Flanagan v. Forsythe
Decision Date | 30 July 1897 |
Citation | 6 Okla. 225,50 P. 152,1897 OK 68 |
Parties | JOHN J. FLANAGAN v. H. C. FORSYTHE. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Error from the District Court of Oklahoma County; before Henry W. Scott, District Judge.
¶0 TORT--Liability For--When Considered a Debt Contracted. The congressional enactment providing that no lands acquired under the federal homestead laws "shall, in any event, become liable for the satisfaction of any debt or debts contracted prior to the issuing of patent therefor," includes a liability for a tort growing out of a breach of contract warranting the title to certain personal property.
2. HOMESTEAD--Exemption From Liability For Debts--Expires When. The exemption from liability for debts of lands entered as homesteads, provided by sec. 2296 of the revised statutes of the United States, no longer applies to said lands after final proof has been made and final, or patent, certificates issued therefor.
Field & Shear, for plaintiff in error.
Amos Green & Son, for defendant in error.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The following are the material facts in this case, to-wit:
¶1 The decision of this cause depends entirely upon the construction to be given sec. 2296, of the revised statutes of the United States, which reads as follows: "No lands acquired under the provisions of this chapter shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt or debts contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor." Counsel for plaintiff in error contend that the judgment against him should be reversed on two grounds: First, because his claim against the said Byrne never became a debt within the meaning of the above section until after judgment had been obtained thereon, viz: January 31, 1893, and patent to said tract of land having issued long prior thereto, said judgment at once became a lien thereon. Second, that the commutation of a homestead entry and the making of final proof and obtaining the final, or patent, certificate for the tract of land covered by said entry by a person qualified to obtain title to such land, who has complied with the requirements of the law regulating the disposition of same, is, so far as the question herein involved is concerned, equivalent to the issuance of the patent itself to such person.
¶2 We do not think the first contention of counsel is supported either by the weight of authority or the better reason. The writer's views, upon the proposition first raised, are perfectly expressed by Chief Justice Kelly, speaking for the court, in State v. O'Neil, 7 Ore. 141, where, in construing said sec. 2296, R. S. U. S., he says:
¶3 The liability of Byrne to plaintiff in error was complete on January 27, 1891, when the latter lost the property which he had purchased, under guaranty of title from the former. If this was not so, how did plaintiff in error maintain his action, accompanied by the ancillary proceeding of attachment, against Byrne? See also upon this proposition, Smith v. Omans, 17 Wis. 406; Mertz v. Berry, [Mich.] 59 N.W. 445; Warner v. Cammack, 37 Iowa 642; Loomis v. Gerson, 62 Ill. 11.
¶4 We also concur fully with the reasoning of the court, per Cole, justice, in Warner v. Cammack, supra, upon a question almost identical with the one here involved. That was a case where the plaintiff had sold to defendant "a certain patent improvement in a mop wringer, for the county of Blackhawk, in Iowa, for the sum of $ 100," and the defendant had, thereafter, in a justice's court, obtained a judgment for damages against him in the sum of $ 100, "in an action brought for fraudulent representations, etc., in the sale of said patent improvement in mop wringer," a transcript of which said judgment for the sum of $ 100 had been duly filed in the district court clerk's office of Fayette county, in said state, and execution issued thereon, which had been levied on the premises in controversy. Then Warner, the defendant in said action before said justice of the peace, brought this action to enjoin the sale of said premises under said execution, on the ground that they were exempt as a homestead. It was conceded on the trial of said action that said premises did constitute the homestead of the plaintiff therein, but it was contended that they were subject to execution under a section of the Iowa statute providing that "the homestead may be sold on execution for debts contracted prior to the purchase thereof," etc. In construing the words "debts contracted," the supreme court of Iowa says:
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