Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Hurtado

Decision Date07 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 75624,75624
Citation587 So.2d 1314
Parties16 Fla. L. Weekly S720 FLORIDA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Rigoberto HURTADO, et ux., Respondents.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

George A. Vaka of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, for petitioner.

Mark J. Feldman, P.A., Miami, and John Beranek of Aurell, Radey, Hinkle & Thomas, Tallahassee, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Hurtado v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co., 557 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), which expressly and directly conflicts with American States Insurance Co. v. Kelley, 446 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 456 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1984), and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trombley, 445 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). 1

On October 26, 1987, Rigoberto Hurtado was severely injured in an automobile accident when the vehicle he drove collided with a vehicle owned and driven by an uninsured motorist. Hurtado was employed as a mechanic by Miranda Groves and Nurseries, Inc. (Miranda). At the time of the accident, Hurtado was operating a vehicle owned by Miranda and provided to Hurtado as part of his employment benefits. All insurance, maintenance costs, and registration fees were paid by Miranda, and Hurtado was allowed to use the vehicle for both business and personal use. He also was allowed to use all other vehicles owned by his employer.

Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. (Florida Farm) issued to Miranda a "business auto policy" in which Miranda was the named insured. The policy defined an "insured" as anyone using a covered auto with permission of the named insured. This policy covered Hurtado's vehicle as well as ten other vehicles owned by Miranda. The policy provided uninsured motorist coverage of $300,000 per person and $500,000 per accident on each of the eleven vehicles, with separate premiums charged for that coverage. Florida Farm does not contest that Hurtado was insured under the policy. The disputed issue is whether Hurtado is entitled to stack the coverages on each of the corporately owned vehicles for a total of $3.3 million or is limited to $300,000 on the vehicle he was driving.

The trial court precluded the stacking and granted Florida Farm's motion for summary judgment. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Hurtado was entitled to stack the available uninsured motorist coverage on automobile policies issued to his corporate employer under section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1987). 2 Florida Farm seeks review, contending that only named insureds or their immediate family members may stack insurance benefits under well-established case law. Florida Farm asserts that Hurtado is neither the named insured nor a family member, and thus he is not entitled to stack under his corporate employer's policy. Florida Farm relies on American States Insurance Co. v. Kelley, 446 So.2d at 1085, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trombley, 445 So.2d at 709, which construed section 627.4132 as permitting only named insureds and their resident family members to stack multiple uninsured motorist coverage.

We begin by noting that there is nothing on the face of section 627.4132 to preclude Hurtado from receiving the benefits of stacking. Indeed, the statute generally prohibits stacking but specifically excludes uninsured motorist coverage from the prohibition. Florida Farm's argument, however, derives from case law antedating legislation on stacking which established classifications of beneficiaries entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. To resolve the issue in this case, we must trace the history of stacking in Florida and examine the applicability or the continued viability of these classifications.

Originally, stacking in Florida was not addressed by the legislature at all and was first permitted by the Court in Tucker v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 288 So.2d 238 (Fla.1973). In Tucker, the plaintiff, whose daughter was injured by an uninsured motorist, had uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $10,000 on each of his two vehicles. The policy expressly prohibited the stacking of the coverage on the two vehicles. The Court held that such an exclusion from coverage was prohibited by the uninsured motorist statute, and thus the insurance company could not preclude a named insured from stacking the available coverage. The Court relied in part on its prior opinion in Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla.1971), which did not involve stacking, but did determine that under Florida law, an insurance company could not exclude a named insured from uninsured motorist coverage even though the named insured was not operating a vehicle insured under the policy.

In Mullis, Shelby Mullis and his son Richard sued State Farm to collect uninsured motorist benefits under two policies that insured two automobiles owned by Mullis. Richard, who was insured under the policy because he was a relative residing in the household, had been injured by an uninsured motorist while operating a motorcycle that was not covered under either policy. The policies excluded coverage for bodily injury if the injury did not occur in a vehicle specifically insured under the policy. The Court held that such an exclusion was legally impermissible under Florida law and that Mullis purchased uninsured motorist coverage intending for that coverage to be available to himself and members of his family as if the uninsured motorist had liability insurance in conformance with Florida law:

Whenever bodily injury is inflicted upon named insured or insured members of his family by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, under whatever conditions, locations or circumstances, any of such insureds happen to be in at the time, they are covered by uninsured motorist liability insurance issued pursuant to the requirements of Section 627.0851[, Florida Statutes (1965) ].

252 So.2d at 233.

The Court went on to note that this rationale was inapplicable to those who were not named insureds or resident family members:

This, of course, would not be the case as to other persons potentially covered who are not in the class of the named insured and relatives resident in the Mullis household. These latter are protected only if they receive bodily injury due to the negligence of an uninsured motorist while they occupy the insured automobile of the named insured with his permission or consent.

Id. Subsequent cases recognized and applied the Mullis class distinction: class one consisting of the named insured and resident family members; and class two consisting of those who are insured only because they are drivers or passengers in an insured vehicle with the consent of the named insured. See, e.g., Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Johnson, 392 So.2d 1348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Hunt v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 349 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pac, 337 So.2d 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 351 So.2d 407 (Fla.1977).

In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Pac, 337 So.2d at 397, the Second District denied the stacking claim of an injured party who was a class-two insured; he was driving an insured vehicle but was not a named insured or resident family member. The court applied the combined rationales of Tucker and Mullis and concluded that although stacking was allowed for class-one insureds, it was not allowed for class-two insureds. Id. at 398.

In 1976, the legislature directly addressed stacking for the first time by enacting chapter 76-266, section 10, Laws of Florida (codified at section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976)). This statute expressly prohibited the stacking of coverages, including uninsured motorist coverage. It provided:

627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited.--If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident. However, if none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds.

Sec. 627.4132, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1976) (emphasis added). Since class-two insureds were already prohibited from stacking under the then-current case law, this statute operated only to prohibit class-one insureds from stacking as well.

In 1980, the legislature changed its mind with reference to uninsured motorist coverage and amended the statute. The words "uninsured motorist" were deleted from the first sentence and a new sentence was added stating that the antistacking section did not apply to uninsured motorist coverage. See ch. 80-364, Sec. 1, Laws of Fla. (amending Sec. 627.4132, Fla.Stat. (1979)). The law, as amended, provided:

627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited.--If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident. However, if none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to uninsured motorist coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds.

Id. ...

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