Flood v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 25 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-497 (BAH)
• Citation: 172 F.Supp.3d 197
• Parties: Mabel Flood, as Parent/Guardian of T.F., Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

172 F.Supp.3d 197

Mabel Flood, as Parent/Guardian of T.F., Plaintiff,

v.District of Columbia, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-497 (BAH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 25, 2016

Carolyn W. Houck, Law Office of Carolyn Houck, St. Michaels, MD, for Plaintiff.

Tasha Monique Hardy, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL

, Chief Judge

After prevailing in an administrative due process hearing on her claim under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act and Individuals with Disabilities in Education Improvement Act (collectively, the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ,

the plaintiff, Mabel Flood, who is suing on behalf of herself and her minor child, seeks reimbursement of attorneys' fees and costs she incurred in pursuing her successful claim. Compl. Decl. Judgment & Relief (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. The plaintiff's request was referred to a Magistrate Judge, See Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 3, who issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending reimbursement at a rate equivalent to three-quarters of the hourly rate requested by the plaintiff. ECF No. 15.

The plaintiff timely objected to this recommendation on the ground that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending reimbursement at a rate that does not reflect the prevailing market rate in the District of Columbia for the services she received in connection with her successful administrative action. Pl.'s Obj. Mag. Judge's R&R (“Pl.'s Obj.”), ECF No. 16. Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.'s Mot”), ECF No. 9; Def.'s Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. & Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.'s Opp'n”), ECF No. 11, under the IDEA attorneys' fees provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I)

. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's objection is sustained, and each party's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is the mother of T.F., a District of Columbia Public School (“DCPS”) student who was diagnosed at an early age with various psychological and behavioral issues, including Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder

and Bipolar Disorder. Compl., Ex. 1 (“Hearing Officer Determination” or “HOD”) at 2–7, ECF No. 1-4. Throughout his elementary education, T.F. experienced serious emotional and behavioral difficulties that have substantially impaired his academic progress. Id. Due to these difficulties, T.F. attended at least three different elementary schools over a period of five years, during which time his frequent outbursts escalated from simple classroom disruptions to threats of physical violence and at least one incident in which T.F. assaulted another student. Id.

Despite the plaintiff's repeated requests over the course of more than two years, DCPS consistently declined to conduct a comprehensive assessment of T.F.'s abilities and needs, as well as his potential eligibility for special education services under the IDEA. Id. Set out below is a summary of the plaintiff's successful effort to obtain such an assessment by means of an administrative due process proceeding, followed by the relevant procedural history underlying the present dispute.

A. The Underlying Merits Action

T.F. began experiencing serious behavioral and emotional difficulties soon after enrolling in elementary school. He was held back in Kindergarten, and continued to have difficulties during his first- and second-grade years. Id. at 3. By the end of second grade, T.F. demonstrated “pervasive sadness, anger, irritability, paranoia, detachment, temper tantrums, arguing with adults, defying adult requests and rules, blaming others, and deliberately annoying people.” Id. Unfortunately, after a move to a new school for the 2011–2012 school year, T.F.'s troubling behavior persisted. Consequently, at some point during his third-grade year, school staff informed the plaintiff that T.F. would be asked to leave his new school if he did not receive medication to treat his emotional and behavioral issues. Id. at 3. In response, the plaintiff asked school officials to conduct a complete evaluation to assess T.F.'s emotional challenges and educational needs. Id. School officials apparently declined to conduct such an evaluation. See id. at 2, 9.

Thereafter, when T.F. began attending a third school during the 2012-2013 school year, the plaintiff alerted school administrators of T.F.'s behavioral issues and indicated to a school counselor that T.F. required a full evaluation to determine the extent of his educational and emotional challenges. Id. at 4. While this second request for evaluation prompted the school counselor to work with the plaintiff to address T.F.'s attendance issues, id. , school officials again declined to conduct a more comprehensive evaluation of T.F.'s abilities and needs, see id. at 2, 9. The next school year, in September 2013, T.F.'s behavior continued to impede his academic progress, prompting the plaintiff for the third time to approach school officials to obtain an evaluation of T.F. Id. at 4–5. In response, a school counselor advised the plaintiff that, because T.F.'s problems were primarily behavioral, T.F. was ineligible for an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) and associated special education services under the IDEA. Id. at 5. As a result, in December 2013, instead of conducting a full evaluation of T.F.'s needs, school staff developed a more limited plan to address T.F.'s disruptive classroom behavior. Id. at 5–6.

This newly developed plan notwithstanding, T.F. continued to demonstrate significant behavioral issues during the 2013–2014 school year. Id. at 6. Due to T.F.'s disruptive and aggressive behavior—including an incident in which T.F. assaulted another student—T.F. was suspended for more than ten days in the spring of 2014. Id. At some point during this period, both the plaintiff and an outside mental health worker again, for the fourth time, asked school staff to evaluate T.F. more thoroughly to determine how best to address his mounting academic and behavioral issues. Id. Again, however, school staff declined to conduct any such evaluation. See id. at 2, 9.

With DCPS continuing to refuse to evaluate T.F., the plaintiff filed an IDEA administrative due process complaint on August 6, 2014. Id. at 1. Alleging that DCPS violated the IDEA by failing to respond to her repeated requests for a full evaluation of T.F., the plaintiff sought an order requiring DCPS to evaluate T.F.'s educational needs and potential eligibility for special education services under the IDEA. Id. at 2. Following a prehearing conference on August 21, 2014, the administrative Hearing Officer convened a hearing on September 5, 2014, during which the parties submitted a total of twenty-five exhibits and presented testimony from both the plaintiff and a school counselor from T.F.'s then-current elementary school. Id. at 1–2.

On September 19, 2014, the Hearing Officer issued an HOD concluding that the plaintiff's request for a comprehensive evaluation of T.F. was reasonable. Id. at 14. Given DCPS's extended failure to address T.F.'s behavioral issues, the Hearing Officer granted the plaintiff's request to require DCPS to fund an independent assessment of T.F.'s educational abilities and needs. Id. at 14–15. Within ten days of the completion of these assessments, the HOD directed DCPS to determine T.F.'s eligibility under the IDEA for special education services. Id. at 15.

B. The Attorneys' Fees Report and Recommendation

Following the resolution of her administrative due process claim, the plaintiff filed the instant action on April 6, 2015. See Compl. As a prevailing party in her effort to obtain an evaluation of her child's eligibility for special education services, the plaintiff seeks reimbursement of the attorneys' fees and costs she incurred in litigating her successful administrative due process claim. Id. at 4–5. Specifically, the plaintiff seeks reimbursement for a total of 68.8 hours her attorney billed in connection with her administrative proceeding, to be reimbursed at the rate provided for her attorney under the familiar Laffey

Matrix maintained by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (“USAO Laffey Matrix”). Id.¹ Under this matrix, an attorney, like the plaintiff's attorney, with between eleven and nineteen years of experience is entitled to an hourly rate of $460. Id. In addition to these requested fees, the plaintiff seeks reimbursement of $710 in associated litigation costs, resulting in a total requested award of $32,358. Id. , Ex. 2 (“Application for Payment of Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act”). The District argues that the plaintiff's requested reimbursement rate for her attorney's time is unreasonably high, and proposes instead a rate equivalent to three-quarters of the plaintiff's attorney's full Laffey rate, which equates to $345 per hour. Def.'s Opp'n at 10–13.

Following referral of the plaintiff's fee request to a Magistrate Judge for full case management, see Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 3, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, see Pl.'s Mot.; Def.'s Opp'n. The Magistrate Judge subsequently issued an R&R recommending that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. See R&R at 2.² Finding that the plaintiff qualifies as a “prevailing party” for purposes of the IDEA fee-shifting provision, id. at 5, the R&R recommends reimbursement at the reduced hourly rate proposed by the District, id. at 12. Finally, the R&R recommends that the plaintiff be reimbursed at half of this hourly rate for three hours of travel time billed by her attorney. Id. at 12–13. As a result of these reductions, the R&R recommends a total award of $24,273.50, representing a roughly 25 percent reduction below the plaintiff's initial request. Id. at 13.

The plaintiff timely objected to the...