Fletcher v. South Dakota Cent. Ry. Co.
| Citation | 155 N.W. 3,36 S.D. 401 |
| Decision Date | 01 December 1915 |
| Docket Number | 3814. |
| Parties | FLETCHER v. SOUTH DAKOTA CENT. RY. CO. et al. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Minnehaha County; Joseph W. Jones, Judge.
Action by J. A. Fletcher against the South Dakota Central Railway Company and Henry S. Stebbins, as receiver. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Joe Kirby, of Sioux Falls, for appellants.
George W. Egan, of Sioux Falls, and Davis & Michel, of Marshall Minn., for respondent.
Plaintiff recovered judgment for damages resulting from an injury received by him while serving defendant as a brakeman. At the time of the injury plaintiff was engaged in switching operations pertaining to and constituting interstate commerce. In the discharge of his duties as brakeman he was called upon to uncouple a certain car from an adjoining one. Being unable to make the uncoupling by means of the lever or lifting rod on the automatic coupler with which the car was equipped, he went between the ends of the two cars and, while standing on a platform on the end of one car, he was thrown to the ground and severely injured. From the judgment and an order denying a new trial this appeal was taken.
Respondent basis his right of recovery upon the contentions: (1) That his injury resulted from a violation by defendant of the federal Safety Appliance Act, in that it had failed to equip one of said cars with a proper coupler; (2) that he was entitled to recover under that act and under the federal Employers' Liability Act. And respondent contends that any evidence tending to prove negligence upon the part of plaintiff became immaterial-that if the evidence established a compliance with the Safety Appliance Act it established an absolute defense; while, if such evidence showed a noncompliance with such act, no negligence on the part of respondent could bar a recovery. Among the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act is one requiring railroad companies to equip all cars used on railroads engaged in interstate commerce "with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." There was evidence showing that respondent made several efforts to work the coupler in the manner contemplated by such act and that the coupler failed to work. This evidence was ample to support a finding that the appellant had failed to comply with the provisions of such act. Nichols v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 195 F. 913 115 C. C. A. 601; Chicago, R. I. & P. I. R. Co. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317, 33 S.Ct. 840, 57 L.Ed. 1204. Under the express provisions of the Employers' Liability Act, contributory negligence on the part of respondent was immaterial; among the provisions of such law is one:
"That no such employé who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employés contributed to the injury or death of such employé."
Under this statute, where a railroad company failed to comply with the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act and such failure "contributed" to an injury suffered by an employé, no act of the employé, no matter how negligent it may be or to what extent it may in fact have contributed to the injury, can be urged as "contributory negligence" for purposes of defense. Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42, 34 S.Ct. 581, 58 L.Ed. 838, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 168. But the negligent acts which are thus forbidden to be urged as a defense are those which in fact do merely contribute to the result. If an act of the employé is the sole cause of the result, it is not contributory, and the railroad company would not be liable therefor even under the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act.
This brings us to a consideration of the proper construction to put upon the word "contributed," as used in the above quotation from the Employers' Liability Law. In considering contributory negligence as a defense, it is unnecessary to draw a close line of distinction between that negligence that merely contributed to the injury and that negligence that is the sole cause of the injury, where proof of either is a complete defense. But negligence of plaintiff cannot in fact merely contribute to an injury unless there be negligence on the part of the defendant also contributing thereto; neither can the negligence of a plaintiff be the sole cause of an injury, and thus bar recovery under the Employers' Liability Act, if the negligence of defendant didcontribute to the injury. Webster's definition of the word "contribute," when used as it is in this law, is:
"To have a share in any *** effect." Webster's New International Dictionary.
This in substance is the same as the definition in the Century Dictionary, announced in 9 Cyc. 791. It needs no argument to show that no person or thing can "have a share in any effect" unless such person or thing shares in thecause or causes which produce the effect. It follows that if an injury results from, or is the effect of, only one act of commission or omission, which act is not itself the effect or result of some other alleged act of commission or omission, such act becomes the sole cause of the injury, and such act, no matter how negligent it may be, cannot and does not constitute contributory negligence, contributory to such alleged act, because it does not "share [with such other act] in any effect." In this connection it is well to bear in mind the distinction between the cause of an act and the occasion for an act. An act may furnish the occasion for another act, and such second act may be thecause of an injury, without the first act in any manner being a contributing cause of such injury; such second act may be the result of some intervening cause in no manner flowing from the original act, but which cause is given an opportunity to operate through the occasion furnished by such original act. The New International Dictionary says:
"The cause of an effect is that which actually produces it or brings it about; the occasion is that which, either directly or indirectly, provides an opportunity for the causal agencies to act or serves to set them in motion."
Or, as stated in Pennsylvania Company v. Congdon, 134 Ind. 226, 33 N.E. 795, 39 Am. St. Rep. 251, undoubtedly quoting from an earlier edition of the Webster Dictionary:
"Webster defines an occasion, as distinguished from a cause, to be 'that which incidentally brings to pass an event, without being its efficient cause, or sufficient reason."'
If a chain of acts leads up to a certain result, it does not necessarily follow that such acts all contribute to such result. If at some place in such chain there is an act that in no true sense can be said to be the cause of the next act in the chain, but which merely brings about the occasion or opportunity for such next act, the line of causation is broken, and it is only that intervening cause which, taking advantage of the occasion or opportunity offered, acts and produces the final effect that can be said to be even a contributing cause leading to such final result or effect. There should be noted this exception to the above: Where the party responsible for the initial act knows or should know that, if the occasion or opportunity is given, such intervening cause will be likely to exert itself, the furnishing of such occasion or opportunity may be in itself an act of negligence causing such party to be liable for the result flowing as the effect of such intervening cause, where such intervening cause is outside of, or beyond the control of, the party who suffers from such result. If the light in the lantern of a brakeman on a freight train should become extinguished through some negligence of the railroad company making it necessary for the brakeman to relight it, and, in order to relight it, it was necessary for him to pass over the moving train to the caboose or the engine, in doing which he, owing to the darkness, fell and was injured, there would be a direct line of causation leading from the negligence of the company to the injury of the brakeman. If, in such case, the brakeman should be negligent while passing over the moving cars, such negligence would be contributory to...
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