Flora v. County of Hudson
| Decision Date | 01 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 98-2753 (NHP) |
| Parties | Re: Glen J. Flora v. County of Hudson, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Ivan H. Sutherland, Esq., Union City, NJ, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Daniel W. Sexton, Assistant Corporation Counsel, SEAN M. CONNELLY, CORPORATION COUNSEL, Jersey City Law Department, Jersey City, NJ, Attorneys for Defendants.
City of Jersey City, Jersey City Police Academy, Kraig M. Dowd, Assistant County Counsel, FRANCIS DE LEONARDIS, HUDSON COUNTY COUNSEL, Jersey City, NJ, Attorneys for County Defendants.
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on defendants City of Jersey City, Jersey City Police Academy, Hudson County Sheriff's Department, the County of Hudson, Joseph T. Cassidy, Edward J. Webster, Anthony Staltari, and Lawrence Hendersons' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). This Court heard oral argument on September 13, 1999. The parties thereafter submitted supplemental briefs addressing the issue of whether plaintiff's complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Because the parties submitted exhibits, the motions were converted to motions for summary judgment under F.R.C.P. 56. For the following reasons, defendants County of Hudson, Hudson County Sheriff's Department, Joseph T. Cassidy, Edward Webster, Anthony Staltari, and Lawrence Hendersons' motions for judgment as a matter of law are hereby GRANTED. Defendants City of Jersey City and Jersey City Police Academys' motions for judgment as a matter of law are hereby GRANTED.
Plaintiff, Glen J. Flora (hereinafter" Flora"), served as a Hudson County Sheriff's Officer for over six years until his termination on June 12, 1996. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 18. Flora alleges that he suffers from the disability of dyslexia. Id. at ¶ 3. He contends that the Jersey City Police Academy (hereinafter "Academy") refused to provide him special accommodations for his disability, thereby causing his dismissal from the Academy. Id. at ¶¶ 17-4; 24. Flora also avers that the Hudson County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter "Sheriff's Dep't"), the County of Hudson (hereinafter "Hudson County"), and certain individually named employees of the Sheriff's Dep't and Hudson County discriminated against him and, ultimately, unlawfully terminated him because of his disability.
Flora originally filed an Order to Show Cause and a Verified Complaint in New Jersey Superior Court on October 10, 1995 in order to enjoin any disciplinary action taken by the Sheriff's Dep't against him. The Superior Court issued temporary restraints against the Sheriff's Dep't enjoining the Sheriff's Dep't from disciplining Flora. On October 27, 1995, the Sheriff's Dep't and the individual defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
Flora filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") on April 18, 1996, alleging that the Sheriff's Dep't discriminated against him based on his disability. On May 14, 1996, this Court dissolved the temporary restraints previously issued by the New Jersey Superior Court against the Sheriff's Dep't. Flora was terminated from his position on June 12, 1996. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Flora on June 19, 1996. On June 20, 1996, Flora filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC, claiming that the Sheriff's Dep't terminated him in retaliation for the EEOC charges previously filed by him. This Court then dismissed Flora's complaint on September 11, 1996.1
The EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Flora on March 13, 1997. Flora then filed another complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on June 20, 1997. On April, 1, 1998, the Honorable William H. Walls dismissed this complaint without prejudice for failure to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendants within the 120 days prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
On June 11, 1998, Flora again refiled the complaint pro se with this Court on June 11, 1998, naming numerous defendants and alleging various violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 424 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (hereinafter "ADA"). Flora later obtained counsel and filed an Amended Complaint on January 19, 1999. Flora then added violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., (hereinafter "NJLAD"), in his Second Amended Complaint filed on May 21, 1999. In his Second Amended Complaint, Flora alleges that Hudson County and the Sheriff's Dep't discriminated against him because of his disability, in violation of Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) and the NJLAD. Id. at ¶¶ 1; 16-17; 17-1; 17-2; 17-3; 17-5; 23. Specifically, Flora avers that the Sheriff's Dep't and Hudson County discriminated against him by placing him on prisoner elevator duty, giving him otherwise inferior work assignments, failing to provide sensitivity training to the Department and its Officers, and ultimately terminating his employment. Id. at ¶¶ 17-3; 17-5; 19; 23.
Flora also contends that certain agents of the Sheriff's Dep't and Hudson County discriminated against him based on his disability. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Sheriff Joseph T. Cassidy (hereinafter "Cassidy") unlawfully discriminated against Flora based on his disability by terminating his employment, giving him inferior work assignments, and failing to provide sensitivity training. Id. at ¶ 19. Flora also contends that Hudson County Management Specialist Anthony Staltari (hereinafter "Staltari") was involved in his unlawful termination. Id. at ¶ 20. The Second Amended Complaint further alleges that former Sheriff Edward Webster (hereinafter "Webster") intentionally prevented Flora from obtaining accommodations at the Academy and that Webster failed to provide sensitivity training at the Sheriff's Dep't. Id. at ¶ 21. In addition, Flora avers that Hudson County Personnel Director Lawrence Henderson (hereinafter "Henderson") also unlawfully terminated him based on his disability, failed to enforce the provisions of the ADA, and failed to provide sensitivity training. Id. at ¶ 22.
Lastly, Flora alleges that the City of Jersey City (hereinafter "Jersey City"), through the actions of the Academy, retaliated, coerced, or interfered with Flora's rights. Id. at ¶ 17-2. Flora further contends that Jersey City and the Academy violated Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12189, and the NJLAD by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability so that he could attend the Academy. Id. at ¶¶ 17-4; 24.2
If on consideration of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). The parties here have attached exhibits to their motion papers, and thus the Court shall treat the motions as motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted only if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir. 1987). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, for which that party will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Moreover, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323; Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 896. Once that burden has been met, the nonmoving party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmovant must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. To defeat "a properly supported summary judgment motion, the party opposing it must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in its favor." Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). If the record, as a whole, cannot "lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. In this case, the Court will liberally construe the Second Amended Complaint in light of the fact that the pleadings are poorly drafted.
Flora alleges that the Sheriff's Dep't, Hudson County, Cassidy, Webster, Staltari, and Henderson discriminated against him in violation of Title I of the ADA. Title I of the ADA prohibits a "covered entity [from] discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual" in the employment context. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Several administrative steps must be taken before a plaintiff may file a federal civil rights action under Title I of the ADA in federal court. The enforcement provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, are applicable to actions brought under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
Under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Section 2000e-5(f)(1) then requires claims to be filed within 90 days of the claimant's receipt of an EEOC right to sue letter. See Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 176 (...
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