Flanagan v. Shamo, 99-73532.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-73532.,99-73532. |
| Citation | 111 F.Supp.2d 892 |
| Parties | Charles Michael FLANAGAN, Plaintiff, v. M. John SHAMO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Michael A. Rataj, Dearborn, MI, for plaintiff.
Thomas E. Marshall, Troy, MI, for defendant.
The above-captioned action is presently before the Court on Defendant John Shamo's July 12, 2000 Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 29, 2000 bench ruling denying his motion to dismiss. Having reviewed and considered Defendant's Motion, Brief and supporting documents, the Court has determined that Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration should be granted and this case should, accordingly, be dismissed, with prejudice.
Plaintiff Charles Michael Flanagan, a sergeant on the Detroit Police force, commenced this action against former Detroit Recorder's Court Judge M. John Shamo on July 16, 1999. Plaintiff's six-count Complaint alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross negligence is predicated upon actions taken by Judge Shamo on July 18, 1996 when he held Plaintiff in contempt of court for violating his order to remain in the courtroom after Plaintiff's testimony as a witness in an unrelated criminal case, People v. Akrawi. Judge Shamo was the presiding judge in that case.
After filing an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant Shamo subsequently filed a Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint on judicial immunity grounds. The Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion on June 29, 2000. At that hearing, Plaintiff's counsel claimed that whether Judge Shamo actually instructed Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom on July 18, 1996 was a matter in dispute. In support of his argument, Plaintiff's counsel represented to the Court that Assistant Wayne County Prosecutor Robert J. Donaldson, who was the prosecuting attorney in the Akrawi case, testified in his deposition that he never heard Judge Shamo order Plaintiff to stay in the courtroom.1 Plaintiff argued that if the Judge never ordered Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom and the Judge simply told officers to go look for Plaintiff and bring him back, judicial immunity does not attach.
After hearing Plaintiff's counsel's arguments, the Court determined that the issue of whether Judge Shamo actually told Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom was disputed. And, because the issue of whether Judge Shamo had ordered Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom is critical to establish the foundation of whether or not the Judge Shamo engaged in a "judicial action" on July 18, 1996 so as to entitle him to the protection of judicial immunity, the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice to the right to renew his claims of judicial immunity after completion of discovery on this issue.
On July 12, 2000, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider and reverse its June 29 ruling denying of his motion to dismiss. In support of his Motion, Defendant submitted the transcript of the July 18, 1996 Detroit Recorder's Court proceedings in the Akrawi case and the transcript of the February 12, 1999 deposition of Assistant Wayne County Prosecutor Robert Donaldson.
The transcript of the July 18, 1996 proceedings in the Akrawi case makes it clear that Judge Shamo did direct Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom after he completed his testimony.
After both the prosecutor and defense counsel indicated that they had no further questions for Sergeant Flanagan on July 18, 1996, Judge Shamo stated the following:
[Sergeant Flanagan completes his testimony.]
MR. HOWARTH [Defense counsel]: Nothing else. Thank you.
MR. DONALDSON [Prosecutor]: No questions.
THE COURT [Judge Shamo]: Ladies and gentlemen, step into the jury room. You can step down, Sergeant, but stay in the courtroom.
[July 18, 1996 Recorder's Court Transcript, Motion for Reconsideration Ex. C, p. 9]
Further, contrary to Plaintiff's counsel's representations at the June 29 hearing, Assistant Prosecutor Donaldson confirmed in his deposition that Judge Shamo ordered Flanagan to remain in the courtroom. He testified as follows:
Q [by Plaintiff's counsel, Mike Rataj]: Now, let's talk about the incident that gave rise to Sergeant Flanagan's incarceration. Off your memory did Judge Shamo order Sergeant Flanagan to remain in the courtroom?
A [by Mr. Donaldson]: Yes, as he was on the stand.
[Donaldson Feb. 12, 1999 Dep., Motion for Reconsideration Ex. D, p. 60.]
The standards governing motions for reconsideration are set forth in Eastern District Local Rule 7.1(g)(3):
Generally, and without restricting the court's discretion, the court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.
L.R. 7.1(g)(3) (emphasis added).
The Court finds that Defendant has sufficiently established through his submission of the two transcripts "a palpable defect by which the Court was misled" in that the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the representations of Plaintiff's counsel that Assistant Prosecutor Donaldson had testified in his deposition that Judge Shamo did not order Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom after testifying on July 18, 1996. As the transcripts demonstrate, Plaintiff's counsel's assertions at the June 29, 2000 hearing are not supported by the record.
With the record now establishing that Defendant Shamo did, in fact, order Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom, the Court will reconsider Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. As indicated, the basis of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is that Plaintiff's claims against Judge Shamo are barred by judicial immunity.
Plaintiff Charles Flanagan is a 14-year veteran of the Detroit Police Department. As indicated above, Defendant John Shamo was at the time of the incident complained of a Detroit Recorder's Court Judge. Judge Shamo is now retired from the bench.
In July 1996, Plaintiff was called to testify as a witness in the case of People v. Luis Akrawi in Detroit Recorder's Court. Judge Shamo presided over the Akrawi matter.
Mr. Akrawi was charged and later convicted of first-degree murder. Judge Shamo entered a pre-trial "gag order" in the case, precluding out of Court discussions of the case. Judge Shamo learned during the trial that Plaintiff violated that gag order.
Plaintiff testified at the Akrawi trial on July 10, 1996 and was later re-called on July 18, 1996 for further testimony. After completing his examination on July 18, Judge Shamo excused Plaintiff as a witness but instructed him to remain in the courtroom for the purpose of serving him with a Show Cause Order for violating the gag order. Judge Shamo then left the bench for a few minutes. Plaintiff left the courtroom when the judge left the bench.
When Judge Shamo returned to the bench and saw that Plaintiff was no longer in the courtroom, he announced that Plaintiff was being held in contempt for violating the order to remain in the courtroom. Plaintiff was then paged by the prosecutor to return to the courtroom, which he did approximately 18 minutes later. Upon Plaintiff's return, Judge Shamo summarily informed Flanagan that he was being held in contempt for violating the order to remain in the courtroom and sentenced him immediately to 10 days in jail. Plaintiff was not given any opportunity to address the court, retain counsel to represent him, or to excuse or mitigate his conduct or attitude at sentencing.2 Plaintiff was held at Wayne County Jail for one night. The next day, the Michigan Court of Appeals granted a Motion for Immediate Consideration and a Motion to Stay for the remaining nine days of the sentence in conjunction with Plaintiff's filing of an appeal of right.
On December 19, 1997, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the adjudication of contempt of court and discharged Sergeant Flanagan. Flanagan subsequently instituted this action for damages against Judge Shamo claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law.
Defendant Shamo contends that inasmuch as he was acting in his judicial capacity at the time of the actions complained of, he is cloaked with judicial immunity, and, therefore, is immune from suit for damages arising out of the events at issue.
Plaintiff concedes that it is generally accepted that judges are absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages, but he contends that his case falls within one of two recognized exceptions to that rule. As this Court noted (sitting by designation) in Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1997), there are two narrow exceptions to judicial immunity:
[Judicial] immunity is overcome in only two instances:
First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.
130 F.3d at 255 (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991)).
There is no dispute between the parties that Defendant's actions were judicial in nature, and, therefore, do not fall within the first of the above-noted exceptions. It is the...
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