Flatin v. Lampert Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 15 March 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 43939,43939 |
| Parties | Orville FLATIN, Respondent, v. LAMPERT LUMBER COMPANY et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Winter, Lundquist, Sherwood & Athens and Thomas C. Athens, Wheaton, for appellants.
Rufer, Hefte, Pemberton, Schulze & Sorlie and Gerald S. Rufer, Fergus Falls, for respondent.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and KELLY, TODD, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court.
This action was brought by plaintiff, Orville Flatin, for personal injuries incurred in a collision of his truck with a truck owned by defendants, Lampert Lumber Company and Edgertown Lumber Company, and driven by their employee Gerald Lemke. In its special verdict, the jury found that Flatin was not negligent and that Lemke or his employers were negligent but that such negligence was not a direct cause of the collision. The trial court set aside the jury's answer regarding cause and determined that the negligence of defendants or Lemke was a direct cause of the accident as a matter of law. The appeal is taken from the judgment entered for plaintiff. We affirm.
The accident giving rise to this action occurred on March 28, 1969, at about 11:30 a.m., on U.S. Highway No. 52 in Otter Tail County. Preceding the collision, the trucks were approaching a 40-foot bridge from opposite directions on a straight and level stretch of the 2-lane highway. Because of the stormy winter weather, the roadway in the vicinity of the bridge was snowpacked and a drift 3 feet deep and 12 feet long had formed in the northbound lane near the south end of the bridge. Lemke, who had been traveling north at 40 miles per hour, testified that he saw the drift when he was about 150 feet from the bridge, and at the same time observed plaintiff's pickup truck approaching at about the same distance from the opposite end of the bridge. Lemke shifted down and applied his brakes and the rear end of the truck slid out across the centerline, blocking the road as far as plaintiff was concerned.
Plaintiff, who had been traveling south at 40 to 50 miles per hour, testified he saw the rear of the other truck slide out when each vehicle was about 50 feet from the bridge. Plaintiff further testified that if he braked at all, he did so only lightly, fearing that if he braked hard his truck would slide out of control. The trucks collided at or near the south end of the bridge.
Lemke testified that the truck he was driving was equipped with vacuum brakes which were set up for a load, so that when the truck was empty, as it was at the time of the collision, the brakes would grab, creating the likelihood of a skid. 1 He also testified that he had traveled 30 miles before the accident, all of it on ice, and that because of the wind and snow he anticipated drifts on the road and was watching for them.
In granting plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court explained in its memorandum it was of the opinion there was ample evidence that defendants were negligent in maintaining their vehicle with a defective braking system and that Lemke who knew of the tendency of the brakes to grab was negligent in the operation of the truck. The court felt that the causal connection between such negligence and the accident appeared as a matter of law.
The only issue before us is whether or not the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's finding that the negligence of defendants and their driver was not a direct cause of the accident and determining as a matter of law that such negligence was the direct cause.
On appeal, defendants argue that the jury could have found that neither driver was negligent, and that defendants were negligent but in a respect which would not be a proximate cause of the accident, such as failure to equip the truck with snow tires or the failure of Lemke to apply brakes sooner or blow the horn. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the jury's finding of negligence was based on Lemke's operation of the truck with knowledge that it could not be braked safely under the existing weather and road conditions, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law.
A number of similar cases have come before this court, and in the case of Nihart v. Kruger, 291 Minn. 273, 276, 190 N.W.2d 776, 778 (1971), we defined the scope of our review with respect to inconsistent verdicts:
However, before we can perform this function, we must know what findings the jury actually made.
The jury clearly made a finding of negligence, but did not specify whether the negligence was only the driver's, only the employers', or a combination. 2 Verdicts, however, must be reasonably construed with reference to the pleadings and the record. 19B Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) §...
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Britton v. Boulden
... ... Stark, 219 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1974); Quinn v. Moore, 292 A.2d 846 (Me.1972); Flatine v. Lampert Lumber Company, 298 Minn. 577, [87 NM 476] ... 215 N.W.2d 783 (1974); Bateman v. Glenn, 459 P.2d ... ...
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Nichols v. Railroad, A15-1100
...assumption of the risk is not a viable defense, and we presume the jury followed that instruction. See Flatin v. Lampert Lumber Co., 298 Minn. 577, 580 n.3, 215 N.W.2d 783, 785 n.3 (1974) (stating that the jury is presumed to follow a district court's instructions). In sum, there was enough......
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Cobb v. Soo Line R.R. Co.
...curative instructions. Johnson v. Washington Cnty., 506 N.W.2d 632, 639 (Minn. App. 1993) (citing Flatin v. Lampert Lumber Co., 298 Minn. 577, 580 n.3, 215 N.W.2d 783, 785 n.3 (1974)), aff'd, 518 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. June 30, 1994). And there is no basis in the record to conclude that the jury......
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Johnson v. Washington County, 833
...was tempered by the trial court's instruction to the jury not to award damages based on sympathy. See Flatin v. Lampert Lumber Co., 298 Minn. 577, 580 n. 3, 215 N.W.2d 783, 785 n. 3 (1974) (jury is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions). Under these circumstances, the trial cour......