Flenner v. Sheahan, 96-1979

• Decision Date: 12 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1979,96-1979
• Citation: 107 F.3d 459
• Parties: Albert FLENNER and William Glover, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael F. SHEAHAN, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 459

107 F.3d 459

Albert FLENNER and William Glover, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael F. SHEAHAN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-1979.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 6, 1997.

Decided Feb. 12, 1997.

Matthew M. Litvak, argued, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jack O'Malley, Gina E. Brock, argued, Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Albert Flenner and William Glover, former Cook County correctional officers, allege that Michael F. Sheahan, the Sheriff of Cook County, initiated discharge proceedings against them due to their affiliation with the Cook County Republican Party. Claiming that Sheahan violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from patronage employment practices, Flenner and Glover brought suit under Title 42, section 1983. Sheriff Sheahan raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, and moved the district court for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted his motion, holding that Sheriff Sheahan was entitled to qualified immunity because the law concerning patronage dismissal of correctional officers was not clearly established in 1993, the time of the alleged constitutional violation. Because we conclude that the district court erred in determining that appellants could prove no set of facts sufficient to support their claim for relief, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

Albert Flenner and William Glover were hired as Cook County correctional officers by the Republican administration of Sheriff James O'Grady on August 10, 1989 and January 2, 1990, respectively. Appellants were active members of the Cook County Republican Party, and both had campaigned on behalf of former Sheriff O'Grady. In the December 1990 general election, Sheriff Sheahan defeated O'Grady. Appellants allege that Sheriff Sheahan instructed the Inspector General for the Cook County Sheriff to compile a list of names of employees of the Sheriff's Department who had been hired by the O'Grady administration and to screen those employees to determine whether they had answered truthfully all of the questions on their employment applications. Making a misrepresentation on an application for employment constitutes a ground for dismissal.

Sheahan initiated complaints against appellants in January 1993. Hearings were held before the Cook County Merit Board, which resulted in appellants' dismissal in February 1993. According to appellants' complaint, Glover did in fact have a high school diploma, although the finding of the Merit Board was to the contrary. While Flenner did not have a high school diploma at the time he applied for his position, he alleges that he subsequently obtained one while still employed as a correctional officer.

Appellants claim that these charges were a pretext for terminating them because of their political affiliation. They allege that three correctional officers, none of whom had graduated from high school, were hired by the Sheahan administration. These officers were sponsored by either the Cook County Democratic Party or Sheriff Sheahan himself for positions identical to the positions held by appellants. Although all three misrepresented on their applications that they had a high school diploma or the equivalent of a diploma, these officers were permitted to obtain G.E.D.'s and to remain employed as Cook County correctional officers.

II.

We review de novo an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See GATX Leasing Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir.1995); Craigs, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.1993). A motion under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b): the motion is not granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts sufficient to support his claim for relief, and the facts in the complaint are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46 (7th Cir.1996); Church v. General Motors Corp., 74 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir.1996); GATX Leasing Corp., 64 F.3d at 1114; Craigs, Inc., 12 F.3d at 688.

Appellants have alleged that Sheriff Sheahan initiated discharge proceedings against them because of their political affiliation and, for purposes of reviewing appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings, we accept these allegations as true. Sheriff Sheahan does not contest, for purposes of this motion, that filing complaints against appellants because of their political affiliation would constitute a violation of their constitutional rights. Our inquiry therefore is limited to Sheriff Sheahan's claim that, even if all of appellants' allegations are true, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

"The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " See Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)); Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 791 (7th Cir.1993). Qualified immunity is therefore a defense which is "contingent on the state of the law" at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. See Smith, 28 F.3d at 650 (quoting Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir.1991)); Marshall, 984 F.2d at 792. "When the law is settled on a particular point, public employees are expected to conform their conduct accordingly, and they may be held liable when they do not." Smith, 28 F.3d at 650. Conversely, government officials cannot "reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments" or "to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Qualified immunity thereby serves the public interest in deterring unlawful conduct without paralyzing government decisionmakers by placing on them the onerous burden of predicting the law's evolution. See id.; Pounds v. Griepenstroh, 970 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1992) ("[Qualified immunity] allows officials to carry out their duties confidently, without fear of incurring unexpected liability.").

Sheriff Sheahan argues that he is entitled to immunity because it was not sufficiently established in January 1993 that the dismissal of Cook County correctional officers based on their political affiliation was a violation of the officers' First Amendment rights to freedom of association. Sheriff Sheahan points to the decisions of this court in Dimmig v. Wahl, 983 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.1993), and Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.1991), both of which address the patronage dismissal of deputy sheriffs. Sheriff Sheahan suggests that these decisions, as of 1993, could reasonably be read to stand for the broad proposition that a deputy sheriff, as a matter of law, is a position for which party affiliation may be an appropriate requirement. Appellee further argues that this court did not make clear that this was not a proper reading of Dimmig and Upton until its 1994 decisions in Kolman v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1994) and Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 892 n. 3.

While recognizing that the position of correctional officer is not the same as the position of deputy sheriff, appellee argues that a reasonable person would conclude that the two positions should be treated similarly for purposes of patronage dismissal. This is so, according to Sheriff Sheahan, because, under Illinois law, the method by which correctional officers and deputy sheriffs are removed from their positions is the same--for cause, upon written charges filed with the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board. ¹

III.

The issue before this court is therefore whether it was sufficiently clear in January 1993 that initiating disciplinary proceedings against Cook County correctional officers due to their political affiliation violated the officers' First Amendment rights. The constitutional right to be free from patronage employment practices was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). In Elrod, a case which coincidently involved the Cook County Sheriff's Office, a plurality of the Court held the practice of patronage employment dismissals to be unconstitutional. Although the Court recognized that patronage dismissal might still be appropriate for certain government positions, namely those in which the practice is "necessary ... to foster and protect efficient and effective government," the Court considered it clear that the positions at issue in Elrod, those of process server, clerk, and a bailiff/security guard in the Juvenile Court of Cook County, are not among those positions for which patronage dismissal is permissible. Id. at 366-67, 96 S.Ct. at 2686-87. The Court's opinion in Elrod "was read to establish a definitional-categorizational test whereby the protection accorded the plaintiff was based on whether the office was found to be a 'policymaking' or 'confidential' position." See Meeks v. Grimes, 779 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir.1985).

In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), the Court "moved away from the policymaking and confidential labels and towards a more functional analysis." Id. The Court held that "the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office...