Florentine Ristorante, Inc. v. City of Grandville
| Decision Date | 20 February 1979 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 77-5093 |
| Citation | 88 Mich.App. 614,278 N.W.2d 694 |
| Parties | FLORENTINE RISTORANTE, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF GRANDVILLE, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Mohney, Goodrich & Titta, P.C. by Richard J. Quist, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellant.
Varnum, Riddering, Wierengo & Christenson by Dennis C. Kolenda, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee.
Before T. M. BURNS, P. J., and KELLY and WALSH, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals a decision of the Kent County Circuit Court upholding a City of Grandville ordinance which prohibits the sale of beer and wine for consumption on the premises on Sunday.
Plaintiff operates a restaurant in the City of Grandville and has a tavern license issued by the Michigan Liquor Control Commission which allows plaintiff to sell beer and wine, beginning at noon on Sundays, for consumption off the premises. However, pursuant to the terms of § 12 of Grandville City Ordinance No. 133-B, plaintiff may not serve beer and wine for consumption on the premises at all on Sunday. Plaintiff brought the present action for declaratory relief seeking to have the ordinance held unconstitutional and void, thereby allowing plaintiff to sell beer and wine for consumption on or off the premises on Sunday.
A hearing was held on December 1, 1977, in Kent County Circuit Court. The trial court found the ordinance valid and enforceable and signed an order to that effect on December 15, 1977. It is from this judgment that plaintiff appeals as of right. Two issues are presented.
Did the trial court err in holding that § 12 of Ordinance No. 133-B of the City of Grandville is not beyond the authority conferred upon that city by M.C.L. § 436.19e; M.S.A. § 18.990(5) of the Liquor Control Act to control the liquor traffic in Grandville?
The Michigan Constitution of 1963 gives the Michigan Legislature the authority to delegate complete control of the state's alcoholic beverage traffic to a liquor control commission subject to statutory regulation. 1 Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature gave complete control of such traffic in Michigan to the Michigan Liquor Control Commission when it enacted M.C.L. § 436.1 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 18.971 Et seq.
The Michigan statute in question, M.C.L. § 436.19e; M.S.A. § 18.990(5) provides in relevant part:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12 of Ordinance No. 133-B of the City of Grandville, which is being challenged in the present case, provides as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The issue here is whether the City of Grandville has the authority to prohibit the sale and consumption of beer and wine On plaintiff's business premises on Sunday, while allowing the sale of beer and wine on Sunday after 12 o'clock noon for consumption Off plaintiff's business premises.
Plaintiff argues that the language in M.C.L. § 436.19e; M.S.A. § 18.990(5) permits the city to either prohibit all Sunday sales of alcoholic liquor or to do nothing, and thereby permit all sales on Sunday. It is argued that Grandville is statutorily permitted to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages on Sunday, but is not statutorily permitted to ban some sales and allow others; that is, the authority to prohibit does not include the authority to impose less than an absolute ban. The defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the traditional rules of statutory construction, as supplemented by legislative history, indicates that the language of M.C.L. § 436.1 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 18.971 Et seq., confers upon cities the power to prohibit Sunday sales of beer and wine for consumption on the premises while permitting beer and wine sales for off-premises consumption. We agree with defendant's argument for two reasons.
First, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the Legislature is presumed to have intended the plain meaning of the words used by it. Gordon Grossman Building Co. v. Elliott, 382 Mich. 596, 603, 171 N.W.2d 441 (1969), Threet v. Pinkston, 20 Mich.App. 39, 41, 173 N.W.2d 731 (1969), Bullard v. Mult-A-Frame Co., 33 Mich.App. 678, 683, 190 N.W.2d 559 (1971). The word "prohibit" does have a plain meaning; 34 Words and Phrases, Prohibit, p. 459, says:
See also, 45 Am.Jur.2d, Intoxicating Liquors, § 22, p. 501.
We think the holding in People v. Blom, 120 Mich. 45, 78 N.W. 1015 (1899), is particularly appropriate here, for it rejects the very argument advanced by plaintiff that authority to prohibit does not include authority to impose less than an absolute ban. In Blom, the defendant had been convicted of violating a Holland, Michigan ordinance by selling liquor without a license from the city, although he had paid the requisite state taxes and furnished the bond required by state law. The Holland Charter authorized the city council to "prohibit and suppress * * * all places of resort for tippling and intemperance". However, rather than forbidding sales of liquor, the city council adopted an ordinance requiring saloons to be licensed and limiting the areas in town where they could operate. In short, the ordinance banned some sales but allowed others on the basis of geography. On appeal, defendant claimed that the city charter did not authorize the licensing of saloons, only their prohibition. By sustaining defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court necessarily rejected that argument and impliedly held that authority to "prohibit and prevent" includes the authority to do something less.
Thus, the "plain meaning" of the statutory term "prohibit" as used in M.C.L. § 436.19e; M.S.A. § 18.990(5) authorizes Grandville to impose a less than absolute ban on the sale of alcohol.
Secondly, we are convinced that the legislative history underlying § 19e supports this conclusion. Whenever a court is confronted with alternative interpretations of a statute, it must ascribe to the Legislature "(the) most probable and reasonable intention". Board of Education of Oakland Schools v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 392 Mich. 613, 619, 221 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1974), Collins v. Secretary of State, 384 Mich. 656, 666, 187 N.W.2d 423 (1971). Originally, the pertinent portion of § 19e read:
"The legislative body of any city, village or township may, by resolution or ordinance, prohibit the sale of alcoholic liquor for consumption On the premises on any Sunday * * * ." 1933 (Ex.Sess.) P.A. 8, § 19(19), and 1937 P.A. 281, § 19(18). (Emphasis supplied.)
This statute was submitted to the Attorney General for interpretation because some municipalities had adopted ordinances banning all Sunday sales of alcohol for consumption on, as well as off, the premises. It was his opinion that under the language of § 19e local legislative bodies were without power to prohibit the sale of alcohol for consumption Off the premises on Sunday, but that they could prohibit the sale of all alcohol for consumption on the premises. OAG, 1945-1946, No. 0-2350, p. 11 (July 14, 1944). A year later, the language giving local legislative bodies only the power to prohibit the Sunday sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises was deleted from the statute and the act was amended to its present form authorizing the general prohibition of the sale of alcohol for consumption on Sunday.
It cannot be assumed from this amendment that the Michigan Legislature intended to bestow upon local legislatures only the power to prohibit all Sunday liquor sales and not the power to allow some while prohibiting others. See 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 50 pp. 187-188. There is no indication that the Legislature's intent was to so severely limit local legislative bodies. Rather, it is more probable and reasonable to assume that, because the amendment deleted the "on the premises" limitation on local authority to regulate liquor sales, the Legislature intended to give...
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