FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, LOCAL NO. 1 v. Air Micronesia, Civ. No. 85-0125.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 85-0125.
• Citation: 684 F. Supp. 1520
• Parties: UNION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, LOCAL NO. 1, Plaintiff, v. AIR MICRONESIA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

684 F. Supp. 1520

UNION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, LOCAL NO. 1, Plaintiff, v. AIR MICRONESIA, INC., Defendant.

Civ. No. 85-0125.

United States District Court, D. Hawaii.

April 5, 1988.

Herbert Takahashi, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiff.

Richard Cys, Washington, D.C., Gary Grimmer, Carlsmith, Wichman, Case, Mukai & Ichiki, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FONG, Chief Judge.

The Court has considered the Motion of Air Micronesia, Inc. (Air Micronesia) for Partial Summary Judgment, the opposition of the Union of Flight Attendants ("UFA") thereto, the reply filed by Air Micronesia, and all relevant materials of record. For the reasons set forth below, Air Micronesia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND.

Defendant Air Micronesia moves the Court to grant summary judgment in its favor on the grounds that virtually all of the claims that plaintiff UFA sets forth in paragraphs 11(b) and 11(c) of its complaint are barred under Hawaii's one year statute of limitations, Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-11, which limitations period Air Micronesia contends applies in this matter.

Plaintiff UFA opposes the motion, arguing alternatively: (1) defendant Air Micronesia has waived its statute of limitations defense; (2) proper choice of law analysis requires the Court to apply the Guamanian three-year statute of limitations; (3) the Ninth Circuit has declared that Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-11 does not apply to federal statutes such as the Railroad Labor Act that preceded the enactment of the Hawaii statute; (4) this Court has declared Haw.Rev.Stat. § 657-11 unconstitutional as applied to federal causes of action; and (5) the Court must not retroactively apply a shorter statute of limitations to bar a suit that was timely when filed.

Defendant Air Micronesia's present motion forces the Court to determine issues on which it reserved determination when it considered defendant's earlier Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Sanctions, dated August 13, 1987. The defendant argued in its earlier motion for partial summary judgment that the applicable period of limitations was six months, which would have barred the claims plaintiff UFA set forth in paragraphs 11(b) and 11(c) of its complaint. The defendant cited International Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 790 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 400, 93 L.Ed.2d 354 (1986) as support, which in turn relied on DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). This Court ruled that it would not retroactively apply the six month statute of limitations period specified in Aloha Airlines for RLA actions.

In its Order the Court reserved two issues, as the following excerpt makes clear:

In its moving papers, defendant argues only that the Aloha decision bars plaintiff's claims in paragraphs 11(b) and (c) of its complaint. Having found otherwise, this court will DENY defendant's motion. In its opposition memorandum, plaintiff argues that the court should apply the Guam three-year statute of limitations to the instant case. Defendant does not discuss in any of its pleadings the statute of limitations that should be used in the event that the six-month statute of limitations is not applied retroactively. Since this issue was raised only in plaintiff's opposition memorandum, the parties have not had a full opportunity to brief it. The parties need to make a record of this issue before the court can decide it. Therefore, the court reserves this issue to be decided, if necessary, after the parties have had an sic chance to fully consider and argue the issue.

Plaintiff also raises the issue of defendant's waiver of the right to raise the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, because it failed to plead the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Since the court decided defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on other grounds, it need not reach this issue at the present time. Accordingly, the court declines to address this issue currently.

Order at 7-8.

Defendant Air Micronesia's present motion requires the Court to determine at least the first of these reserved issues. Namely, the Court must determine which statute of limitations applies in this matter: the Guam three-year statute of limitations as the plaintiff contends or the Hawaii one-year statute as the defendant contends.¹

II. DISCUSSION.

A. Rule 56 Standards.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be entered when:

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

For purposes of this motion, there are no material facts in dispute. The motion and opposing papers concern the statute of limitations the Court should apply, a strictly legal question. Accordingly, the Court may decide the motion for partial summary judgment as a matter of law.

B. Arguments of the Parties.

Both parties agree that the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") does not provide its own statute of limitations period. See Aloha Airlines, 790 F.2d at 733. The parties present different lines of cases, however, to support apparently anomalous propositions concerning the statute of limitations the Court should apply.

Defendant argues that under federal choice of law rules:

"When Congress creates a right but fails to provide a limitations period, the appropriate statute of limitations of the forum state is applied." Trotter v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 13, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 n. 2 (9th Cir.1983); See also Copitas v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir.1980); Vigman v. Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 (5th Cir.1981); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C.Cir.1977); Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., 707 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir.1983) (rule applied to choice of applicable statute of limitations in action arising under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Champion Int'l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328, 333-34 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that statute of limitations governing the most closely analogous state substantive claim controls rather than the forum state's borrowing statute).

Defendant's Memorandum at 9-10.

Defendant then argues that the Hawaii one year statute of limitations found in Haw. Rev.Stat. § 657-11 applies, which is discussed in detail below.

Plaintiff UFA argues a different line of cases:

The Ninth Circuit's courts on several occasions have applied the rule that "the relevant statute of limitations for federally created causes of action which do not provide their own filing periods is that of the state most connected with the action." (Emphasis added.) Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521 n. 2 (9th Cir.1987), citing Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.1981). See also Chung v. Pomona Valley Community Hosp., 667 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.1982); Guzman v. Van Demark, 651 F.Supp. 1180, 1186 (C.D.Cal. 1987).

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 10-11.

Thus the lines of cases the defendant and plaintiff cite, both from the Ninth Circuit wholly or primarily, present an apparent anomaly. The defendant's lines of cases suggest that the Court apply the appropriate statute of limitations of the forum state, which would be Hawaii. The plaintiff's line of cases suggest that this Court apply the statute of limitations of the state most connected with the action, which it argues would be Guam.² To solve this apparent anomaly, the Court must examine carefully the cases the parties cite to the Court.

The first case the defendant cites is Trotter v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 13, 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.1983). In Trotter, a union member brought an action against his union to challenge the validity of a medical assessment. The district court held the action was time barred. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the suit was barred by the California three-year statute of limitations. Trotter engaged in no choice of law analysis. It cited only Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.1983), for the general proposition that when Congress creates a right but fails to provide a limitations period, the appropriate statute of limitations of the forum state is applied. Trotter, 704 F.2d at 1143 n. 2. Apparently, the parties in Trotter did not contest that California would supply whatever statute was appropriate. In Vanegas, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's decision that Vanegas's civil rights claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Again, there was no choice of law analysis; the parties agreed that the applicable statute of limitations was the three-year period provided by a California statute. 704 F.2d at 1145.

The second case defendant cites to the Court as support is Copitas v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir.1980). In Copitas, a union member brought an action against his union alleging a violation of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. The district court dismissed the complaint as time barred. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the appropriate California statute of limitations barred the action. The Ninth Circuit stated: "Where there is no applicable federal statute of limitations, federal courts must look to state law for an appropriate limitations periods." 618 F.2d at 1372. The Ninth Circuit did not engage in any choice of law analysis. Again, there apparently was no disagreement as to which state would apply the statutory period, i.e., California.

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