FLEET NAT. BANK v. GARDINER HILLSIDE

• Decision Date: 30 July 2002
• Citation: 2002 ME 120,802 A.2d 408
• Parties: FLEET NATIONAL BANK v. GARDINER HILLSIDE ESTATES, INC. et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

802 A.2d 408

2002 ME 120

FLEET NATIONAL BANK v. GARDINER HILLSIDE ESTATES, INC. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: March 26, 2002.

Decided: July 30, 2002.

Colleen P. Tucker, Portland, for the plaintiff.

Mark A. Kearns, Abenaki Professional Park, Wells, for the defendants.

Panel: CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.

CLIFFORD, J.

[¶ 1] Gardiner Hillside Estates, Inc.¹ appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.), that certified as final pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b) a summary judgment in favor of Fleet National Bank² in Fleet's foreclosure action against the property of Gardiner Hillside. Gardiner Hillside contends that the Superior Court erred in certifying the judgment as final before resolving its counterclaims, and in entering the summary judgment. We affirm the judgment.

[¶ 2] Fleet lent $337,500 to Hamilton Trowbridge Realty Trust Corporation, evidenced by a promissory note dated March 6, 1996. The note provided that the borrower would make sixty monthly payments, the first fifty-nine of which would be $3176.86. Fleet also loaned $50,000 to HTH Corporation, which executed a promissory note, also dated March 6, 1996, that had substantially the same terms as the note from Hamilton Trowbridge except that the monthly payments were proportionally lower. On that same day, Gardiner Hillside guaranteed each of the above loans and granted Fleet mortgages on two properties owned by Gardiner Hillside to secure the loans.

[¶ 3] The debtors on the notes fell behind in their payments, and Fleet instituted this foreclosure action against Gardiner Hillside. Gardiner Hillside raised the affirmative defenses of fraud in the inducement, contributory negligence, fraud, illegality, injury by a fellow servant, estoppel, failure to comply with 14 M.R.S.A. § 6111 (Supp.2001),³ violation of state and federal confidentiality statutes, violation of the Maine Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, failure to include a necessary party, and failure to mitigate damages. Gardiner Hillside also asserted five counterclaims, seeking damages for (I) fraud in the inducement, (II) release of confidential information, (III) violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, (IV) violation of the Maine Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and (V) abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The remedy sought by the counterclaims was limited to monetary damages.

[¶ 4] Fleet moved, unsuccessfully, to strike the affirmative defenses and counterclaims pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(f) and to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Fleet later moved for a summary judgment in its foreclosure action, but not on Gardiner Hillside's counterclaims. Gardiner Hillside's response to the motion for a summary judgment on the complaint for foreclosure did not specifically dispute the facts set out in the M.R. Civ. P. 56(h) statement of material facts filed by Fleet, nor did Gardiner Hillside submit a statement of material facts to support its affirmative defenses. Rather, Gardiner Hillside asserted facts to support its counterclaims and argued that summary judgment on the foreclosure action was improper because the damages that would be recovered pursuant to the counterclaims would offset the liability on the note.

[¶ 5] The court entered a summary judgment in favor of Fleet on its foreclosure claim. It concluded that the statement of material facts submitted by Fleet established its right to a judgment of foreclosure, and that Gardiner Hillside's response failed to controvert Fleet's statement of material facts in the manner required by M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2). Gardiner Hillside appealed the summary judgment.

[¶ 6] On June 22, 2001, this Court (Wathen, C.J.) ordered that Gardiner Hillside's appeal from the summary judgment be remanded to the Superior Court for either (1) disposition of the pending counterclaims, or (2) a determination of the appropriateness of the entry on the docket pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b).

[¶ 7] On remand, the Superior Court certified the foreclosure judgment as final and ordered its immediate entry on the docket. The court determined that the requirements of Rule 54(b) were satisfied because (1) the claims for foreclosure were legally and factually distinguishable from the counterclaims, (2) the amounts due on the loans were determinable and determined, (3) Gardiner Hillside had failed to show that it would be irreparably harmed by the entry of the judgment and initiation of the ninety-day redemption period, and (4) Gardiner Hillside's counterclaims sought monetary relief only, and its ability to recover those damages from Fleet, should it prevail on the counterclaims, would not be affected by the foreclosure. This appeal by Gardiner Hillside from the order of certification followed.

I.

[¶ 8] Gardiner Hillside challenges the propriety of the certification of the summary judgment. It also contends that the summary judgment should be vacated on its merits because the damages it will receive for its counterclaims will offset the amount due on the notes.⁴

[¶ 9] Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)(1) provides, in its entirety:

Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of this subdivision [concerning entry of a judgment on the underlying claim before entering judgment on a request for attorney's fees] and in Rule 80(d) [concerning certain orders prior to judgment], when more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, except those enumerated in paragraph (2) of this subdivision and in the last sentence of Rule 80(d), which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).

[¶ 10] We review certifications under Rule 54(b) for abuse of discretion. Dravo Corp. v. Regional Waste Sys., Inc., 632 A.2d 141, 142 (Me.1993). There is a strong policy against piecemeal review of litigation, however, and we require that there be a good reason for immediate certification of a partial judgment. See Bates v. Eckhardt Telecomm. Inc., 2002 ME 69, ¶ 6, 794 A.2d 648, 650. The trial court must explain with particularity why it finds that "no just reason for delay" exists. Id. It is not sufficient that the court merely recites that it finds no reason for delay as "a matter of rote." Cole v. Peterson Realty, Inc., 432 A.2d 752, 757 (Me.1981).

[¶ 11] When deciding whether there is no just reason for a delay, the trial court should consider several factors:⁵

They include the relationship between adjudicated and unadjudicated claims, the

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