Greene v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Office

Decision Date04 February 2015
Docket NumberNo. 12 C 8763,12 C 8763
Citation79 F.Supp.3d 790
PartiesElliotte Greene, Marlon Jones, and Luis Santoyo, Plaintiffs, v. Cook County Sheriff's Office, Toni Preckwinkle, In her Individual Capacity As Cook County Board President, DeWayne Holbrook, in his Individual Capacity as Chief of Police for the Cook County Sheriff's Office, and Cook County, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Edward M. Fox, Jonathan R. Ksiazek, Ed Fox & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Michael A. Kuczwara, Jr., James Charles Pullos, Lisa Marie Meador, Thomas Edward Nowinski, Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs are three employees of the Cook County Sheriff's Office who, during Todd Stroger's term as Cook County Board President, held the title of “security specialist” and provided driving and protection services for Mr. Stroger. After Defendant Toni Preckwinkle was elected Cook County Board President, Preckwinkle wanted no members of Stroger's security detail to continue on her detail. Defendant DeWayne Holbrook, then the Chief of Police for the Cook County Sheriffs Office, transferred Plaintiff Luis Santoyo from the security detail to a patrol position. Gary Hickerson, within the Department of Corrections, transferred Plaintiffs Elliotte Greene and Marlon Jones to their previous positions within the Department of Corrections.

Plaintiffs filed this § 1983 suit against Cook County; Toni Preckwinkle, in her individual capacity as the Cook County Board President; the Cook County Sheriff's Office; and DeWayne Holbrook in his individual capacity as the Chief of Police for the Cook County Sheriff's Office, alleging that Defendants demoted Plaintiffs based on political considerations in violation of Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants seek summary judgment. In their motion [72], Defendants DeWayne Holbrook and the Cook County Sheriff's Office (Sheriffs Office Defendants) argue (1) that the security specialist position is exempt from First Amendment protections because it is a confidential position, and (2) that Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case of political retaliation. Defendants Toni Preckwinkle and Cook County (County Defendants) have moved independently for summary judgment [77], similarly arguing that the position is exempt from First Amendment protections and that Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case. County Defendants also urge that Toni Preckwinkle is entitled to qualified immunity.

The court concludes that Sheriff's Office Defendants' motion for summary judgment [72] must be denied. County Defendants' motion for summary judgment [77] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants have not established that, as a matter of law, security specialists are confidential positions, and Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of retaliation. Because Plaintiffs' right not to lose their job assignments for political reasons was not clearly established, however, Toni Preckwinkle is entitled to qualified immunity.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiffs Greene, Jones, and Santoyo are employees of the Cook County Sheriff's Office. Santoyo began working for the Sheriff's Office in 1995, Greene in 1999, and Jones in 2005; each one started out in the Department of Corrections as Correctional Officers. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO Defs.' Local R. 56.1 Statement of Facts [86], hereinafter “Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF,” ¶¶ 5–7.) Santoyo was promoted to the Sheriffs Police in 1997 and Greene was promoted to Correctional Sergeant within the Department of Corrections in 2004. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶¶ 5, 7.) All three Plaintiffs were assigned to Stroger's security detail and served in that capacity until Stroger's term ended on December 6, 2010. (Pls.' Local R. 56.1 Statement of Additional Material Facts in Opp. to Cnty. [85] hereinafter “Pls.' SAF to County,” ¶ 20.)

The detail operates as a hybrid entity reporting to supervisors in both the Cook County Board President's office and the Cook County Sheriff's Office. Though the Cook County Sheriff's Office is not mandated by any ordinance or state statute to provide security specialists, (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 34), the security detail is composed of Sheriff's Office employees who remain employed by the Cook County Sheriff's Office (and paid out of the Sheriff's budget), but report to a director of the detail. (Pls.' Resp. to County Defs.' Local R. 56.1 Statement of Facts [83], hereinafter “Pls.' Resp. to County SOF,” ¶¶ 32, 48; Organizational Chart, Ex. 21 to Pls.' Appendix [89–21], hereinafter “Org. Chart,” 3.) The director of the detail in turn reports to the Cook County Board President. (Org. Chart at 3; County Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' SAF [91], hereinafter “County Resp. to SAF,” ¶ 9.) The Chief of Police of the Cook County Sheriff's Office also retains authority over any police officers assigned to the detail. (County Resp. to SAF ¶ 8.)

I. Todd Stroger's security detail

Todd Stroger was elected Cook County Board President in November, 2006. (Dep. of Elliotte Greene, Ex. 2 Pls.' Appendix [89–2], hereinafter “Greene Dep.,” 12:8–9.) During Mr. Stroger's campaign, from about August through November of 2006, Plaintiffs Greene and Jones volunteered one day a week as drivers and security specialists. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 12.) Greene and Jones were both employed by the Department of Corrections at the time (Greene as a Correctional Sergeant and Jones as a Correctional Officer) and performed this volunteer work on their days off. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶¶ 5–6, 12.) Shortly after Stroger's election, Stroger's Chief of Staff, Lance Tyson, called Brian Towne, then the Sheriff's Director of Administration, to request that the Sheriff's Office assign Greene to his security detail. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 15.) About a year and a half later, on May 8, 2008, another position on the detail opened up, and Lance Tyson requested that Jones fill that position. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 20; Pls.' Resp. to County SOF ¶ 10.) The parties dispute the reasons for these openings on the detail: Plaintiffs assert that the positions became available after a previous member of the detail retired. (Pls.' SAF to County ¶ 20.) According to County Defendants, Greene replaced Elmer Frazier,2 a member of the detail “who was removed when Bobby [sic] Steele left office.” (County Resp. to SAF ¶ 20.) The parties do not say who made the decision to remove Mr. Frazier. (See County Resp. to SAF ¶ 7 (Elmer Frazier was removed before Todd came in to make room for Elliotte Green [sic]); County SOF ¶ 56 (“Frazier was taken off the detail before Todd Stroger came in”).) County Defendants assert that Jones replaced a member of the detail who was removed at Todd Stroger's request because Stroger's wife did not like his driving. (County Resp. to SAF ¶ 20.) The parties do agree that in each case, the Sheriff's Office honored the President's Office request and completed the transfer to assign Greene and Jones to the detail. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 35; Pls.' Resp. to County SOF ¶ 51.)

In July, 2008, another member of the security detail retired, and Luis Santoyo took his place. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 15.) Unlike Greene and Jones, Santoyo had not worked for Todd Stroger's campaigns before being selected for the detail. (Dep. of Luis Santoyo, Ex. 1 to Pls.' Appendix [89–1], hereinafter “Santoyo Dep.,” 21:23–22:15.) Phil Stephens, the director of the detail at that time, had previously worked with Santoyo in the Detective Unit of the Sheriff's Police; Stephens recommended Santoyo for the job and ultimately called to offer him the position. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 21; Santoyo Dep. at 12:15–13:2.) Before serving on Stroger's security team, Santoyo had been working temporarily as a patrol officer in the Police Department, though he spent the previous four years in the Special Operations Unit and technically remained assigned to that unit. (Santoyo Dep. at 10:5–11.) Santoyo testified that he requested the patrol assignment because he expected to move to Florida—he does not specify when—and transferring from patrol would be smoother; had he remained in Special Operations until he left, he would have needed to return to Chicago to testify even after the move. (Id. at 10:9–11:6.) But the Florida plans fell through, so Santoyo accepted the positon on the Stroger security detail. (Id. at 10:11–11:6.)

The procedure used to hire the three Plaintiffs—someone from the President's office, either Lance Tyson or Phil Stephens, would call the Sheriff's Office to request a particular assignment—was the procedure used throughout Todd Stroger's term for security detail appointments. (Pls.' Resp. to County SOF ¶¶ 50–51.) It is undisputed that if the President expressed a preference, the Sheriff's Office generally deferred to the President's choices. (Pls.' Resp. to CCSO SOF ¶ 35; Pls.' Resp. to County SOF ¶¶ 51, 54.) When Plaintiffs were assigned to the security detail, they remained Sheriff's Office employees, but received a higher rate of pay in return for longer hours and loss of eligibility for overtime pay. (Pls.' Resp. to County SOF ¶ 36; CCSO Defs.' Local R. 56.1 Statement of Facts in Support of Summ. J. [74], hereinafter “CCSO SOF,” ¶¶ 37–38.)

Plaintiffs contend that their positions on the detail constituted a promotion and a raise. (Pls.' Local R. 56.1 Statement of Additional Material Facts in Opp. to CCSO [88], hereinafter “Pls.' SAF to CCSO,” ¶ 21.) The exact amount of the pay difference is unclear, however: Santoyo testified that the person currently in charge of the security detail receives an annual salary that is $26,000 greater than Santoyo's current salary. (Santoyo Dep. at 60:8–19.) His own annual salary dropped $8,000 to $9,000 after being transferred from the detail, Santoyo maintains. (Id. at 45:21–46:3.) Greene testified that his...

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  • Sroga v. Preckwinkle
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 24 Enero 2017
    ...This is not the case, however, in which we need to confront that issue." (citations omitted); see also Greene v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Office, 79 F. Supp. 3d 790, 812 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The Supreme Court's decision in City of Saint Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), however, suggests th......
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    ...decided." Pounds v. Griepenstroh , 970 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1992).The plaintiffs have identified no such case. In fact, in Greene v. Cook County Sheriff's Office —decided four years after the police department reassigned them—the Northern District of Illinois granted qualified immunity a......
  • Taylor v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Office
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 4 Marzo 2020
    ...of multiple-decision-making levels in Taylor's case does not foreclose his theory of liability. See Greene v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Office , 79 F. Supp. 3d 790, 812 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (noting precedent suggests that "motivating factor causation can be established where there is a discriminatory......
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    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 18 Marzo 2021
    ...a consent decree may impose remedies that "exceed what is required to correct a constitutional violation," Greene v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Off., 79 F. Supp. 3d 790, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2015), at this juncture, the complaint states factssufficient to find that Defendants should have known that thei......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Testimonial Evidence
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Employment Evidence
    • 1 Abril 2022
    ...levels in plaintiff’s case did not defeat his cat’s paw theory of liability. (Citing Greene v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Office , 79 F. Supp. 3d 790, 812 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (noting precedent suggests that “motivating factor causation can be established where there is a discriminatory animus driving......

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