Florida Citrus Commission v. Owens

• Decision Date: 26 November 1969
• Docket Number: No. 1565,1565
• Parties: The FLORIDA CITRUS COMMISSION and Indian River Citrus League, Appellants, v. William E. OWENS et al., Appellees. . Fourth District
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 840

239 So.2d 840

The FLORIDA CITRUS COMMISSION and Indian River Citrus League, Appellants, v. William E. OWENS et al., Appellees.

No. 1565.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Nov. 26, 1969.

On Rehearing Oct. 9, 1970.

William P. Tomasello, Bartow, for appellant Florida Citrus Commission.

Monterey Campbell, III, of Tomasello, Campbell, Dunlap & Norris, Bartow, for appellant Florida Citrus Commission (on rehearing only).

Sherman N. Smith, Jr., of Smith, Heath, Smith & O'Haire, Vero Beach, and Counts Johnson, Tampa, for appellant Indian River Citrus League.

E. Snow Martin, of Martin & Martin, Lakeland, for appellee William E. Owens.

BARNS, PAUL D., Associate Judge.

The Florida Citrus Commission was a defendant to a suit in equity by the plaintiff-appellee, Owens, seeking an injunction enjoining the Commission from enforcing its regulations which regulations would prohibit Owens from marketing citrus fruit labeled, 'Indian River' fruit. From a final decree granting the injunction, the Commission appealed. We affirm.

The appellants' attorneys on this appeal have failed and neglected to state in their briefs with the points argued any assignment of error giving rise to the point, as is their duty in compliance with F.A.R. 3.7(f)(4), 32 F.S.A., which rule requires that 'Specific assignments of error from which the points argued arise should be stated, * * *.' Reversal on appeal is not to be expected in the absence of judicial error of the lower court assigned, stated and argued in appellants' brief. Professional advocacy requires that the judicial errors relied on for reversal should be stated in the brief with points argued, even in the absence of a rule requiring it.

For some fifteen years Owens had been marketing citrus fruit grown in Range 39 E, near Indiantown in Martin County on the west side of the range line dividing Ranges 39 and 40, which citrus fruit was labeled, 'Indian River' fruit. Indian River citrus fruit brings a premium price in the market because of its quality.

Of the eighteen assignments of error the points argued appear to come within the scope of two assignments, viz.: (1) that the lower court erred in its order denying the appellants' motions to dismiss the complaint; and (2) that the court erred in its final decree in favor of the plaintiff.

The appellants argue in support of the assignment that the court erred in denying appellants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff-appellee is required to seek relief before the Florida Citrus Commission as provided by F.S. Section 601.12, F.S.A. The law applicable to this point as to the jurisdiction of a court of equity to entertain plaintiff's suit is answered by the law as stated in an attack on a zoning ordinance by a suit in equity reviewed in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 1926, 272 'A motion was made in the court below to dismiss the bill on the ground that, because complainant (appellee) had made no effort to obtain a building permit or apply to the zoning board of appeals for relief, as it might have done under the terms of the ordinance, the suit was premature. The motion was properly overruled. The (sic) effect of the allegations of the bill is that the ordinance of its own force operates greatly to reduce the value of appellee's lands and destroy their marketability for industrial, commercial and residential uses, and the attack is directed, not against any specific provision or provisions, but against the ordinance as an entirety. Assuming the premises, the existence and maintenance of the ordinance in effect constitutes a present invasion of appellee's property rights and a threat to continue it. Under these circumstances, the equitable jurisdiction is clear. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468.'

U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016, wherein it is stated:

Owens could probably have sought relief by petition for writ of certiorari. The certiorari jurisdiction of a court is discretionary as distinguished from the obligatory jurisdiction of a court of equity when there is no plain, full, adequate and complete relief otherwise available. The lower court did not err in denying appellants' motions to dismiss the complaint; it was sufficient in substance to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the court, and plaintiff was not required to pursue administrative relief before seeking relief in equity. The distinctions in substance between law and equity in the federal and state systems of jurisprudence has not been affected by the new unified rules of pleading, practice and procedure. The circuit court's jurisdiction in suits in equity is conferred by Fla.Const. art. V, § 6(3), F.S.A.

The findings of fact by the Chancellor and his conclusions as set forth in his final decree are as follows:

CHANCELLOR'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

'This is a suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief brought by (Owens) a citrus grower against the Florida Citrus Commission as a result of the adoption by the Commission of Amendment 36 to Regulation 105--1.03 and Amendment 4 to Regulation 105--1.09. The Prosecuting Attorney and Sheriff are joined as defendants in order to prevent the arrest and prosecution of the Plaintiff for violation of the Commission regulations.

'The Indian River Citrus League is a non-profit grower-owned and grower-controlled co-operative association without capital stock whose membership is composed of approximately 1650 growers engaged in the production of approximately ninety percent of the citrus fruit grown in the Indian River citrus area. It was permitted to intervene (as a party defendant). * * *

'The Florida Citrus Commission proposed the adoption of the amendments cited above and published them June 22 and 23, 1966. A number of growers filed protests to the adoption of the amendments and a hearing was held before the Commission's attorney as hearing officer. This officer made findings and conclusions recommending that the protests be denied and that the amendments remain in full force and effect. Certain growers protested the proposed findings and conclusions and a hearing was held before the Commission on December 21, 1966, at which time the Commission adopted the findings, conclusions, and order recommended by the hearing officer and directed that the regulations become immediately effective. The Plaintiff herein was not a protestant in the proceedings before the Commission.

'* * *.

'Essentially this suit involves the problem whether the Florida Citrus Commission may by regulation prevent the Plaintiff from using what is, in effect, a form of common trademark or trade name, 'Indian River'. It is clear from the evidence submitted in this case, all of which was presented by the Plaintiff, that citrus fruit labeled 'Indian River' brings a premium upon the retail market. It is also clear that for fifteen years the Plaintiff has so labeled fruit and has built a substantial business as a result. Under these regulations as amended by the Commission, however, fruit grown upon Plaintiff's leased property could not bear the Indian River label and would be considered 'Interior fruit'.

'In 1947 the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States entered an order establishing regulation areas one and two with respect to marketing agreements and the handling of oranges, grapefruit, and tangerines in Florida. Subsequently Federal marketing orders 905, 912 and 913 were entered by the Secretary similarly defining the two regulation areas. These orders do not, however, control the instant problem because they do not purport to limit or define the labeling of fruit. Under the regulations adopted by the Florida Citrus Commission, however, the labeling of fruit as Indian River Citrus would be limited to fruit grown in Federal regulation area two and the label interior citrus fruit would be limited to fruit produced in Federal regulation area one. Insofar as Martin County is concerned, the division between regulation areas one and two is the range line between ranges 39 and 40 east. That portion of the county lying east of the line would be permitted to use the Indian River label and that portion of the county lying west of the line would be restricted to the interior label. Plaintiff's grove lies in Range 39 East and is, accordingly, just west of the dividing line and outside the proposed Indian River area.

'It further appears from the evidence that prior to 1947 most of the citrus grown in Martin County was grown east of the line in question although the evidence discloses that Plaintiff's grove and another, called Bower grove, were in existence as early as 1906. The evidence further shows that subsequent to 1947 many additional acres west of the dividing line have been put into citrus production. The evidence presented by the Plaintiff included the testimony of the vice president and director of grove operations for Minute Maid Corporation who personally recommended and purchased 8,100 acres in Martin County west of the dividing line. It requires no particular insight to speculate that the movement of such a major citrus producer into the disputed area has precipitated the problem under consideration.

'The Plaintiff testified that for the past fifteen years he has been growing and selling in the Indiantown, Florida area upon property leased in Township 40 South, Range 39 East. Forty percent of his total income comes from gift shipping which is advertised as and bears the Indian River citrus label. If he is prohibited from using such a label he would lose the investment he has in his current inventory of boxes and advertising materials, would lose the premium price he obtains for his gift shipped fruit, and would lose the advantage he has in selling fresh fruit to retailers who prefer such fruit over Interior citrus. He...