Fletcher v. State

• Decision Date: 08 October 1892
• Parties: FLETCHER v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

17 S.E. 100

90 Ga. 468

FLETCHER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 8, 1892

Syllabus by the Court.

1. When, after a proper preliminary examination as to their free and voluntary nature, confessions or criminating admissions are adjudged competent and received in evidence, there is no room for any question touching the propriety of having conducted the preliminary examination in the presence of the jury.

2. When, in verifying instructions given to the jury as set out in the motion for a new trial, the presiding judge qualifies the verification by referring to the whole charge of the court, such qualification must be regarded in construing the motion for a new trial. There was no error in defining or describing a reasonable doubt thus: "A reasonable doubt is such a doubt as the term itself implies. It is difficult to explain what a reasonable doubt is. It means a doubt that has something to rest upon; some reason that it is based on such a doubt as would control you, and you would be governed by, in your important business affairs. It means such a doubt as a sensible, honest-minded man would reasonably entertain in an honest investigation after truth; a doubt that would arise from the evidence or the want of evidence in the case. It does not mean a mere vague conjecture, or a bare possibility, of the innocence of the accused."

3. Declarations made with an exculpatory object may have an inculpatory effect. On a trial for arson, declarations by the accused designed and tending to explain his possession of some of the goods which were in the burned building immediately preceding the fire, and his knowledge touching the whereabouts and the possession of other parcels of the goods, were in their inculpatory tendency criminating admissions, as distinguished from confessions; and it was error for the trial judge, in charging the jury, to denominate them "confessions," and instruct upon them as though they were admissions of guilt, instead of admissions of fact, from which, together with other evidence the jury might or might not infer guilt.

4. The evidence without the declarations in question being wholly insufficient to warrant the verdict, and with them of very doubtful sufficiency, the error of the court in treating the declarations as confessions necessitates a new trial notwithstanding three different juries have found the accused guilty. There can be no punishment inflicted except as the result of a legal trial.

Error from superior court, Sumter county; W. H. Fish, Judge.

Andy Fletcher was convicted of arson, and brings error. Reversed.

C. W. Bass and L. J. Blalock, for plaintiff in error.

C. B. Hudson, Sol. Gen., and Harrison & Peeples, for the State.

BLECKLEY C.J.

1. The court declined to require the jury to withdraw from the court room, so as not to hear the preliminary examination of two policemen touching facts relevant to the free and voluntary nature of certain declarations attributed to the accused which were about to be offered in evidence against him. It turned out that these declarations were not confessions of guilt. This being so, according to some authorities, it was unnecessary to inquire whether they were free and voluntary or not. Other authorities seem to be to the contrary; and with the latter has been the practice in this state, without, perhaps, any direct adjudication upon the precise question having been definitely and distinctly made. But grant that the same rule holds with respect to criminating admissions as with respect to confessions of guilt, and grant also that the jury ought to be retired and remain out during the preliminary examination when the admissions offered prove not to have been voluntary and freely made, (as was the fact in Hall v. State, 65 Ga. 36,) there could certainly be no well-grounded reason for treating it as error to allow the jury to hear preliminary evidence which showed that the admissions were in fact free and voluntary, and were therefore properly receivable in evidence. We can see no room for any question touching the propriety of having conducted the preliminary examination in the presence of the jury when the examination disclosed nothing which the jury should not have been allowed to hear. Holsenbake v. State, 45 Ga. 44...