Florance v. Ind. Univ.

• Docket Number: 22A-CC-2653
• Decision Date: 09 November 2023
• Parties: Charles W. Florance, Appellant-Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff, v. Indiana University, Appellee-Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

1

Charles W. Florance, Appellant-Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff,
v.
Indiana University, Appellee-Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.

No. 22A-CC-2653

Court of Appeals of Indiana

November 9, 2023

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit Court The Honorable John E. Broden, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71C01-1904-CC-1456

APPELLANT PRO SE Charles W. Florance South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Maher Thomas M. Everett Barnes &Thornburg LLP South Bend, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Foley, Judge.

2

[¶1] Charles W. Florance ("Florance") appeals, pro se, the order granting summary judgment to Indiana University ("the University") on Florance's claim that the University committed breach of contract by modifying its attendance policies. Florance presents the following consolidated and restated issues for our review:

I. Whether there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on the claim of breach of contract; and

II. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing a claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) due to the statute of limitations

[¶2] Discerning no error in the challenged rulings, we affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶3] Florance attended the Indiana University School of Medicine ("IUSM") in the fall of 2016 and withdrew after one semester. The University sued Florance in 2019, alleging he defaulted on student loans. Florance counterclaimed. One counterclaim was that the University committed breach of contract by modifying its attendance policies ahead of Florance's sole semester of classes. Representing himself in the proceedings before the trial court, Florance claimed that he chose IUSM because IUSM representatives "made promises to [him] about" the program, among them, that "lectures are not mandatory; students can learn course material in ways that work best for them." Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 36. Florance alleged that, "[i]n between [his] application and the start of classes, IUSM significantly changed" aspects of the program, including its attendance policies, which had "significant and negative impacts on [him] and

3

[his] family." Id. at 37. He further alleged that he "would not have attended IUSM if [he] had known earlier that [IUSM] would make these changes." Id.

[¶4] The University moved to dismiss Florance's counterclaims, and the trial court held a hearing. The trial court determined that the breach of contract claim was not subject to dismissal, however the court dismissed the remaining claims determining that the claims were either time barred or otherwise procedurally defective. The University then moved for summary judgment. Meanwhile, Florance's loan debt was cancelled. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the University's complaint, agreeing that "[t]he only pending issue remaining" was the motion for summary judgment on Florance's "breach of contract claim." Id. at 45.

[¶5] The University designated evidence that Florance received an offer of admission to IUSM in January 2016. Enclosed was an information sheet providing a link to an online version of the IUSM Student Handbook ("the Handbook"). The information sheet stated that the Handbook was "the official document outlining the policies, procedures, and resources" of IUSM. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 111. The Handbook contained a Reservation of Rights Clause specifying that IUSM could amend its policies at any time: "While every effort is made to provide accurate and current information, the School of Medicine reserves the right to change without notice policies, procedures, programs, and other matters when circumstances dictate." Id. at 73; Appellant's Br. p. 6 (asserting that the linked version of the Handbook "opened with the disclaimer" (citing Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 73)).

4

[¶6] In response, Florance designated evidence that, after receiving his offer letter, he arranged an informational call and was told: "You don't have to attend lectures." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 168. Florance also designated evidence regarding similar statements from other IUSM representatives. He averred that he chose to attend IUSM because of its attendance policy, electing to withdraw his applications to other schools. He further averred that he "first discovered the school made changes to the[] attendance policy on or around August 4, 2016," and "[t]he policies governing attendance got more and more strict in the coming weeks," ultimately leading to "a punishment . . . that would be part of a student's permanent record and . . . negatively impact" the student. Id. at 169.

[¶7] At the hearing on summary judgment, Florance argued that the University made an enforceable promise to maintain a relaxed attendance policy for his benefit whereas the University argued it was "within [its] power" to change policies. Tr. Vol. II p. 43. The trial court granted the University's motion for summary judgment. In its written order, the trial court referred to caselaw on implied contracts and at one point stated that "not[h]ing in the designated evidence would suggest bad faith on [the University's] part or any conduct that could be construed as arbitrary or capricious." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. The court acknowledged that "there is definitely evidence in the record that[,] prior to August of 2016, [IUSM] had a different attendance policy than the one that was employed . . . [regarding] the 2016-2017 academic year, Florance's first year." Id. The trial court also acknowledged that Florance had "presented evidence that the attendance policy in effect prior to his enrollment was a

5

significant factor in his decision to choose IUSM for his medical studies." Id. The court ultimately concluded that the University was entitled to summary judgment because "nowhere in the designated evidence is there any handbook or other similar document that would bind" the University and prevent it "from making changes to this attendance policy." Id. Florance now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Summary Judgment

[¶8] "We review the trial court's summary judgment decision de novo." Z.D. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 217 N.E.3d 527, 531 (Ind. 2023). A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is 'contrary evidence showing differing accounts of the truth,' or when 'conflicting reasonable inferences' may be drawn from the parties' consistent accounts and resolution of that conflict will affect the outcome of a claim." Z.D., 217 N.E.3d at 532 (quoting Wilkes v. Celadon Grp., Inc., 177 N.E.3d 786, 789 (Ind. 2021)). "In viewing the matter through the same lens as the trial court, we construe all designated evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party." Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 912 (Ind. 2017).

[¶9] "The party appealing the trial court's summary judgment determination bears the burden of persuading us the ruling was erroneous." Id. at 913. However,

6

"we carefully scrutinize that determination to ensure that a party was not improperly prevented from having its day in court." Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 908 (Ind. 2001). Where-as here-the party appealing the ruling is self-represented, the party "is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented." Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).

[¶10] As this court observed in Neel v. I.U. Bd. of Trustees: "Courts have analyzed the nature of the student-university relationship under many different legal doctrines." 435 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982) (collecting cases from sister courts). "The most pervasive and enduring theory is that the relationship between a student and an educational institution is contractual in nature." Id.

[¶11] "Legal questions, such as contract interpretation, are well-suited for summary judgment." Ryan, 72 N.E.3d at 913. Moreover, "[w]hether a contract exists is a question of law." Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. 2009). "The basic requirements for a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties." Id. at 812-13. "To be valid and enforceable, a contract must be reasonably definite and certain," but "[a]bsolute certainty in all terms is not required." Id. at 813. Rather, there "must be mutual assent or a meeting of the minds" as to "all essential elements or terms[.]" Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ind. 1982) (quoting 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 18 (1964)). When it comes to assent, "the manifestation of a party's intention, rather than the actual or real intention, is ordinarily controlling[.]" Id.; see State v. Koorsen,

7

181 N.E.3d 327, 335 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) ("[T]he relevant intent is not the parties' subjective intentions but the outward manifestations thereof."), trans denied...