Flores v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1973
• Citation: 30 Cal.App.3d 681,106 Cal.Rptr. 543
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Raymond FLORES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Appellant; McDONNELL DOUGLAS AERONAUTICS COMPANY, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Civ. 40272.

Page 543

106 Cal.Rptr. 543

30 Cal.App.3d 681

Raymond FLORES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Appellant;

McDONNELL DOUGLAS AERONAUTICS COMPANY, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Civ. 40272.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 21, 1973.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward M Belasco, and Thomas E Warriner, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent and appellant.

Jonathan B. Steiner, Los Angeles, for petitioner and respondent.

No appearance for real party in interest.

FILES, Presiding Justice.

This is a mandate proceeding filed in the superior court by a claimant for unemployment insurance benefits to review a decision of the respondent Appeals Board. The superior court gave judgment ordering the Appeals Board to hear claimant's case on its merits. The board has appealed from that judgment.

The issue here involves the interpretation and application of section 1328 of the Unemployment Insurance Code which establishes the time for an appeal by a claimant after a summary administrative ruling against him.

This appeal was brought upon the judgment roll. (Rule 5(f), California Rules of Court.) The facts shown by the trial court's findings follow:

After the claimant was discharged by his employer on September 4, 1970, he applied for unemployment insurance benefits. On October 13, 1970, the local unemployment insurance office sent to the claimant a notice of determination, informing him that he was ineligible for benefits. The notice stated 'This decision is final unless an appeal is filed on or before 10--23--0.'

On October 14, 1970, the claimant visited a legal aid office and consulted an attorney there, who agreed to handle the appeal. The attorney prepared a notice of appeal and a letter of transmittal in time to meet the October 23 deadline. But because of the large caseload processed through the attorney's office and the backlog of secretarial work, the claimant's appeal was not typed and mailed out until October 25, and was not received at the unemployment insurance office until Monday, October 26.

The referee's decision was to dismiss the appeal upon the ground it was untimely filed. In support of this decision he found that the appeal had been prepared in time but was filed late because of the internal office procedure in the office of the claimant's attorney, and concluded that the claimant had not shown good cause for extending the 10 day period.

The claimant appealed to the respondent California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, which affirmed the decision of the referee. The claimant then commenced this proceeding in the superior court. The court heard the case upon the administrative record, and found that the referee's decision was unsupported by the weight of the evidence, and that the claimant had shown good cause for extending the 10 day period. The judgment of the superior court remanded the case to the respondent board to be determined on its merits. ¹

Unemployment Insurance Code section 1328 provides, so far as pertinent here:

'The claimant . . . may appeal (from the administrative determination) to a referee within 10 days from mailing or personal service of notice of the determination. The 10-day period may be extended for good cause.'

The statute is ambiguous in that it does not clearly indicate whether the 10 day period can be extended only upon an application made before the period has expired, or whether the referee or board may also grant relief from default upon a showing made after the period has expired. In this case it appears that each considered the claimant's request for an extension, even though it was received after the period had expired, without expressing any doubt about the power to do so. In two other reported cases it appears that the referee entertained (but refused to grant) a claimant's request for relief after the 10 day period had expired. (See Perez v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 62, 65, 83 Cal.Rptr. 871; Hicks v. Sheffield (1972)23 Cal.App.3d 441, 100 Cal.Rptr. 274.) ²

Although the board's interpretation is not binding upon the courts, the interpretation of a statute by the officials charged with its administration is entitled to great weight. (See Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 753, 756, 151 P.2d 233.) It is hardly necessary to mention that this particular statute is remedial and 'must be liberally construed for the purpose of accomplishing its objects.' (Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 33, 43, 168 P.2d 686, 692.)

The 10 day limitation for filing appeals is doubtless intended to expedite the disposition of claims, but no purpose is served by imposing forfeiture where the delay is minimal and there is no prejudice to others. Where the period for filing an appeal is as short as 10 days, it is expectable that there will be some defaults due to unavoidable circumstances, inadvertence or excusable neglect. Considering the remedial nature of the statute, it seems manifest that the Legislature intended to empower the referee to hear and determine applications for relief received after the 10 day period had expired.

Considering the explanation given for the delay, which was found to be true, and the amount of time involved, the...