Flanagan v. State
| Decision Date | 22 March 1898 |
| Citation | 30 S.E. 550,103 Ga. 619 |
| Parties | FLANAGAN v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. No person indicted for crime can, under sections 951 and 953 of the Penal Code, as matter of right, demand more than one trial upon a special plea of insanity at the time of trial. If, after such a plea has been found against the person, the trial in chief has been postponed, it would be a matter within the sound discretion of the judge whether or not another preliminary investigation upon the question of insanity at the trial should be had, and, if so, to what extent and in what manner the same should be conducted.
2. An exception to the general and well-settled rule that one is criminally responsible who had sufficient reason to distinguish between right and wrong, as to a particular act committed by him, exists in a case where it appears that though the accused had such knowledge, his will, in consequence of some delusion brought about by mental disease was overmastered, so that there was no criminal intent as to the act in question, and when it also appears that this identical act was connected with the peculiar delusion under which the accused was laboring.
3. Under the evidence introduced in the trial of the present case, it was erroneous not to give in charge to the jury the written request embodying the principle above announced, the same not being covered in the court's general charge to the jury.
4. Where the defense relied upon in a trial for murder was irresponsibility arising from insanity at the time of the homicide, any evidence tending to show the real mental condition of the accused at that time is relevant, and his acts both before and after the homicide may be proved as tending to throw light upon the question thus put in issue. Accordingly, it was not erroneous to allow the state to introduce in evidence an affidavit sworn to and subscribed by the accused himself, at a previous term, for the purpose of obtaining a continuance, the probative value and effect of such evidence being a matter solely for the determination of the jury.
5. Save as stated in the third headnote, the record discloses no sufficient cause for ordering a new trial in this case; the charge of the court, with the exceptions above referred to fairly presented to the jury the questions in issue; and the exceptions to it relating to other matters are not meritorious. There was no material error in admitting or rejecting evidence. The foregoing covers all questions requiring special mention which arose at the last trial and are likely to arise at the next.
Error from superior court, Dekalb county; J. S. Candler, Judge.
E. C. Flanagan was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Reversed.
Glenn & Rountree, for plaintiff in error.
W. T. Kimsey, Sol. Gen., J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., W. W. Braswell, and W. L. Wright, for the State.
Flanagan was indicted for the offense of murder. Upon his arraignment on the indictment, he filed a special plea of insanity, alleging that he was then insane. Under the provisions of the Penal Code, §§ 951, 953, a jury was selected to try the issue raised by this plea. After hearing the evidence, the argument of counsel, and the charge of the court, they returned a verdict finding that E. Flanagan was sane at that time. The case was then called for trial upon the merits, and the accused moved for a continuance, which was granted. More than two months thereafter, the case was again called for trial. Through his counsel the accused again filed a special plea of insanity, alleging that he was then insane, and could not, under the above sections of the Code, be forced to trial upon the merits until this second special plea was tried and determined. The state's counsel filed what they called a "special answer" to this second plea, wherein they set up the former trial upon a similar plea, and averred that the question of insanity at the time of trial was res adjudicata. Counsel for the accused demurred to this answer. The demurrer was overruled by the court, and the accused excepted. The trial then proceeded upon the merits. Flanagan was convicted of murder, and his motion for a new trial was overruled. The judgment overruling this motion was excepted to, and brought here for review.
1. One of the grounds of the motion for new trial alleged error in the trial judge in overruling the demurrer to the special answer of the state of the plea of "present insanity," above alluded to. The sections of the Code providing for this plea, and cited above, are as follows "Whenever the plea of insanity is filed, it shall be the duty of the court to cause the issue on that plea to be first tried by a special jury, and if found to be true, the court shall order the defendant to be delivered to the superintendent of the asylum, there to remain until discharged in the manner prescribed by law." "No lunatic, or person afflicted with insanity, shall be tried, or put upon his trial, for any offense, during the time he is afflicted with such lunacy or insanity, which shall be tried in the manner hereinbefore pointed out where the plea of insanity at the time of the trial is filed, and, on being found true, the prisoner shall be disposed of in like manner." Counsel for the accused insisted that, under these sections, Flanagan could file this plea, and, as matter of right, demand that it be tried by a special jury, although it had once been so tried by and determined against him. It was argued here in support of this contention that a person accused of crime had a right, under these sections, to file the plea of "present insanity" every time he was about to be tried, and that the trial judge had no discretion, but was compelled to impanel a jury to try this issue, regardless of the fact that he had tried it upon a former occasion. Were this true, it would be almost impossible to force the accused to a trial upon the merits of the case. As soon as one trial of such a special plea was ended by an adverse finding, and the case was again called for trial on the merits, the accused could again plead present insanity, and force the court to go over another trial of that issue, with possibly the same witnesses and the same evidence. If, in such second trial, the verdict should be against the plea, the accused could again file the same plea, and demand that it be again tried. We think that the legislature did not contemplate, such a construction of the act embodied in these sections of the Code. The intention of the legislature, as we gather it from these sections and from the original act, was doubtless to give the accused the benefit of a jury trial, in order to ascertain whether he had sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, to realize his peril, and to assist his counsel in his defense, and that, if the jury determined that he had such mental capacity, the trial would proceed upon its merits. It was simply the separate trial of one issue of the case, and this one trial was all, in our opinion, that the act was intended to give as matter of right. When this is had, the statutory right of the accused under these sections is exhausted. It is, however, possible, and in some cases probable, that a person, sane at the time of the trial of the special issue, may, where his case is continued for any length of time, become insane to such an extent as to lack mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, realize his peril, assist his counsel, etc. In such a case the accused would not be forced to trial upon the merits simply because a jury had, at a previous term of court, declared him then sane. His statutory rights under the Code sections above cited would have been exhausted, but resort could still be had to his common-law remedies. Under the common law, when a suggestion of insanity was made upon arraignment, the judge always investigated the case, and determined for himself whether the accused had sufficient mental capacity to go to trial. We think, therefore, that even after a jury had passed upon the plea of insanity at the time of trial, and had determined it against the accused, where it is suggested to the judge that since the time of such finding the mind of the accused had materially changed, and that he is now in such a mental condition as that he should not be put upon trial, the judge should make the proper investigation to ascertain the truth of the suggestion. He may do this in any right and proper manner,--by impaneling another jury if he deem it best to do so, by considering the affidavits of experts, by a personal examination and inspection, or otherwise. In 1 Bish. New Cr. Law, in the footnote to section 376, an account is given of the trial of Freeman, who was tried and convicted of murder. It appears from this account that Freeman, upon arraignment, had filed a plea similar to the special plea in the present case, and that it was found against him by the jury. Afterwards he was tried upon the merits of the case, and convicted. The supreme court granted a new trial. Mr. Bishop says: "Thereupon the judge of the higher court, who was to preside at the new trial, visited the prisoner in jail, and, in consequence of what there appeared of his mental condition, refused to proceed with the trial." The man, he states, subsequently died in prison, indubitably insane. Under the Code sections above set out, we think that the accused has no statutory right to more than one jury trial upon the issue of insanity at the time of the trial; but, under his common-law rights, he can at all trials suggest to the trial judge his incapacity, by reason of mental weakness, to go to trial, and appeal to the discretion of the judge, just as may be done by a...
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