Guzman v. Van Demark

• Decision Date: 14 January 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 86-2250 RG(Gx).
• Parties: Joseph GUZMAN and Dolores Guzman, Plaintiffs, v. J.M. VAN DEMARK, S.A. Wood, Department of California Highway Patrol, and the State of California, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

651 F. Supp. 1180

Joseph GUZMAN and Dolores Guzman, Plaintiffs, v. J.M. VAN DEMARK, S.A. Wood, Department of California Highway Patrol, and the State of California, Defendants.

Civ. No. 86-2250 RG(Gx).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

January 14, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David R. Worley, Nordman, Cormany, Hair and Compton, Oxnard, Cal., for plaintiffs.

John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., of Cal., Marsha S. Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants State of California (also erroneously named and served as the California Highway Patrol) J.M. Van Demark and S.A. Wood.

ORDER

GADBOIS, District Judge.

On August 24, 1984, plaintiff Joseph Guzman ("Guzman") was arrested for suspicion of drunk driving. Incident to the arrest, an altercation ensued between Guzman and his wife, and defendants J.M. Van Demark and S.A. Wood, officers of the Department of California Highway Patrol ("CHP"). Plaintiffs seek monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and under various California laws for injuries allegedly caused by the tortious conduct of the CHP officers. The several defendants, including the State of California ("the State") and the CHP, have moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of sovereign immunity and the running of the appropriate statutes of limitations. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTS

The complaint alleges that on August 24, 1984, the Guzmans were driving on U.S. Highway 101 from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles County Hospital to visit Guzman's father who was a patient there. Guzman was driving when he and his wife were stopped and detained by officers Van Demark and Wood. As a result of this detention, Guzman was arrested for driving while intoxicated (Cal.Veh.Code § 23152). While arresting him, the CHP officers allegedly used excessive and unreasonable force against both plaintiffs, but particularly with respect to Guzman, who was also charged with resisting arrest and battery upon a peace officer (Cal.Penal Code §§ 148 and 243). This use of force allegedly injured the plaintiffs; Guzman was apparently injured somewhat severely.

Based on these incidents, plaintiffs sued the CHP officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving them of their civil rights (Count One of the complaint). They also assert state causes of action for battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Counts Three through Six, respectively) against the officers, the CHP and the State.

In Count Two, plaintiffs claim that the officers conspired to interfere with the Guzmans' civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The thrust of this allegation is that these defendants suppressed, concealed and altered evidence in the underlying state criminal action against Guzman. Plaintiffs are presumably attempting to state a cause of action under section 1985(2) which proscribes various forms of obstruction of justice in state and federal courts.

Finally, the Guzmans sued the CHP officers for malicious prosecution under California law (Count Seven). Plaintiffs allege that the officers filed the three criminal charges against Guzman—which were dropped on the date set for trial—in bad faith and without probable cause. Plaintiffs claim that the charges were pretextual and filed solely for the purpose of justifying the excessive force used in effectuating Guzman's arrest.

DISCUSSION

I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. The State and the CHP

It is beyond question that this court lacks the power to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims against the State and its agency, the CHP. Both of these defendants are immune in this action under the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs' failure to oppose these defendants' motion evidences the inevitability of this conclusion.¹

The eleventh amendment states that "the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The Guzmans are California citizens, yet it is well settled that the eleventh amendment also extends a state's sovereign immunity to federal court cases brought by its own citizens. The Supreme Court has "consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in the federal courts by her own citizens...." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, 672 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842, 845 (1890). Furthermore, a state's eleventh amendment immunity extends to federal court cases brought against the state's agencies. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Thus, the CHP's immunity is coextensive with the State's immunity.

Because plaintiffs have named the State and the CHP as defendants and seek a damage award from the State's treasury, their action against these defendants is barred by the eleventh amendment unless the State has waived its immunity. State of Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 54 S.Ct. 18, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933); Riggle v. State of California, 577 F.2d 579, 584 (9th Cir. 1978). Such waiver will not be inferred lightly. Riggle, 577 F.2d at 582. It will only be found to exist when stated "by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. at 1360, 39 L.Ed.2d at 678 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 464, 53 L.Ed. 742, 751 (1909)).

As the plaintiffs have not asserted that the State has waived its sovereign immunity, it is difficult to imagine upon what basis such waiver might exist. The only conceivable basis for finding waiver in this case would be the State's consent to be sued under the California Tort Claims Act (Cal.Govt.Code §§ 810 et seq.). However, this act does not benefit the Guzmans because it waives the state's state sovereign immunity not to be sued in state court. It has long been recognized that a state may waive its state sovereign immunity without relinquishing it eleventh amendment immunity. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-80, 66 S.Ct. 745, 746-48, 90 L.Ed. 862, 866-67 (1946); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S.Ct. 873, 876-77, 88 L.Ed. 1121, 1126 (1944); Riggle, 577 F.2d 579. Simply put, California has not waived its constitutional sovereign immunity in passing its tort claims act. Riggle, 577 F.2d 579. Therefore, the State's and the CHP's motion is granted, and Counts Three through Six are accordingly dismissed with respect to these defendants.

B. Officers Van Demark and Wood²

Although these defendants are officers of the State's agency, the CHP, they are not shielded by the State's eleventh amendment immunity. This holding applies to both the state and federal causes of action. To justify a finding that the officers are immune, the court would have to conclude that the action against them is actually one against the State, where the latter is the "real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67, 79 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389, 394 (1945)). Such a case, of course, would be barred by the eleventh amendment. The only support for this conclusion is that the State is obligated to indemnify the officers for any damage award levied against them for acts performed within the scope of their employment. See Cal.Govt.Code § 825.³ This argument, however, lacks merit.

On at least two occasions, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the argument that a wholly collateral and voluntary indemnification program between a state and its officers extends the state's eleventh amendment immunity to the officers. See Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1147-49 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 810, 83 L.Ed.2d 803 (1985) (Cal.Govt.Code § 825 does not immunize state officers in section 1983 actions); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir.1981) (similar Arizona statute does not shield state officers from state tort liability). A contrary holding might well produce the incongruity whereby a state, in "creating a fund to compensate victims, has somehow extended immunity to state employees so as to deny payment to the class of intended beneficiaries."⁴ Demery, 735 F.2d at 1147; Ronwin, 657 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Palmer v. Penn-Ohio Road Materials, Inc., 470 F.Supp. 1199, 1203 (W.D.Pa.1979)). Thus, both panels concluded that "a state should not be able to turn a purely intramural arrangement with its officers into an extension of sovereign immunity." Ronwin, 657 F.2d at 1074 (quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 132-33 n. 22 (1978)).⁵ A simple indemnification scheme does not transform a case against individuals into one against the state. This court has proper subject matter jurisdiction over all causes of action against defendants Van Demark and Wood.

II. SECTION 1985

Defendants Van Demark and Wood move to dismiss the Guzmans' section 1985 cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because the court cannot imagine any set of circumstances upon which plaintiffs might be afforded relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the motion to dismiss Count Two is granted with prejudice.

Although the complaint does not indicate under which subsection of section 1985 the Guzmans assert their claim, the only conceivably applicable subsection is section 1985(2). This statute makes unlawful certain conspiracies to obstruct justice in federal and state courts. Count Two of the complaint alleges that defendants Van Demark and...