Flint City Nursing Home, Inc. v. Depreast

• Decision Date: 25 September 1981
• Parties: FLINT CITY NURSING HOME, INC. v. James Daniel DEPREAST, as Administrator of the Estate of William B. Depreast, Deceased. 79-652.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 356

406 So.2d 356

FLINT CITY NURSING HOME, INC. v. James Daniel DEPREAST, as Administrator of the Estate of William B. Depreast, Deceased.

79-652.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 25, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1981.

John S. Key of Eyster, Eyster, Key & Tub, Decatur, for appellant.

Dan F. Nelson and James D. Whitmire of Brewer, Lentz, Nelson & Whitmire, Decatur, for appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

Plaintiff James Daniel Depreast, as administrator of the estate of William B. Depreast, deceased, filed suit against Flint City Nursing Home, Inc., and alleged that the deceased, William B. Depreast, while a patient at the nursing home, fell from a window and sustained injuries which caused his death. In his complaint, the administrator charged that the nursing home was negligent or wanton in causing or allowing the deceased to fall from the window.

In its answer, and subsequently at the pre-trial hearing, the nursing home stipulated that plaintiff's intestate died as a result of injuries sustained when he fell from a window, but the nursing home denied that it failed to exercise reasonable care for the deceased's safety. The trial was before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $225,000.

The primary issues determinative of the appeal involve evidentiary questions, viz.:

(1) Did the trial court err in admitting evidence concerning the licensure status of the nursing home and its administrator at the time of and prior to the accident?

(2) Did the trial court err in admitting evidence that the Alabama State Department of Health had cited the nursing home for various deficiencies?

I

We first discuss the issue of whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the licensure status of the nursing home and its administrator at the time of and prior to the accident. While we have been unable to locate any Alabama decision which specifically addresses the question of the admissibility of evidence of the licensure status of a business or enterprise or its administrator when the question posed is whether that business or enterprise exercised reasonable care on the occasion of the accident, we determine that this Court's case of Lindsey v. Barton, 260 Ala. 419, 70 So.2d 633 (1954), which involved the admissibility of evidence that a motorist did not possess a driver's license, presented a similar question and is persuasive. The central question tendered to the Court in Lindsey concerned the action of the trial court in refusing to admit evidence proffered by the defendants that while driving his car at the time of the accident, the plaintiff did not have a driver's license. The Court discussed the question of the admissibility of that evidence, as follows:

"Under Title 36, § 59, Code 1940, a driver's license is required of anyone operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state; § 63 provides for an examination of the driver prior to the issuance of such license and § 69 makes it a misdemeanor to drive a vehicle without a driver's license. The argument is advanced that on the issue of contributory negligence, evidence that the plaintiff, in violation of Title 36, § 59 et seq., did not have a driver's license was admissible. We are aware of the divided authority in other jurisdictions bearing on this question. It is res novo with us.

"The appellants contend that violation of a statute is negligence per se in Alabama, Watts v. Montgomery Traction Co., 175 Ala. 102, 57 So. 471, 472, and that since the appellee's driving without a license was in violation of Title 36, § 59 et seq., on an issue of contributory negligence such violation is conclusively negligence and evidence thereof should necessarily be admitted and is proper on the question of the competency of the driver.

"Mr. Justice Anderson in the Watts v. Montgomery Traction Co. case, supra, cited 29 Cyc. 438 as authority for the rule that 'the statute * * * violated * * * (in order to be negligence per se) must have been enacted for the benefit of the party who seeks to invoke its violation as distinguished from the public generally or a class to whom the ordinance necessarily applies.' And in 29 Cyc. 438 there appears the following statement: 'It is necessary, however, that the duty imposed be for the benefit of the person injured * * * and where the duty is plainly for the benefit of the public at large the individual acquires no new rights by virtue of its enactment. Whether a liability arising from the breach of a duty prescribed by a statute * * * accrues for the benefit of an individual specially injured thereby, or whether such liability is exclusively of a public character, must depend upon the nature of the duty enjoined and the benefits to be derived from its performance.' (Emphasis added).

"Some statutes have been held to have been passed for the benefit of particular individuals only and not for the benefit of the public. In this situation, the breach of the statute is negligence per se only if the party invoking such violation is within the class sought to be protected by the statute. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Murphree, 129 Ala. 432, 29 So. 592; Central of Georgia R. v. Sturgis, 149 Ala. 573, 43 So. 96.

"It would seem that the statute requiring a driver's license imposes a duty for the benefit of the public at large and the individual defendant therefore, would acquire no new rights by virtue of its enactment, nor would a violation thereof by the plaintiff, although a criminal offense, inure to the benefit of the defendant so as to be pleaded as contributory negligence against the plaintiff in an action for damages arising from an auto collision between them.

"Moreover, there was no evidence in this case nor any offer to show evidence by the appellants-defendants tending to prove a causal relationship between the plaintiff's injuries and the plaintiff's alleged violation of the statute in failing to have a license. This is equally true of the evidence of the refusal upon application to grant the plaintiff a driver's license. By the weight of authority and the better reasoning as we see it, under the facts here presented, evidence that the driver was not licensed as required by statute is inadmissible unless there is some causal relationship between the injuries and the failure to have a license. Upon like reasoning the rejection of the evidence of the refusal upon application to grant the plaintiff a driver's license was proper. See DeVite v. Connecticut Co., 112 Conn. 670, 151 A. 320; Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699, 156 A.L.R. 1109 (Evidence that defendant's license had been revoked before the accident in question improperly admitted.); Dervin v. Frenier, 91 Vt. 398, 100 A. 760; Lindsay v. Cecchi, 3 Boyce 133, 80 A. 523, 35 L.R.A., N.S., 699; Lutfy v. Lockhart, 37 Ariz. 488, 295 P. 975; Speight v. Simonsen, 115 Or. 618, 239 P. 542, 43 A.L.R. 1149; Mahowald v. Beckrich, 212 Minn. 78, 2 N.W.2d 569; Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 540, 195 N.E. 81; Strandt v. Cannon, 29 Cal.App.2d 509, 85 P.2d 160; Ross v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 106 N.J.L. 536, 148 A. 741. Prichard v. Collins, 228 Ky. 635, 15 S.W.2d 497 (All evidence with reference to failure of driver to be licensed wholly immaterial.) See also Huddy, 15-16 Ency. of Automobile Law 364, § 193; McElroy, The Law of Evidence in Alabama, § 41, p. 14; Gregory, 'Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation,' 36 Corn.L.Q. 622.

"We hold, therefore, that the rejection of evidence that the plaintiff had tried and failed to get a driver's license and that he had never had one was proper."

This Court reached a similar result in Giles v. Gardner, 287 Ala. 166, 169, 249 So.2d 824 (1971):

"Assignment of error two is predicated on the trial court's overruling of the defendant's objection to admitting into evidence the defendant's lack of a driver's license. The only witness presented in behalf of the defendant was the defendant's mother, who had given her son permission to use the car on the day the accident occurred. On cross examination, counsel for plaintiff asked, 'You knew that he didn't have a driver's license didn't you?' Then, without a ruling on the objection, the trial court asked, 'Did he have a driver's license?' There was further objection and the trial court overruled the objection and the witness answered, 'No.'

"Before such evidence is admissible there must be established a causal connection between the failure to have a license and the injuries received in the accident. Lindsey v. Barton, 260 Ala. 419, 70 So.2d 633. In Chattahoochee Valley Railway Company v. Williams, 267 Ala. 464, 103 So.2d 762, proof of revocation of a driver's license was held inadmissible absent a showing of a causal connection between such revocation and the injuries received from the accident. The existence or non-existence of a driver's license does not establish the competency or incompetency of a driver. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Security Gen. Ins. Co., 282 Ala. 344, 211 So.2d 477. In the instant case, no such causal connection is shown. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the admission into evidence of the failure of the defendant to possess a driver's license was prejudicial error which requires a reversal. See Madison v. State, 40 Ala.App. 62, 109 So.2d 749, cert. denied 268 Ala. 699, 109 So.2d 755, holding that reversible error was committed in admitting evidence of the revocation of the defendant's driver's license in a case where defendant was convicted of manslaughter; and see also, Stanford v. State, 40 Ala.App. 220, 110 So.2d 641, holding that reversible error was committed in allowing testimony that the defendant had no driver's license. That case was a criminal prosecution for leaving the scene of an accident. Although the instant case is civil, we think that the evidence admitted was prejudicial error necessitating a reversal of the judgment."

Although Lindsey and Giles both involved a failure of the person...