Flavell v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev.
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-623 (CKK) |
| Parties | SARA GONZALEZ FLAVELL, Plaintiff v. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Sara Gonzalez Flavell, proceeding pro se, filed this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking reimbursement for certain employment benefits allegedly owed to her by Defendant International Bank for Reconstruction & Development ("IBRD"). IBRD subsequently removed this action to federal court and then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. Now pending before the Court are Plaintiff's [10] Motion to Remand and Defendant's [24] Motion to Dismiss. Upon review of the pleadings, the relevant legal authority, and the record as a whole,1 the Court will DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and also DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE IBRD's Motion to Dismiss.
On February 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a civil action against IBRD in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia ("D.C. Superior Court"). See Compl. at 1. Therein, Plaintiff alleged that she had been an employee of IBRD from October 1988 until December 2017. See id. at ¶ A. In December 2017, however, IBRD allegedly terminated Plaintiff "due to redundancy." Id. at ¶ E. IBRD then withheld $74,101.90 in employee benefits from Plaintiff, allegedly owed to her upon termination. See id. at ¶ P. According to Plaintiff, IBRD's refusal to pay out these benefits violated IBRD's own "rules," as well as "DC law." Id. at ¶ E. On the basis of these withholdings, Plaintiff asserted a single "breach of contract" claim against IBRD in her complaint before the D.C. Superior Court. See id. at 13 (identifying "nature of suit").
On March 3, 2020, IBRD removed Plaintiff's action from the D.C. Superior Court to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). To support removal, IBRD explained that it is a "public international organization" under the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 ("IOIA"), Not. of Removal, at ¶ 5, and, therefore, receives "the same privileges and immunities as foreign nations conferred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")," id. at ¶ 6. IBRD contended that because "the Court must apply the intricacies of federal case law interpreting the FSIA at the outset of any suit against an international organization, Plaintiff's claims arise under a federal question." Id. In sum, IBRD asserted that "[t]his Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the IOIA, 22 U.S.C. § 288a, the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), . . . and because it raises a question arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331." Id. at ¶ 7.
One week after its removal under § 1441(a), IBRD filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7, at 1. IBRD's motion acknowledged that Plaintiff's complaint "checked the 'Breach of Contract'box when indicating the nature of her suit." Id. at 9 n.1. Nonetheless, IBRD argued that this Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because IBRD "is immune from suit and legal process pursuant to its Articles of Agreement and the [IOIA]." Id. at 1. In particular, IBRD explained that "having to defend against a lawsuit based on Plaintiff's employment-related allegations interferes with the pursuit of [IBRD's] chartered objectives" and "would contravene the express language of Article VII section 1" of its Articles of Agreement. Id. at 6 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, IBRD maintained that this Court "lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice." Id. at 5.
In view of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court issued an order on March 10, 2020, pursuant to Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988), notifying Plaintiff of her obligation to respond to IBRD's dispositive motion. See Order, ECF No. 8, at 1. In that order, the Court also "order[ed] Plaintiff to include in her response to [IBRD's] Motion to Dismiss either an Amended Complaint, or a precise statement of the nature of the claims she [wa]s making in her Complaint and the legal grounds in order to assist the Court and parties in determining her claims." Id. The Court then required Plaintiff to submit her opposition and her amended pleadings by of before April 10, 2020. See id.
In response, Plaintiff promptly filed a motion on March 17, 2020, to remand her complaint back to the D.C. Superior Court. See Mot. to Remand at 1. In that motion, Plaintiff contended that her "claim [was] based on state law," id. at 19, and that IBRD's notice of removal included "no plausible case [for] federal question jurisdiction . . . " id. at 16. As such, Plaintiff requested that this Court "remand [her] case to state court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)." Id. at 19. In turn, IBRD filed an opposition brief on March 31, 2020, which again argued that "[p]ursuant to the IOIA, international organizations enjoy the same privileges and immunities as foreignnations under the FSIA, so this action may be removed to federal court." Def.'s Opp'n at 3. Additionally, IBRD's opposition brief asserted, for the first time, that the Court alternatively "has original jurisdiction pursuant to Section 10 of the Bretton Woods Act of 1945." Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. 286g).
In June 2020, after moving for remand, Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint. See Order, ECF No. 8, at 1. Plaintiff made clear that her amended complaint was filed specifically to comply with what "the Court ordered . . . in its Order of March 10, 2020." Pl.'s Mot., ECF No. 22, at 1. Plaintiff's amended complaint reiterated, in greater detail, her allegations that IBRD had wrongfully withheld benefit payments contractually owed to Plaintiff upon her termination in December 2017. See Am. Compl. at 1-12. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff set forth eight common-law causes of action, for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Conversion; (3) Misappropriation and/or Detinue; (4) Unjust Enrichment and/or Restitution; (5) Fraud and Deceit; (6) Misrepresentation; (7) Nonfeasance and/or Malfeasance; and (8) Tortious Interference with Contract. See id. at 55-103. In light of this amended pleading, the Court denied IBRD's original motion to dismiss without prejudice and ordered IBRD to respond to Plaintiff's amended complaint by June 26, 2020. See Order, ECF No 23, at 1. IBRD subsequently filed a renewed motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint, again arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because IBRD is "immune from suit and legal process pursuant to its Articles of Agreement and the [IOIA]." Def.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Second Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 24-1, at 1.
Plaintiff's motion for remand, as well as IBRD's renewed motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint remain pending. As the parties have now fully briefed these motions, both motions are ripe for this Court's review.
"Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).2 Upon filing a notice of removal, the defendant "bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists in federal court." Downey v. Ambassador Dev., LLC, 568 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Similarly, "[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to have a case that has been removed to federal court remanded back to state court, the party opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court." Mizell v. SunTrust Bank, 26 F. Supp. 3d 80, 84 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotation omitted). Courts in this jurisdiction "construe[ ] removal jurisdiction strictly, favoring remand where the propriety of removal is unclear." Ballard v. District of Columbia, 813 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2011). To that end, courts "must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand." Busby v. Cap. One, N.A., 841 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2012).
IBRD removed Plaintiff's original complaint "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)." Not. of Removal, at ¶ 7. To support removal jurisdiction, IBRD argued that this Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action under three federal statutes: (1) the IOIA, 22 U.S.C. § 288a; (2) the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), and (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Not. of Removal, at ¶ 7. Then, in its brief opposing remand, IBRD further asserted that this Court also "has original jurisdiction pursuant to the Bretton Woods Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. 286g." Def.'s Opp'n at 2 n.1. The Court will address each potential basis for jurisdiction below.
To begin, the Court is not persuaded that either 22 U.S.C. § 288a, under the IOIA, or 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), under the FSIA, independently confer this Court with original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action. Under the IOIA, 22 U.S.C. § 288a is a federal immunity statute, providing "international organizations," like IBRD, with "the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments. . . . " 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b); see also Zhan v. World Bank, No. 19-CV-1973 (DLF), 2019 WL 6173529, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Zhan v. World Bank, 828 F. App'x 723 (D.C. Cir. 2020). There is, however, no grant of jurisdiction mentioned anywhere in § 288a, nor does IBRD identify such a jurisdictional provision in either its Notice of Removal or its brief in opposition to remand. See Not. of Removal, at ¶ 7; Def.'s Opp'n at 1-4. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis for removal jurisdiction under 22 U.S.C. § 288a.
Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), under the FSIA, falls short. Unlike § 288a of the IOIA, § 1330(a) does set forth a jurisdictional grant. See 28 U.S.C. §...
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