Flinn & Hart v. Brown
| Decision Date | 26 June 1875 |
| Citation | 6 S.C. 209 |
| Parties | FLINN & HART v. BROWN. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
BEFORE TOWNSEND, J., AT DARLINGTON, NOVEMBER, 1872.
This was an action by Henry K. W. Flinn, and Robert L. Hart as administrator of Ellen M. Brown, deceased, plaintiffs against James M. Brown, Sr., and Joseph T. Brown, defendants to set aside a deed of trust made by the intestate, Ellen M Brown, on the 28th day of November, 1870, whereby she conveyed her personal property, consisting of bonds and stocks, to the defendant James M. Brown, Sr., in trust for the donor for life, and after death to the use of the defendant, Joseph T. Brown, infant son of the trustee. The grounds, as alleged in the complaint on which it was sought to have the deed vacated and set aside, were that the intestate was insane when it was executed, and that it was procured to be executed by the trustee by fraudulent means and undue influence. There was no allegation in the complaint that the deed had been altered after its execution. The answer denied the allegations of insanity, fraud and undue influence.
The deed, in consideration of one dollar, conveyed to " the said James M. Brown the choses in action and stocks following, as well as any other personal property not named," (followed by a long and particular description of the choses in action and stocks intended to be conveyed,
The case was tried by a jury, to whom the whole issue involved in the cause was submitted. Much testimony was introduced on both sides, and James M. Brown, Sr., testified that the words " as well as any other personal property not named," and also the words " and other property not named," were inserted by him in the deed after its execution.
His Honor instructed the jury " that if the additions to the deed were made by James M. Brown, Sr., after its execution, under all the circumstances, it would render it void." To this instruction the defendants excepted.
The jury found a verdict as follows: " We find for the plaintiffs, and that the paper purporting to be a deed from Ellen L. Brown to James M. Brown, dated the 28th November, 1870, is void."
A motion for a new trial was made on the ground of error in the instruction to the jury. The motion was denied, and judgment ordered to be entered for the plaintiffs.
The defendants appealed.
Spain, Edwards & Dargan , for appellants.
McIver & Boyd, Warley & Dargan , contra.
Ellen L. Brown, a widow, departed this life without issue on the day of April, 1871. On the 28th day of the preceding November she conveyed, by deed, certain named personal securities to James M. Brown, Sr., her father-in-law, in trust, to receive the dividends, income and profits thereof, and to pay the same to her during her natural life, and from and after her death to transfer, assign and deliver, free from all trusts, " the said choses in action and stocks to Joseph T. Brown, the youngest son of the said James M. Brown, Sr., or his legal heirs if he shall predecease her," with power to the said trustee at all times to dispose of or sell any of the said securities and invest the proceeds in such real and personal property as he may deem most beneficial to the parties in interest.
On the 29th April, 1871, Henry K. W. Flinn, a brother and distributee of the said Ellen L. Flinn, filed a complaint, in which, after asking the interposition of the Court for the protection of the property covered by the said deed, as well as any other belonging to the deceased in the hands of the said James M. Brown, Sr., he prayed that the said deed might be declared to be fraudulent, null and void. It presented two grounds upon which it claimed to avoid it:
1. That the said Ellen L. Flinn was of unsound mind at the time of its execution.
2. That it was executed by force of the undue influence of the said Brown, operating on a mind so weakened and affected by the excessive indulgence in spirituous liquors and anodynes as to be incapable of resisting it. On the 20th of May following, an answer was filed in due form by the said Brown, denying the material allegations of the complaint. On the 4th of August succeeding, the plaintiff amended his complaint by stating that R. L. Hart, on the 7th of June preceding, took out letters of administration on the estate of the said Ellen L. Flinn, and joined in the charges and prayer of the said complaint, a previous order having been passed to allow him to be made a party. An answer was also filed for and on behalf of the infant defendant, Joseph T. Brown. Thus stood the pleadings, when, after the usual notice, the parties proceeded to trial at the special term of the Common Pleas for Darlington, held in November, 1872.
The relief sought by the plaintiffs in their proceeding is through the equitable jurisdiction of the Court. It is of that character which can only be claimed in a Court of chancery, where such a Court exists as a separate and distinct organization from the Common Pleas. If the Constitution of 1868 had not conferred equity jurisdiction on the Court of Common Pleas,...
To continue reading
Request your trial