Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Bd. v. Everglades Laundry

• Decision Date: 21 April 1939
• Citation: 137 Fla. 290,188 So. 380
• Parties: FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD v. EVERGLADES LAUNDRY, Inc., et al. ECONOMY CASH & CARRY LAUNDRY, Inc., et al. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD v. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD v. ECONOMY CASH & CARRY LAUNDRY, Inc., et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

188 So. 380

137 Fla. 290

FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD v. EVERGLADES LAUNDRY, Inc., et al. ECONOMY CASH & CARRY LAUNDRY, Inc., et al. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD v. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING AND LAUNDRY BOARD v. ECONOMY CASH & CARRY LAUNDRY, Inc., et al.

Florida Supreme Court

April 21, 1939

Bill of injunction by the Everglades Laundry, Incorporated; by the Economy Cash & Carry Laundry, Incorporated, and others; by the Economy Cash & Carry Cleaners, Incorporated; and the French Benzol Cleaners, Incorporated, against the Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, an instrumentality of the State of Florida, to restrain the enforcement of price-fixing orders, and from enforcing the collection of license taxes as required by Acts 1937, c. 17894. From the decree, the Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board appealed in two separate proceedings, and the Economy Cash & Carry Laundry Incorporated, and others appealed in one proceeding.

Reversed with directions.

BROWN J., dissenting.

COUNSEL

E. F P. Brigham and Sibley, Giblin & Schroeder, all of Miami, and Whitfield & Whitfield and Harry Wells, all of Tallahassee, for appellants.

George Couper Gibbs, Atty. Gen., Lawrence Truett, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Hoffman & Robinson and Walsh, Beckham & Ellis, all of Miami, for appellees.

George Holt, of Miami, amicus curiae.

OPINION

TERRELL Chief Justice.

In August, 1938, Economy Cash and Carry Laundry, Inc., Economy Cash and Carry Cleaners, Inc., and French Benzol Cleaners, Inc., as complainants, filed their bill of complaint in the Circuit Court praying that the Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, as defendant, be enjoined from instituting any action against them for the purpose of coercing them (complainants) to observe all price fixing orders promulgated by said defendant and from enforcing the collection of any license taxes from complainants as required by Chapter 17894, Acts of 1937.

A temporary restraining order was granted as prayed for. The defendant, Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, then came to this Court and sought a writ of prohibition against the Circuit Court from proceeding further in the cause. A rule nisi was issued which was on hearing discharged and the rule was dismissed. This appeal is from the temporary restraining order, the pertinent part of which is as follows:

'It is considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Defendants, and each of them, their officers, agents, servants, attorneys and employees, be and they are each here severally restrained and enjoined, until the further order of this Court, from enforcing or attempting to enforce against the Plaintiffs, or either of them, any price fixing order promulgated or passed by the Defendants, or either or any of them, and they are each hereby further enjoined, until the further order of this Court, from instituting any action of any nature whatsoever against these Plaintiffs, or either of them, for the purpose of compelling them to pay any license taxes authorized by Chapter 17894, of the Acts of Florida for the year 1937, and fixed and determined by the Defendants or either of them.'

On this appeal, several questions are urged, but the main question with which we are confronted is the correctness vel non of the temporary restraining order and whether or not the plaintiffs below, appellees in this Court, adopted the proper remedy to secure the relief they seek.

The contend that Chapter 17894, Acts of 1937, about which they complain, is unreasonable and unconstitutional as to them because they do a cash and carry business as distinguished from a delivery business and that the said act was designed to eliminate them from the laundry business and to destroy their business. They also contend that the legislative finding that said act was passed in response to public demand and necessity is without foundation or basis in fact.

The constitutional validity of Chapter 17894, Acts of 1937, was approved and upheld in Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, Fla., 183 So. 759, 119 A.L.R. 956. That holding was predicated entirely on the asserted invalidity of the act as such. The procedure followed, the prices fixed, and other results incident to the administration of the act were not before us and were not considered in the last cited case.

The constitutional validity of Chapter 17894 in so far as relates to the legislative power to enact it is accordingly a closed question, but the reasonableness of the prices fixed under it and other questions pertaining to its administration as applied to complainant's business are open and may be raised by them.

While we held in the last cited case that a legislative declaration to the effect that a business demands regulation under the police power is not conclusive but is subject to judicial review, we do not find sufficient showing in the record here to overthrow the finding of the legislature on this point. The legislature is the primary judge of this matter and unless its action is palpably wrong, it will not be disturbed.

Section 13 of Chapter 17894, provides that 'any person, firm or corporation deeming themselves aggrieved by any action of the Board taken under and of the provisions of this Act which has resulted in the granting of a final order by the said Board, may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of the order of this Board, file a bill of complaint in Chancery in the Circuit Court of the Circuit where the main head-quarters of the Board is located, seeking to reverse, vacate or modify the said order complained of, together with such other relief in equity as plaintiff might deem himself entitled to and such Court may thereafter proceed to hear and dispose of the same as in other proceedings in Chancery'.

In respect to the procedure required to secure relief under the act as quoted, we held in State ex rel. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board v. Atkinson et al., 188 So. 834, decided November 19, 1938, that it was not essential that those aggrieved by orders of the Board first apply to it for relief before invoking the aid of the Circuit Court.

The law merely provides that the party aggrieved by orders of the Board may seek relief by Bill in Chancery. In this case, relief was sought by injunction. Some other remedy may have been as effective. The act is prima facie valid. It has been held to be a proper exercise of legislative power and, being so, it was error on the showing made for the Court to suspend its operation by temporary injunction pending the final disposition of the cause on the merits.

The...