Threet v. Pinkston, Docket No. 6009
Decision Date | 30 October 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 2,Docket No. 6009,2 |
Citation | 173 N.W.2d 731,20 Mich.App. 39 |
Parties | Billie M. THREET and Ruth Threet, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John PINKSTON, Defendant-Appellee |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Michael W. Evanoff, Flint, for appellants.
Brownell, Gault & Andrews, Flint, for appellee.
Before QUINN, P.J., and BRONSON and T. M. BURNS, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's dismissal of their personal injury action. The dismissal was on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
Billie M. Threet, defendant and defendant's son, William Pinkston, are fellow employees of Chevrolet Division of General Motors Corporation. The accident which gave rise to this action occurred January 8, 1966 in the parking lot of the employer at a time when Billie M. Threet and William Pinkston were on their way to work. Defendant had already reported for work. The automobile of Billie M. Threet was struck in the rear by an automobile owned by defendant but driven by William Pinkston.
Plaintiffs filed their action against defendant under the owners civil liability statute, M.C.L.A. § 257.401 (Stat.Ann.1968 Rev. § 9.2101). In denying jurisdiction, the trial court held that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was under the workmens compensation act, M.C.L.A. § 412.1 and § 413.15 (Stat.Ann.1968 Rev. §§ 17.151 and 17.189).
The Supreme Court has held that M.C.L.A. § 413.15, supra, bars a common law action by an employee agaisnt a co-employee for job related injury. See Sergeant v. Kennedy (1958), 352 Mich. 494, 90 N.W.2d 447, and Jones v. Bouza (1968), 381 Mich. 299, 160 N.W.2d 881. In each of those cases, the co-employee was an active tort feasor. Here plaintiffs contend that because defendant was not an active tort feasor, was in no way involved in the accident and the only basis of his liability is the owners civil liability statute, section 413.15 is no bar to the action.
The pertinent language of section 413.15 reads:
'Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies, but such injured employee or his dependents or their personal representative may also proceed to enforce the liability of such third party for damages in accordance with the provisions of this section.'
The statute speaks not of common law legal liability nor of an active tort feasor. It speaks plainly of 'under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ'. We may not attempt to rewrite ...
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...recognized that the judiciary cannot read restrictions or limitations into a statute that plainly contains none. Threet v. Pinkston, 20 Mich.App. 39, 41, 173 N.W.2d 731 (1969). The crux of this case is whether the broad assumption-of-risk subsection can be reconciled with the provisions (1)......
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...co-employee is immune from liability for such injury. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hutchinson, 453 S.W.2d 269 (Ky.1970); Threet v. Pinkston, 20 Mich.App. 39, 173 N.W.2d 731 (1970). This Court said in Bennett v. Buckner, 150 W.Va. 648, 149 S.E.2d 201 (1966), that in a personal injury action between......