Flood v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1994
• Citation: 419 Mass. 176,643 N.E.2d 439
• Parties: Sandra FLOOD v. MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; Arthur B. Chandler, Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 439

643 N.E.2d 439

419 Mass. 176

Sandra FLOOD v. MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; Arthur B Chandler, Third-Party Defendant.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Plymouth.

Argued Nov. 8, 1994.

Decided Dec. 14, 1994.

Martin J. Drilling, Plymouth, for plaintiff.

Devra G. Bailin, Boston, for Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

On July 9, 1991, the plaintiff, Sandra Flood, commenced this action in the Superior Court against the defendant, Midland National Life Insurance Company (Midland), alleging that Midland was in breach of contract, and had violated G.L. c. 93A (1992 ed.) by failing to honor her claim as beneficiary under the life insurance policy of her deceased business partner, Robert E. Desrochers. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant's motion and denied the plaintiff's motion. The plaintiff timely appealed. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We reverse the judge's orders and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¹

The following are the material, undisputed facts. The plaintiff and Desrochers had jointly inherited Belben's Service Station, Inc. They operated the service station as equal owners. As one of her responsibilities, the plaintiff paid the bills of the business. On September 8, 1989, Arthur Chandler (Chandler), an insurance agent, suggested to the plaintiff and Desrochers that both should purchase life insurance policies to protect their respective spouses in the event of the death of either partner. The plaintiff and Desrochers decided to apply to Midland for term life insurance policies in the amount of $150,000 on the life of each of them, each naming the other as beneficiary. ²

The plaintiff and Desrochers filled out applications for term life insurance policies with Midland. Desrochers's application stated that he was a partner in Belben Service Station, Inc., and worked as a mechanic in the business. As part of the application process, he was required to undergo a physical examination, including an electrocardiogram, the results of which were abnormal. As a consequence, Midland rated Desrocher's risk as "F," and issued him a "special class" policy, effective October 1, 1989. The premium was set at $545 a month for the initial period; the maximum monthly premium was set at $669.50. Once the initial premium payments were made (with funds from the business), payments were deducted by an automatic withdrawal system from Belben's business checking account on the first day of each month.

Desrochers was the insured and the owner of the policy at issue, which named "Sandra L. Flood--Partner" as primary beneficiary. Under the policy, Midland agreed to pay the beneficiary the proceeds of the policy on "due proof of the Insured's death while this Contract is in force." Premiums were due on the first day of each month. The policy further specified that, if Midland did not receive payment on the due date, the policy would be in default. It would remain in effect, however, during a grace period of thirty-one days, after which time the policy would terminate. After the expiration of the grace period, reinstatement was available if the following conditions were met:

"a. [Desrochers sent Midland] a written request not more than five years after the Date of Default;

"b. [Desrochers provided Midland] with any facts [Midland] [needed] to satisfy [Midland] of the insurability of the insured.

"c. All overdue premiums, with compound interest at 6% per year from the Date of Default to the Date of Reinstatement, [were] paid." ³

The plaintiff and Desrochers thought the monthly premium charged by Midland was too high. They asked Chandler to see whether he could obtain comparable coverage from another source at a more reasonable rate. On November 11, 1989, Desrochers applied to Surety Life Insurance Company for $150,000 worth of life insurance. The policy with Surety was delivered to Desrochers on December 22, 1989, and went into effect on December 28, 1989.

At some point in December, 1989, Desrochers requested that the automatic checking account deductions covering the premiums for the Midland policy be stopped, and that he be billed directly for the coverage. On December 21, 1989, Chandler wrote to Midland asking it to "cancel" Desrochers's policy as of January 1, 1990, and not to draw any more premium payments from Belben's business checking account. The premium due on January 1, 1990, was, nonetheless, automatically withdrawn from the account.

On January 10, 1990, Midland sent a notice to Desrochers, in care of Belben's Service Station, informing him that, as of that date, the company had "stopped the automatic draft from your bank and have changed it to monthly direct bill." The notice, a form letter, further informed Desrochers that Midland was required "to send premium notices until [the] policy expire[d]," and that, "[i]f no further premium payments [were] made, [Desrochers] will receive a lapse notice notifying [him] that [his] policy ha[d] lapsed." The premium payment due on February 1, 1990, was not made.

On February 14, 1990, Desrochers became ill and went into a coma. The grace period for payment of the premium due February 1, 1990, on his Midland policy, expired on or around March 3, 1990.

On March 9, 1990, Midland sent what it called, in capital letters, a "SPECIAL LATE PAYMENT OFFER" to Desrochers, again in care of Belben's Service Station. The "offer" contained these terms:

"The past due premium will still be accepted without interest charge or other requirements, if during the lifetime of each person insured under this policy ... and on or before the date shown under 'offer expires', this notice is received by the company with a remittance for the amount due."

The expiration date for the offer was March 22, 1990, and the amount shown as due was $1,202 (covering the February and March, 1990, premium payments). Appearing on the face of the offer, in smaller capital letters, was the notation "GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED."

On March 12, 1990, the plaintiff sent a check for $1,202, drawn on the Belben's Service Station checking account, next day delivery, to Midland. The check was accepted and deposited by Midland. Subsequently, Midland sent a premium payment notice for $601, due April 1, 1990, to Desrochers, in care of Belben's Service Station. On March 20, 1990, Desrochers died, without having regained consciousness. On the same day, the plaintiff sent Midland payment for the April 1, 1990, premium on Desrochers's Midland policy.

The plaintiff requested payment under the terms of Desrochers's insurance policy. Midland refused payment on the ground that its special late payment offer of March 9, 1990, was an offer to reinstate a policy which had already lapsed, and that the right of reinstatement was personal to Desrochers and could not be exercised by the plaintiff as policy beneficiary.

A case may be resolved by summary judgment when there are no material issues of fact in dispute, "and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). See Thattil v. Dominican Sisters of Charity of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin, Inc., 415 Mass. 381, 385, 613 N.E.2d 908 (1993); Miles v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 412 Mass. 424, 426, 589 N.E.2d 314 (1992). At issue is the legal effect of Midland's March 9, 1990, special late payment offer to Desrochers, when read in conjunction with the terms of Desrochers's policy, a question appropriate for resolution by a court by means of summary judgment. See Cody v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 387 Mass. 142, 146, 439 N.E.2d 234 (1982).

1. Midland contends that Desrochers's policy lapsed on the expiration of the grace period. According to Midland, the special late payment offer (offer) was an offer to reinstate a lapsed policy, and, as such, was personal to the insured, and could not be accepted by the beneficiary without the insured's knowledge or authorization. See 18 G. Couch, Insurance § 69:25, at 94 (2d ed. 1983) ("The insured is ordinarily the only person entitled to apply for a revival or reinstatement of the policy"). ⁴ We disagree and conclude that Midland unilaterally extended the agreed time for receipt of payment, and that this offer could be (and was) accepted by the plaintiff's act of payment in accordance with its terms.

The language of the offer was precise and clear. It stated that "[t]he past due premium will still be accepted," meaning that the time for payment had been extended beyond the contractual grace period, if certain conditions were met. Those conditions were equally precise and required that (1) payment was made during the lifetime of the insured; (2) before the expiration of the offer; and (3) in the amount shown as due. The language of the offer was indifferent as to who could make the payment. All of the explicit conditions in the offer were met by the plaintiff's payment.

The offer did not use the term "reinstatement." It expressly waived payment of compound interest, one of the contractual requirements for reinstatement. The reference to "other requirements" which Midland was willing to waive, is logically a reference only to the other requirements for reinstatement, namely, that proof of continued insurability be provided, and that the insured request reinstatement in writing. It would be anomalous to permit Midland to insist on compliance with a condition which it concedes is associated only with reinstatement (payment only by, or on authority of, the insured), when Midland's offer expressly waives all of the other requirements associated with reinstatement. ⁵

"[An] insurance company has an interest in seeing that policies do not lapse and it has the right to extend the time of payment to avoid lapses." Scott v. United Of Omaha Life Ins....