Flateau v. Harrelson

• Decision Date: 16 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3652.,3652.
• Citation: 355 S.C. 197,584 S.E.2d 413
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ruby FLATEAU and Herbert S. Fielding, Appellants, v. Robert M. HARRELSON, Oliver H. Willis, Stella G. Williams, E. Lynn W. Smith, and Earlene S. Gardner, Respondents.

355 S.C. 197

584 S.E.2d 413

Ruby FLATEAU and Herbert S. Fielding, Appellants, v. Robert M. HARRELSON, Oliver H. Willis, Stella G. Williams, E. Lynn W. Smith, and Earlene S. Gardner, Respondents.

No. 3652.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard May 13, 2003.

Decided June 16, 2003.

Rehearing Denied August 22, 2003.

Coming B. Gibbs, Jr., and Jeffrey A. Barnwell, both of Charleston, for Appellants.

Kathryn Thomas and Christopher W. Johnson, both of Columbia, for Respondents.

ANDERSON, J:

Ruby Flateau and Herbert S. Fielding, employees of the South Carolina Commission for the Blind (Commission), appeal the circuit court's dismissal of their tort actions against the following members of the Commission's governing board: Robert M. Harrelson, Oliver H. Willis, Stella G. Williams, E.Lynn W. Smith, and Earlene S. Gardner (collectively, "the Board"). On appeal, Flateau and Fielding argue the court erred in finding: (1) the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (Act) provided the exclusive remedy for Flateau and Fielding; (2) the Act's two-year statute of limitations barred the actions; and (3) the Board's failure to substitute the Commission as a party precludes a finding that the causes of action of Flateau and Fielding fall within the Act's auspices. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 1998, the Board called Flateau and Fielding to a hearing in the Commission's Board Room. Flateau and Fielding entered the room at 10:00 a.m. Flateau left at 2:30 p.m. to attend a scheduled medical appointment. Fielding remained in the room until 4:30 p.m. During the interim, they were not allowed to leave the room without a security escort, nor were they permitted unaccompanied access to their offices. Members of the media were present.

Flateau and Fielding filed separate complaints in April 2001. Their respective complaints identified each of them as "an employee of the South Carolina Commission for the Blind" at all relevant times. The pleadings further stated that "[a]t the time of the incident ..., the Defendants were members of the Board of the South Carolina Commission for the Blind." In their complaints, Flateau and Fielding averred they "were commanded by Defendants to remain in the Board Room for the purposes of awaiting an interview by Defendants, who had entered upon an executive session." Flateau and Fielding alleged causes of action for outrage, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy.

The Board filed motions to dismiss the actions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. The Board argued: (1) Flateau and Fielding failed to assert in their pleadings that the Board's members acted outside the scope of their duties; (2) the Act provided the exclusive remedy for Flateau and Fielding; (3) the causes of action were barred by the Act's two-year statute of limitations; (4) the two-year statute of limitations applied "even if the complaint had alleged that the defendants acted outside the scope of their duties"; and (5) neither Flateau nor Fielding filed a verified claim that would extend the statute of limitations to three years. The court granted the motions to dismiss.

ISSUES

I. Did the circuit court err in finding the Act applied to the case at bar?

II. Did the circuit court err in finding the Act's two-year statute of limitations barred the causes of action brought by Flateau and Fielding?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, a defendant may move to dismiss based on a failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 511 S.E.2d 69 (1999); Bergstrom v. Palmetto Health Alliance, 352 S.C. 221, 573 S.E.2d 805 (Ct.App.2002). A trial judge in the civil setting may dismiss a claim when the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in the pleadings filed with the court. Williams v. Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 553 S.E.2d 496 (Ct.App.2001). Generally, in considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court must base its ruling solely upon allegations set forth on the face of the complaint. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995); Bergstrom, 352 S.C. at 233,573 S.E.2d at 811; see also Brown v. Leverette, 291 S.C. 364, 353 S.E.2d 697 (1987) (trial court must dispose of motion for failure to state cause of action based solely upon allegations set forth on face of complaint); Williams, 347 S.C. at 233,553 S.E.2d at 499 (trial court's ruling on 12(b)(6) motion must be bottomed and premised solely upon allegations set forth by plaintiff).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted if facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case. See Gentry v. Yonce, 337 S.C. 1, 522 S.E.2d 137 (1999); Stiles, 318 S.C. at 300, 457 S.E.2d at 602-03; see also Baird, 333 S.C. at 527, 511 S.E.2d at 73 (if the facts and inferences drawn from the facts alleged on the complaint would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory, then the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is improper); McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 494 S.E.2d 431 (Ct.App.1997) (motion to dismiss cannot be sustained if facts alleged in complaint and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case). In deciding whether the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss, this Court must consider whether the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, states any valid claim for relief. See Gentry, 337 S.C. at 5, 522 S.E.2d at 139; see also Cowart v. Poore, 337 S.C. 359, 523 S.E.2d 182 (Ct.App.1999) (looking at facts in light most favorable to plaintiff, and with all doubts resolved in his behalf, the court must consider whether the pleadings articulate any valid claim for relief).

The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action. Toussaint v. Ham, 292 S.C. 415, 357 S.E.2d 8 (1987). The trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss will be sustained if the facts alleged in the complaint do not support relief under any theory of law. Tatum v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, 346 S.C. 194, 552 S.E.2d 18 (2001); see also Gray v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 327 S.C. 646, 491 S.E.2d 272 (Ct.App.1997) (motion must be granted if facts and inferences reasonably deducible from them show that plaintiff could not prevail on any theory of the case).

"Dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appealable." Williams, 347 at 233, 553 S.E.2d at 500. Upon review of a dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the appellate court applies the same standard of review implemented by the trial court. Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. TORT CLAIMS ACT

Flateau and Fielding contend that because they stated a valid claim of relief, the trial court's decision to dismiss their causes of action under the Act was erroneous. We disagree.

The Tort Claims Act governs all tort claims against governmental entities and is the exclusive civil remedy available in an action against a governmental entity or its employees. See Murphy v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 317 S.C. 560, 455 S.E.2d 688 (1995); Wells v. City of Lynchburg, 331 S.C. 296, 501 S.E.2d 746 (Ct.App.1998). "The remedy provided by [the Tort Claims Act] is the exclusive civil remedy available for any tort committed by a governmental entity, its employees, or its agents except as provided in § 15-78-70(b)." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b) (Supp.2002) (emphasis added). "[The Tort Claims Act] constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a) (Supp.2002) (emphasis added). According to the Act, "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law, this chapter, the `South Carolina Tort Claims Act,' is the exclusive and sole remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity while acting within the scope of the employee's official duty." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-200 (Supp.2002) (emphasis added).

Section 15-78-70(a) provides in part that "[a]n employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is not liable therefor except as expressly provided for in subsection (b)." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a) (Supp.2002). Subsection (b) declares: "Nothing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmental entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-70(b) (Supp.2002).

The Act defines a "[g]overnmental entity" as "the State and its political subdivisions." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-30(d) (Supp.2002). The State "means the State of South Carolina" and includes its commissions. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-30(e) (Supp.2002). In the present case, the Act's definition of an "employee" refers to "any officer, employee, or agent of the State or its political subdivisions, including elected or appointed officials, law enforcement officers, and persons acting on behalf or in service of a governmental entity in the scope of official duty." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-30(c) (Supp.2002). "`Scope of official duty' or `scope of state employment' means (1) acting in and about the official business of a governmental entity and (2) performing official duties." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-30(i) (Supp.2002).

The Act is intended to cover those actions committed by an employee within the scope of the employee's official duty. "The provisions of [the Act] establishing limitations on and exemptions to the liability of the State, its political subdivisions, and employees, while acting within the scope of official duty, must be liberally construed in favor of limiting the liability of the State." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-20(f) (Supp. 2002); see also Wade v. Berkeley County, 330...