Fletcher v. State

• Decision Date: 23 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 5D04-77.,5D04-77.
• Citation: 890 So.2d 1167
• Parties: Richard C. FLETCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

890 So.2d 1167

Richard C. FLETCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D04-77.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

December 23, 2004.

Rehearing Denied January 21, 2005.

Richard C. Fletcher, Indiantown, Pro Se.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

ORFINGER, J.

Richard Fletcher appeals the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(A).

Following a negotiated no contest plea, Fletcher was convicted of dealing in stolen property. In exchange for the plea, Fletcher admitted that he stole a food processor and a lamp from his parent's home and traded it for crack cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Fletcher was sentenced to eight years in prison. Fletcher appealed, and this court affirmed. See Fletcher v. State, 744 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

Fletcher then filed his Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his plea was involuntary and his counsel was ineffective. Specifically, the motion alleged that his plea was involuntary because his defense counsel, Robert Vest, should have advised him of certain defenses available under the facts of his case to the charged crimes. Fletcher further alleged that his plea was involuntary because his counsel failed to adequately investigate whether his voluntary ingestion of crack cocaine and prescription medication, coupled with a head injury, would have been a basis to suppress his incriminatory admissions to the police.

The trial court denied Fletcher's first claim for relief, but granted an evidentiary hearing on Fletcher's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Fletcher requested the appointment of postconviction counsel, which the trial court initially denied. However, the trial court subsequently sua sponte appointed the Office of the Public Defender to represent Fletcher at the evidentiary hearing, despite the fact that Fletcher's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were made against an attorney who was, at the time he represented Fletcher, employed by the Office of the Public Defender.

At the evidentiary hearing, Fletcher's attorney, Assistant Public Defender James Edward Jacobs, argued that the court should appoint conflict-free counsel to represent Fletcher in the postconviction proceedings since Fletcher's trial counsel, Vest, had also worked in the Office of the Public Defender. The State objected, arguing that no counsel should be appointed to represent Fletcher.

The court ruled that it did not believe that there was a conflict since Vest was no longer a member of the Office of the Public Defender. The court also determined that the issue was relatively simple and could be cleared up with a review of the plea transcripts:

THE COURT: First of all, I don't think that you have a conflict. Mr. Vest is no longer a member of the public defender's office. It's actually a fairly simple question as to whether or not Mr. Fletcher conveyed information to his attorney that would have supported a good faith basis for even an investigation of whether or not there was a motion to suppress that should be filed concerning his statements.

Secondly, the question would be whether or not based on the plea that a motion to suppress would have been dispositive of the case.

MR. JACOBS: Was this a plea case, Judge?

MR. FRANCE [THE STATE]: Yes, sir.

MR. JACOBS: Well, then wouldn't the plea merge any factual dispute in terms of suppression? That's my understanding of the current status of the law, if that's the case.

MR. FRANCE [THE STATE]: The plea dialogue should be sufficient if it does state — if the defendant did state that he had discussed available defenses with his attorney and had time to speak with his counsel.

The court then asked Fletcher about the allegations made in this Rule 3.850 motion. Fletcher testified that his incriminating statements to the police should have been suppressed because when he was questioned, he was home suffering from a head injury, and was under the influence of crack cocaine and prescription medication, which his defense counsel knew. Thus, Fletcher felt that he did not know what he was doing when he told the police that he "traded" the items for crack cocaine. The court then denied ground two of Fletcher's motion, finding that it was legally insufficient and not dispositive of his case in light of his negotiated plea. This appeal followed.

We conclude the trial court erred in determining that ground two of Fletcher's Rule 3.850 motion was legally insufficient. Properly framed, the issue below was not whether the entry of the no contest plea precluded an attack on the admissibility of the incriminatory statements; rather, it was whether Fletcher's counsel failed to investigate facts that would have supported a motion to suppress the incriminating statements he gave to the police, and whether his counsel should have filed a motion to suppress. Fletcher alleges that he would not have entered a plea in the absence of these alleged...