Fletcher v. Rickey

• Decision Date: 18 April 1934
• Citation: 154 So. 147,114 Fla. 563
• Parties: FLETCHER et al. v. RICKEY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

154 So. 147

114 Fla. 563

FLETCHER et al. v. RICKEY.

Florida Supreme Court

April 18, 1934

En Banc.

Suit by Dora Rickey against Margaret M. Fletcher, joined by her husband, I. M. H. Fletcher. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

DAVIS C.J., dissenting. Appeal from Circuit Court Hillsborough County; L. L. Parks, judge.

COUNSEL

G. B Wells, of Plant City, for appellants.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The appeal here is from a final decree canceling an administrator's deed and holding the same to be void and constituting a cloud on the appellee's title, the appellee having been complainant in the court below.

The record shows that Tillie Snyder was a married woman, the wife of William Snyder; that Dora Rickey was the only child of Tillie and William Snyder; that Tillie Snyder died, leaving surviving her her husband, William Snyder, and her daughter Dora. That at the time of the death of Tillie Snyder she was possessed in fee simple, as her separate property, of a certain lot of land in Hillsborough county, Fla.; that after her death and after the subsequent death of her husband, one Weeks applied for and was granted letters of administration and thereafter procured an order of court authorizing him to sell the lot of land owned by Tillie Snyder at the time of her death to pay certain bills which he alleged were claims against the estate of Tillie Snyder, amongst which was the bill for the expense of her funeral.

The record shows that Tillie Snyder was under the disabilities of coverture at the time of her death.

On the face of the record it appears that the claims presented, and for the payment of which the separate property of the decedent was sold, were valid claims against her surviving husband, William Snyder, and there existed no authority of law to subject in the probate court the separate property of the decedent to sale for the payment of these claims. On the death of Tillie Snyder the property descended by virtue of the statutes of inheritance to William Snyder, the husband, and Dora, the daughter, in equal parts, and at the death of William Snyder, which the record shows to have later occurred, his interest in the property descended to the daughter, Dora.

As a general rule of law an administrator's deed cannot be collaterally attacked, but this rule does not apply where the property purported to be conveyed by the administrator's deed was not subject to sale. The rule of caveat emptor applies to purchasers at administrators' sales, and, if property sold at such sales is such that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the court to order the sale, then the deed is void and may be attacked either directly or collaterally. This principle is elementary and requires no citations of authority here to support it.

Now the record shows, as hereinbefore stated, that Tillie Snyder was under the disabilities of coverture at the time of her death and, therefore, her separate property could not then have been reached by creditors, except by that course of procedure which is authorized by statute to carry into effect the provisions of section 2 of article 11 of the Constitution of Florida. The debts accruing, as the debts here are alleged to have accrued, became and were the debts of the husband, and, therefore, the married woman was not liable for that part of the debt which accrued prior to her death and her separate estate was not liable to be held for it after her death. When she died, the property here involved immediately became vested in her surviving heirs, the husband and daughter, and was no more liable to be sold for the payment of her debts or for her funeral expenses, in so far as the share of the daughter was concerned, than if she, the daughter, had acquired the property through some other and different source. It is true that as a one-half interest in the property descended to the husband, a judgment against him for this debt would have constituted a lien upon his interest in the property, but no such judgment was obtained or attempted as far as this record discloses.

The question here is not whether or not the county judge had jurisdiction to approve the bills presented as claims against the estate of a decedent. If that were the question involved, certainly his judgment could not be collaterally attacked. But, the question is whether or not the county judge had jurisdiction to order the sale of property which an administrator could have no right to take possession of, and property which could not be subjected to the payment of any debt, except when proceeded against in equity under the provisions of statutes enacted in pursuance to section 2, art. 11 of the Constitution.

Under the Constitution, section 17, art. 5, and the statutes, section 3677, R. G. S., section 5541, C. G. L., the county judge is given authority to order the sale of real estate of decedents, but these provisions do not authorize the sale of a decedent married woman's separate property for debts which are not chargeable against that property under that other provision of the Constitution, section 2, art. 11, wherein the forum in which suits to charge such separate property is specially designated.

For statement of the rule of law applicable to liability of husband for wife's funeral expenses, see 30 C.J. 606 et seq.

So, there was no error in the decree appealed from. The same should be affirmed and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

WHITFIELD, TERRELL, and BUFORD, JJ., concur.

ELLIS and BROWN, JJ., concur specially.

DAVIS C.J., dissents.

CONCURRING

ELLIS, Justice (concurring).

Tillie Snyder died. She was a married woman and left surviving her a husband, William Snyder, and a daughter, Dora Rickey. Mrs. Snyder died seized and possessed of certain lands in Hillsborough county. About three years after her death, her husband William Snyder died. Prior to his death, he and his daughter, Mrs. Rickey, who succeeded to the title by descent, leased the property to R. L. Register, who continued in actual possession as their tenant until Mr. Snyder's death and afterwards as Mrs. Rickey's tenant.

James R. Weeks, as administrator of Mrs. Snyder's estate, procured an order from the county judge to take possession of the land and sell it for the payment of some debts alleged to be due by Mrs. Snyder. The debts consisted of $3.60 due Dr. R. C. Black for professional services and to James R. Weeks in the sum of $85. The property was sold under those orders to Margaret M. Fletcher for the sum of $225. A deed was executed to her by the administrator.

In March, 1931, Mrs. Dora Rickey exhibited her bill in the circuit court for Hillsborough county against Mrs. Fletcher and her husband to quiet title to the land, to cancel the deed to her as a cloud on the title, and to declare the order of sale to be void as being in violation of the Constitution, article 11, § 2, and not within the jurisdiction of the county judge to make.

Mrs. Fletcher and her husband answered the bill. It was averred that the debt due to James R. Weeks, as administrator, in the sum of $85, was for balance due for funeral expenses of Mrs. Snyder and that her real property was liable for that debt which was a charge against her estate; that her husband, from the date of her death to the date of his death, was insolvent.

Testimony was taken and the chancellor in September, 1932, entered a final decree granting the prayer of the bill declaring Mrs. Rickey to be the owner of the land and the proceedings in the county judge's court under which the sale of the land was made to Mrs. Fletcher to be null and void. From that decree, Mrs. Fletcher appealed.

I concur in the conclusion reached by Messrs. Justices WHITFIELD, BU...