Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Knowles

• Decision Date: 25 November 1914
• Citation: 67 So. 122,68 Fla. 400
• Parties: FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO. v. KNOWLES.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

67 So. 122

68 Fla. 400

FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO. v. KNOWLES.

Florida Supreme Court

November 25, 1914

Error to Circuit Court, Putnam County; J. T. Wills, Judge.

Action by John Knowles against the Florida East Coast Railway Company, a corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The object of judicial proceedings is to ascertain and to decide upon disputes between parties. In order to do this, it is indispensable that the point or points in controversy be evolved and distinctly presented for decision. The pleadings in an action at law are designed to develop and present the precise points in dispute, and they should be characterized with certainty, clearness, and conciseness. The administration of justice is a practical affair, and the pleadings should not be converted, or rather perverted, into logomachies or logic chopping.

In actions at law, where the negligence of the defendant is the basis of recovery, it is not necessary for the declaration to set out the facts constituting such negligence, but an allegation of sufficient acts causing injury to the plaintiff, coupled with an allegation that such acts were negligently done, will be sufficient.

Where a declaration is filed in an action at law containing unnecessary counts, the trial court is warranted in requiring a compulsory amendment thereof of its own motion, under the provisions of section 1433 of the General Statutes of 1906 of Florida.

A special plea tendering an issue covered by the plea of not guilty should be stricken out either on motion of the plaintiff or by the court of its own motion, under section 1433 of the General Statutes of 1906, of Florida, as tending to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action.

The practice of assigning a large or unnecessary number of errors is disapproved.

There is a clear distinction in the functions performed by a demurrer to a pleading and a motion for the compulsory amendment thereof, and this distinction should be observed. They cannot be used interchangeably and indiscriminately employed, as they are governed by essentially different rules of procedure.

A case should not be taken from the jury unless the conclusion follows from the evidence as matter of law that no recovery can be lawfully had upon any view taken of facts that the evidence tends to establish.

In passing upon a single instruction or charge it should be considered in connection with all the other instructions and charges bearing on the same subject, and if, when thus considered, the law appears to have been fairly presented to the jury, an assignment predicated upon the giving of such instruction or charge must fail, unless under all the peculiar circumstances of the case the court is of the opinion that such instruction or charge was calculated to confuse, mislead, or prejudice the jury.

Only such instructions should be requested by either the plaintiff or defendant as bear upon the law of the case, and will aid the jury in trying and determining the issues, as unnecessary instructions afford opportunities for error, and are burdensome to the courts. When a large number of instructions are given, they are also well calculated to confuse and mislead the jury.

In passing upon an assignment based upon the ruling of the trial court in denying a motion for a new trial, which questions the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the guiding principle for an appellate court is not what it may think the jury ought to have done, or what such court may think it would have done had it been sitting as a jury in the case, but whether as reasonable men the jury could have found such verdict from the evidence adduced. If this question can be answered in the affirmative, the action of the trial court upon such motion should not be disturbed.

Applications for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence are looked upon by the courts with distrust and disfavor, and are granted only under the following restrictions: (1) The evidence must have been discovered since the former trial (2) the party must have used diligence to procure it on the former trial; (3) it must be material to the issue; (4) it must go to the merits of the cause, and not merely to impeach the character of a witness; (5) it must not be merely cumulative; (6) it must be such as ought to produce on another trial an opposite result on the merits. The party applying must make his vigilance apparent, for if it is left even doubtful that he knew of the evidence, or that he might but for negligence, have known of and produced it, he will not succeed in his application.

COUNSEL Alex St. Clair-Abrams, of Jacksonville, and E E. Haskell, of Palatka, for plaintiff in error.

Hilburn & Merryday, of Palatka, for defendant in error.

OPINION

SHACKLEFORD C.J.

John Knowles brought an action against the Florida East Coast Railway Company, a corporation, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $3,000. The original declaration consists of four counts, to which the defendant interposed a demurrer upon a number of grounds, some of which were directed to the declaration as an entirety and others to the separate counts, which demurrer was overruled. Subsequent to such ruling the plaintiff, by leave of court, amended his declaration by adding four additional counts, making eight counts in all. To the declaration as amended the defendant filed nine pleas, some of which were designated as amended pleas, and were quite lengthy. The plaintiff joined issue upon all of the pleas and a trial was had before a jury. ...