Flavell v. Jim Yong Kim
| Decision Date | 07 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-115 (CKK) |
| Parties | SARA GONZÁLEZ FLAVELL, Plaintiff, v. JIM YONG KIM, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Sara González Flavell, proceeding pro se filed this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against current and former officers, directors, or employees of the World Bank. Asserting seven claims under District of Columbia common law, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed various “fraudulent, wrongful, and tortious acts” against her. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No 1-3. Defendants subsequently removed this action to federal court and then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.[1]
Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff's [15] Motion to Remand. Upon review of the pleadings, the relevant legal authority, and the record as a whole, [2] the Court will GRANT Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. However, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff's request for fees and costs associated with removal.
Plaintiff Sara González Flavell is a former employee of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”). Compl. ¶ 22. Defendants are seven current or former officers, directors, or employees of the World Bank. Id. ¶¶ 23-31.
Although Plaintiff's 82-page Complaint is quite detailed and difficult to follow, in general terms, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants fraudulently conspired to enforce a redundancy notice against her; failed to “prevent” this fraud; influenced an internal administrative tribunal to rule against her challenge to the redundancy notice; and caused her severe emotional distress. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 88, 109-13, 180, 188, 210, 223-29. Plaintiff's claims include: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, Compl. ¶¶ 122-51; (2) “fraud - concealment, ” id. ¶¶ 152-63; (3) “promissory fraud, ” id. ¶¶ 164-77; (4) interference with contractual rights and constructive fraud, id. ¶¶ 178- 95; (5) conspiracy to commit fraud, id. ¶¶ 196-220; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 221-31; and (7) “tort of another, ” id. ¶¶ 232-35. In sum, Plaintiff pleads only tort and fraud claims arising under District of Columbia common law.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”) on November 12, 2020. Compl., ECF No. 1-3. Although Defendants contend that they are immune from service of process, they agreed to waive service of process without prejudice to their assertion of immunity. See Stipulation & Order Regarding Service, ECF No. 9.
Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 13, 2021, invoking the Court's “original jurisdiction” over the case because “it raises questions arising federal law, ” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, including the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (“Bretton Woods Act”), 22 U.S.C. § 286g, the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (“IOIA”), 22 U.S.C. § 288, and Article III of the United States Constitution. Defs.' Notice of Removal ¶ 6, ECF No. 1. On March 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a [15] Motion to Remand and accompanying [16] Memorandum of Points & Authorities in support thereof. Plaintiff argues that removal was improper because there “are not federal laws relied on and no federal cause of action claimed in the Complaint.” Pl.'s Mem. ¶¶ 5, 33. She further contends that removal was improper due to various alleged technical defects with Defendants' Notice of Removal. See Id. ¶¶ 61-67. Plaintiff's motion is ripe for the Court's consideration.
“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”[3] Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Upon filing a notice of removal, the defendant “bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Downey v. Ambassador Dev., LLC, 568 F.Supp.2d 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Similarly, “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to have a case that has been removed to federal court remanded back to state court, the party opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Mizell v. SunTrust Bank, 26 F.Supp.3d 80, 84 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotation omitted). Courts in this jurisdiction “construe[ ] removal jurisdiction strictly, favoring remand where the propriety of removal is unclear.” Ballard v. District of Columbia, 813 F.Supp.2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2011). To that end, courts “must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand.” Busby v. Cap. One, N.A., 841 F.Supp.2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2012).
Defendants removed Plaintiff's complaint based on the Court's “original jurisdiction” over the action “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).” Not. of Removal ¶ 7. Defendants contended that the Court has “original jurisdiction” of Plaintiff's action pursuant to three federal statutes: (1) the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (“IOIA”), 22 U.S.C. § 288a; (2) the Bretton Woods Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 286g, and (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. However, in their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Defendants contend that the Court has “original jurisdiction” under the Bretton Woods Act, see Defs.' Opp'n at 12-14, and that Plaintiff's Complaint raises a “substantial question of federal law, ” such that it “arises under federal law” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, id. at 3-12.[4] The Court will address each potential basis for jurisdiction below.
A. Original Jurisdiction
Defendant argues that the Court has “original jurisdiction” over Plaintiff's action under the Bretton Woods Act, which provides:
For the purpose of any action which may be brought within the United States or its Territories or possessions by or against the [International Monetary] Fund or the Bank [for Reconstruction and Development] in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund or the Articles of Agreement of the Bank, the Fund or the Bank, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be an inhabitant of the Federal judicial district in which its principal office in the United States is located, and any such action at law or in equity to which either the Fund or the Bank shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of any such action. When either the Fund or the Bank is a defendant in any such action, it may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action from a State court into the district court of the United States for the proper district by following the procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law.
22 U.S.C. § 286g (emphases added). In sum, this provision allows the World Bank to remove to federal court “any action which may be brought . . . by or against . . . the Bank in accordance with . . . the Articles of Agreement of the Bank.” Id.
Without citing any supporting legal authority, Defendants argue that the Court “must read the Bretton Woods Act's provision allowing for removal as encompassing executive directors, officers, and employees of the Bank as well.” Defs.' Opp'n at 14. They contend that such a reading of § 286g because the “immunities” of such individuals “derive from the Bank itself, ” and should be properly litigated in federal, rather than state court. Id. at 13. Absent any supporting legal authority, the Court sees no reason to adopt such an expansive reading of § 286g. Rather, other statutory provisions upon which Defendants rely clearly distinguish between the Bank and its officers and employees. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 288d(b) (“[O]fficers and employees of such [international] organizations shall be immune from suit . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 288a (“International organizations shall enjoy the status, immunities, exemptions, and privileges, as set forth in this section . . .”) (emphasis added). Had Congress intended to extend to “officers and employees” of the World Bank the ability to remove an action brought “in accordance with the Articles of Agreement with the Bank, ” it would have so stated.
Even if Defendants' proposed reading of § 286g is correct, they ignore § 286g's qualification limiting removal to “any such action” “brought . . . in accordance with” the Articles of Agreement. § 286g. Defendants have failed to show how the present action may be “brought in accordance with” the Bank's Articles of Agreement to secure § 286g's grant of original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Flavell, 2021 WL 1146301, at *4-5. The Court is not satisfied that Defendants have carried their burden to demonstrate that this Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action pursuant to § 286g. B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Defendants also contend that removal was proper because this action “arises under” federal law.” 28 U.S.C § 1331. “One category of cases over which the district courts have original jurisdiction are ‘federal question' cases; that is, those cases ‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'” Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). “The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule, '” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, which provides that “a suit ‘arises under' federal law ‘only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law], '” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). “[A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an...
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