he has been made to undergo on account of his alleged wrongful prosecution.

2. Plaintiff was also allowed, over defendant's objection, to describe to the jury the place in which he was confined, the manner in which his mind was affected by the experience, and that certain other prisoners called him by name, and asked him, “What in hell are you doing here?” It may be conceded that so much of this testimony as repeats what was said to him by a fellow prisoner is incompetent and immaterial, but we cannot conceive it possible that it could have had any influence upon the verdict of the jury, or that the error in admitting it was prejudicial. The facts that plaintiff was placed in the jail, and that he was hemmed in by iron bars, and surrounded by the usual gloomy and depressing features which are characteristic of prisons, were proper to be called to the attention of the jury. Not that any neglect or any abuse of power by the sheriff would be chargeable to the defendant. Such we do not understand to be the purpose or effect of the testimony. No such abuse or neglect is alleged, but it must be presumed that in causing plaintiff's arrest on charge of a grave crime defendant contemplated his possible or probable confinement, and that in such confinement he would have the surroundings and receive the treatment and fare which are inseparable from prison experience. If, for instance, the sheriff instead of putting plaintiff in jail had entertained him at his own home, as a trusted friend or guest, it would have been a fact which the defendant could properly have shown in mitigation of damages. Why, then, should the jury not be made acquainted with the usual and necessary characteristics of the entertainment which a jail affords, in order that they may determine for themselves whether plaintiff's detention there can reasonably be said to have occasioned the discomforts of mind or body of which he complains? The cases upon which appellant relies as supporting this exception go simply to the extent of saying that a person who wrongfully institutes a criminal prosecution cannot be held liable for the wrongful acts of the magistrate or other official over whom he has no control in respect to the prosecution thus begun. The rule of these cases is manifestly correct, but it is not applicable to the facts under consideration.

In this same connection may be taken up the objections raised to plaintiff's attempt to describe his mental suffering while in custody. We know of no rule of law which prohibits such testimony. It is true, perhaps, the jury may properly be left to infer such sufferings from the circumstances of his situation, and it is also true that the average witness finds it difficult to describe mental conditions in apt terms. But does it follow that such description, when made, is not proper evidence? If a man who has been wrongfully prosecuted for crime feels a sense of shame and humiliation that such a charge should be laid at his door, or that he has been disgraced in the eyes of his neighbors and friends, or is tormented with fear that his incarceration in jail may bring sorrow and disgrace to his home, we think he should be permitted to say it. There was no error in the ruling here complained of.

3. Many of the assignments of error are based upon ...