Fleming v. Texas Loan Agency

• Decision Date: 25 June 1894
• Citation: 27 S.W. 126
• Parties: FLEMING v. TEXAS LOAN AGENCY.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

27 S.W. 126

FLEMING v. TEXAS LOAN AGENCY.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 25, 1894.

Certified questions from court of civil appeals of fifth supreme judicial district.

Action by Fannie R. Fleming against the Texas Loan Agency. On appeal to the court of civil appeals by plaintiff, questions were certified to the supreme court.

Todd & Rogers, for appellant. R. S. Neblett, for appellee.

GAINES, J.

The court of civil appeals for the fifth district certifies for our determination the following question: "Does article 2899, subd. 2, of the Revised Statutes of Texas, confer a right of action against a private corporation, other than a common carrier, for death of any person, caused by the wrongful act, negligence, unskillfulness, or default of such private corporation? In other words, does the word `person,' as contained in said subdivision 2, include private corporations within its meaning?"

The provision in question, with a part of its context, reads as follows: "Art. 2899. An action for the actual damages on account of injuries causing the death of any person may be brought in the following cases: * * * (2) When the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, unskillfulness or default of another." Since death cannot be predicated of an artificial person, it is obvious that by the word "person," as expressly used in subdivision 2, is meant a natural person; and the contention on part of those who hold the negative of the question would seem to be that by the word "another," as used in the same sentence, is meant another such person. The argument, in our opinion, is more plausible than sound. The sentence is rendered complete, with all its terms fully expressed, by the addition of the word "person" only. If that was expressed which is left to be implied, subdivision 2 would read as follows: "When the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, unskillfulness or default of another person." Because the word "person," as first used, is applicable to its context in a restricted sense only, it by no means follows that, as subsequently used, the legislature did not intend it to have a more comprehensive meaning. It does not follow that because you mean a human being, when you speak of the death of a person, you may not mean to include corporations, when you speak of such death as having been caused by the act or omission of a person. In view of article 3140 of the Revised Statutes, this is especially true when applied to the statute in question. That article declares, in effect, among other things, that the word "person," whenever it appears in the Revised Statutes, shall be construed to include corporations, "unless a different meaning is apparent from the context." The fortuitous circumstance that the word, as expressed in the provision in question, applies only to natural persons, does not make it apparent to us that the legislature intended that the same meaning should be given to it when impliedly repeated in a connection in which it is capable of a broader application, and thus to except it from the rule of construction so...