Fleet v. Webber Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–0637.,14–0637.
• Citation: 772 S.E.2d 369,235 W.Va. 184
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: James R. FLEET, Jamila J. Fleet, and James Lampley, Defendants Below, Petitioners v. WEBBER SPRINGS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff Below, Respondent.

235 W.Va. 184

772 S.E.2d 369

James R. FLEET, Jamila J. Fleet, and James Lampley, Defendants Below, Petitioners

v.WEBBER SPRINGS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff Below, Respondent.

No. 14–0637.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 7, 2015.

Decided April 23, 2015.

May 26, 2015.

Stephen G. Skinner, Anthony J. Delligatti, Skinner Law Firm, Charles Town, WV, for Petitioners.

Christopher J. Regan, Jason E. Causey, Bordas & Bordas, PLLC, Wheeling, WV, Anthony J. Majestro, Powell & Majestro, PLLC, Charleston, WV, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Association for Justice.

Susan R. Snowden, Jason S. Murphy, Martin & Seibert, L.C., Martinsburg, WV, Tammy Mitchell McWilliams, Trump & Trump, L.C., Martinsburg, WV, for Respondent.

Opinion

DAVIS, Justice:

This case involves a dispute between a homeowners association that is a West Virginia Limited Expense Planned Community under W. Va.Code § 36B–1–203 (1994) (Repl. Vol. 2011) and certain homeowners who have failed to pay their association assessments. The parties disagree over the ability of a West Virginia Limited Expense Planned Community to assert a common law lien on real property for unpaid association assessments, attorney's fees, and costs. In addition, we are asked to decide whether an association's attempts to collect delinquent assessments are governed by the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The homeowners herein appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment resolving these issues in favor of the homeowners association. We conclude that W. Va.Code § 38–16–202(a) (1999) (Repl. Vol. 2011) and W. Va.Code § 38–16–201 (1999) (Repl. Vol. 2011) authorize a consensual common law lien against real property and that the unfair debt collection provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act do apply to a homeowners association's attempts to collect delinquent assessments. Accordingly, we affirm, in part; reverse, in part; and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¹

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Webber Springs Owners Association, Inc. (“Webber Springs”), plaintiff below and respondent herein, has elected to be a West Virginia Limited Expense Liability Planned Community (“LELPC”). In November 2003, the developer and declarant² of Webber Springs recorded in the Berkeley County, West Virginia, land records, its declaration³ of conditions, covenants, restrictions, and easements for the planned community. Because Webber Springs declared itself to be an LELPC pursuant to W. Va.Code § 36B–1–203,⁴ it is exempt from all but a few specified provisions of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, and its assessments⁵ are capped in accordance with W. Va.Code § 36B–1–203. The declaration recorded by Webber Springs provides that delinquent unpaid assessments are both liens against the real estate and the personal obligation of the owner.

The parties do not dispute that Webber Springs has the right to assess and collect certain fees and homeowners association assessments. Rather, the instant conflict revolves around Webber Springs ability to place a lien on the real property of Webber Springs homeowners whose dues are delinquent.

Mr. James Lampley (“Mr. Lampley”) acquired title to real property within Webber Springs by deed dated February 25, 2005. The deed expressly provides that the conveyance is subject to “all those reservations, restrictions, easements and other matters of record....” Similarly, James R. Fleet and Jamila J. Fleet (“the Fleets”) acquired title to real property within Webber Springs by deed dated May 6, 2005. Their deed expressly provides that the conveyance is subject to “all rights, ways, utility line easements and restrictive covenants of record.” In addition, Mr. Lampley and the Fleets signed a document titled “Planned Unity Development Rider” in which they agreed to promptly pay, when due, all homeowners' dues and assessments. Mr. Lampley and the Fleets (collectively, “the Homeowners”) are the defendants below and petitioners herein.

It is undisputed that Mr. Lampley failed to pay his annual homeowners assessments for the years 2007 through 2011. Likewise, it is undisputed that the Fleets failed to pay their annual homeowners assessments for the years 2006 through 2011. As a consequence, Webber Springs recorded, in the Berkeley County Clerk's office, “notices of liens” purporting to create liens for the unpaid assessments, attorney's fees, and costs, on the real property owned by the Homeowners.⁶

On January 3, 2012, Webber Springs filed separate complaints against the Homeowners. The Homeowners responded by filing separate answers and counterclaims against Webber Springs asserting violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The Homeowners then filed a combined motion to file an amended answer to include class action claims⁷ and to consolidate their cases. The circuit court granted the Homeowners' motion to consolidate their cases.

Thereafter, Webber Springs moved for summary judgment on the counterclaims asserted by the Homeowners. By order entered April 25, 2014, the Circuit Court of Berkeley County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Webber Springs as to all of the Homeowners' counterclaims. This appeal followed.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The instant matter is before this Court on appeal from an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Webber Springs.⁸ Accordingly, our review is de novo.

“A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. ” Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). In conducting our de novo review, we are mindful that “[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Finally, to the extent that our resolution of this matter requires us to consider statutory provisions, our review is likewise de novo. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). Applying the foregoing standards, we proceed to address the issues raised.

III.DISCUSSION

Two issues are raised in this appeal. First, the Homeowners assert that the circuit court erred by concluding that Webber Springs had valid common law liens against the Homeowners' real property. Second, the Homeowners argue that the circuit court erred by concluding that a homeowners associations' attempts to collect assessments are not subject to the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. We address each of these issues in turn.

A. Validity of Webber Springs' Liens

The Homeowners argue that the liens asserted by Webber Springs are invalid and unenforceable pursuant to W. Va.Code § 38–16–202(a). In this regard, the Homeowners contend that the circuit court erred by failing to interpret W. Va.Code § 38–16–202(a) as completely barring common law liens against real property, regardless of whether such liens are consensual. Webber Springs, on the other hand, contends that the Homeowners have misconstrued the statute. We agree.

Prior to examining the relevant statutes, we pause to note that “[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). See also Syl. pt. 1, Pond Creek Pocahontas Co. v. Alexander, 137 W.Va. 864, 74 S.E.2d 590 (1953) (“The basic and cardinal principle, governing the interpretation and application of a statute, is that the Court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature at the time the statute was enacted, and in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time of the enactment.”). However, this Court's authority to construe a statute is confined to only those statutes that contain an ambiguity. “A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Hereford v. Meek, 132 W.Va. 373, 386, 52 S.E.2d 740, 747 (1949). See also Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959) (“When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.”); Syl. pt. 2, Pond Creek Pocahontas Co. v. Alexander, 137 W.Va. 864, 74 S.E.2d 590 (1953) (“Where the meaning of a statute is clear and its provisions are unambiguous, this Court will not undertake to construe and interpret it, but will apply the statute as its exact terms require.”); Syl. pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.”).

Pursuant to the plain language of W. Va.Code § 38–16–202(a), “[a] common law lien against real property is invalid and is not recognized or enforceable in this state.” However, the foregoing statute may not be read in isolation. “Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.” Syl. pt. 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). See also Syl. pt. 5, in part, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975) (“Stat...