Flores v. Barman
| Decision Date | 20 January 1955 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 27 Lab.Cas. P 68,964 Trinidad FLORES, as President, and Floyd Jones, as Treasurer, of and for and on behalf of Furniture Workers, Upholsterers and Wood Workers Union, Local 576, Independent, a voluntary unincorporated association and labor union, and its members, Petitioners and Appellants v. Cam BARMAN and Harry Sunshine, co-partners doing business as Crown Upholstering Company, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 20343. |
Margolis, McTernan & Branton and John T. McTernan, Los Angeles, for appellants.
Gendel & Raskoff and H. Miles Raskoff, Los Angeles, for respondents.
Appeal by petitioners from a judgment denying an application to confirm an award of an arbitrator and modifying the award.
Petitioners are officers of Furniture Workers, Upholsterers and Wood Workers Union, Local 576. They instituted the proceeding on behalf of the Union and its members. Crown Upholstering Company, referred to as 'the company,' is a partnership and the employer of members of the Union. On October 1, 1951, the company and the Union entered into a collective bargaining contract. The pertinent parts of the contract (article XIV) read:
'(a) This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until September 1, 1953, and thereafter annually; provided, however, that either party may terminate this Agreement or give notice of a desire to modify any portion thereof on said date, or at the end of any subsequent yearly period, by notifying the other party in writing to that effect not less than sixty (60) days prior to said date or not less than sixty (60) days prior to the end of any subsequent yearly anniversary.
The contract provided for the submission of unsettled controversies between the company and the Union to an 'Impartial Umpire' for decision and,
(Italics added.)
On June 26, 1953, the company in writing notified the Union it intended to terminate the contract on its expiration date, September, 1, 1953. The writing further stated:
'You are further notified that Crown Upholstering Company offers to meet with any authorized representatives of the Union for the purpose of negotiating a new contract, and will arrange a mutually satisfactory time and place for such negotiations, at any time after receipt by you of this notice and prior to September 1, 1953.
'You are further advised that if no agreement is reached on or before September 1, 1953, it is the intention of Crown Upholstering Company by this notice to terminate absolutely any and all obligations under the existing agreement as of September 1, 1953, and particularly any obligation to keep the existing agreement in force after September 1, 1953, or to make any new agreement retroactive to September 1, 1953.
'This notice is intended as the Notice of Termination referred to in Paragraph XIV of the existing Labor Agreement, and also in accordance with the provisions of Section 8(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.'
Petitioners replied in writing on July 1, 1953, stating the company's notice was in violation of the contract, by its terms the contract was to remain in effect pending negotiations toward a new one, and the new contract was to be retroactive to September 1, 1953.
On July 6, 1953, the company in writing denied the notification of June 26 constituted a violation of the contract; stated it had always complied with the terms of the contract and would continue to do so for its full term; reiterated its intention to 'terminate absolutely any and all obligations under the existing agreement as of September 1, 1953'; and repeated the statement of its intention to negotiate with the Union for a new contract to commence at the expiration of the existing contract. Negotiating meetings without results were held by the parties on July 3 and 10. Another union claimed to represent a majority of the employees of the company. Petitioner-Union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for an election. On July 23, 1953, the company in writing asked the Union if, in view of the question of representation, it (the Union) thought 'it would be proper for the employer to carry on further negotiations with you before this question is determined.' On August 5 a hearing was held by the National Labor Relations Board. The other union notified the board it did not desire to intervene. The company advised the board that inasmuch as the other union did not represent a majority of the employees, it desired to resume negotiations with petitioner-Union. On August 6, 1953, the Union requested resumption of negotiations.
Without waiting for a reply from the company, the Union, on August 6, requested the 'Impartial Umpire' to arbitrate the controversy--with the statement that the issue was:
'Has the Company the unilateral right to abrogate Article XIV(b) and does the Contract continue in full force and effect after September 1, 1953, pending negotiations and agreement on a new Agreement.'
On August 7 the company expressed a willingness to resume negotiations. Nevertheless, the 'Impartial Umpire' proceeded to hear the matter on August 11. The company objected to arbitration, and reserved its objection at all times, contending before the 'Impartial Umpire' that the right to terminate the contract was purely a matter of law and that there was no decision an arbitrator could make in the matter. The award of the 'Impartial Umpire,' made on August 17, was:
'The Company does not have the unilateral right to abrogate Article XIV(b) and the Contract continues in full force and effect after September 1, 1953 pending negotiations and agreement on a new Agreement or until all negotiations end.'
After the award, the company again expressed a willingness to continue negotiations in an effort to reach a new contract by September 1, 1953.
On September 10, 1953, the Union applied to the superior court for an order confirming the award. The company answered and filed a counter application for an order vacating the award. The court denied the application to confirm, denied the application to vacate, and modified the award to provide:
'The Company does have the right to terminate that certain collective bargaining agreement dated October 1, 1951, on its expiration date, to wit, September 1, 1953, by virtue of the written notice given by the Company to the Union on June 26, 1953.'
The Union appeals.
Appellants' contentions are: 1. The trial court erred by examining the merits of the controversy decided by the arbitrator and substituting its judgment for that of the arbitrator. 2. In any event, the arbitrator's construction of the contract is sound, as a matter of law.
Construction of the contract involved a pure question of law. No extrinsic evidence was received by the arbitrator. The interpretation of a written instrument based solely on the terms of the instrument without the aid of extrinsic evidence presents a question of law. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819, 826-827, 167 P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685.
The superior court must make an order vacating the award where the arbitrator exceeded his powers. Code Civ.Proc. § 1288(c). Petitioners assert that the merits of the controversy and errors of law are not reviewable. The question is not one of review of the issues before the arbitrator. It is one of determining his powers. '[I]n the absence of some limiting clause in the arbitration agreement,i the merits of the award, either on questions of fact or of law, may not be reviewed except as provided in the statute.' Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 186, 260 P.2d 156, 172. (Italics added.)
The powers of the arbitrator are derived from and limited by the contract. Bierlein v. Johnson, 73 Cal.App.2d 728, 733, 166 P.2d 644. He has no legal right to decide a question which the contract expressly says he shall have no power to decide. If in the present case he decided such a question, the trial court properly held he exceeded his powers. Bierlein v. Johnson, supra. In Screen etc. Guild v. Walt Disney Productions, 74 Cal.App.2d 414, 168 P.2d 983, 984, the contract provided that any ruling or decree of the arbitrator 'shall not be in conflict with the express provisions of this agreement' and "this agreement shall constitute the basis upon which such decision shall be rendered." The contract in the 13th clause provided that five days shall constitute a 'work week.' The arbitrator ruled that the 'work week' mentioned in the contract was a 7-day week. The court held, 74 Cal.App.2d at page 418, 168 P.2d at page 985: '[I]n construing the work week to include Saturday, the arbiter's ruling was in direct conflict with the express terms of the bargaining contract, and thus exceeded the powers conferred upon him under clause thirteenth, heretofore quoted.' See also Hanes v. Coffee, 212 Cal. 777, 779-780, 300 P. 963; Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal.App.2d 779, 784, 254 P.2d 613; Stetson v. Orland Oil Syndicate, 42 Cal.App.2d 139, 143, 108 P.2d 463.
In the case at hand it is clear that the...
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